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ABSTRACT

The study‘s main purpose is to propose a governance framework that meets the
priority of sustainable development for the regulation of offshore renewable resources in
the OECS region. The study develops an analytical framework for evaluating the recently
adopted ―Round 3 model of governance‖ for the regulation of offshore wind and other
marine activities in the United Kingdom. The focus is on the licensing procedures
applicable to offshore wind development. Thereafter, the study examines the
appropriateness of the application of the Round 3 model to the regulation of marine
renewables in the OECS, and makes recommendations in that regard.
Additionally, through the study of marine renewable resource development, this
thesis looks at general conditions for effective ocean governance. In this regard, the thesis
argues that strict hierarchical governance of the marine environment is not a desirable
approach to effective ocean governance.
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CHAPTER ONE
Introduction

1.1

Background Information
The fancy of the Caribbean lies in the shameless promise of heaven on earth

offered by pristine sandy beaches and exciting marine adventures, all wrapped in the
seclusion and tranquility of untouched charm. For many of these low-lying paradises,
particularly in the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) region, 1 the tourism
industry alone relies heavily on the natural beauty of coastal environments and the
ecosystem biodiversity characteristic of the Caribbean Sea and the Atlantic Ocean.
Together, this package provides the primary means for economic sustenance and survival
for many OECS states. Beyond tourism however, these bodies of water service many
other competing interests and uses. The ocean spaces have long been the epicenter for
many environmental, social, cultural and economic benefits which range from oil and gas
exploration to aquaculture, fishing, boat racing, leisure, down to navigation, shipping and
trade. The coastal and marine ecosystems therefore, have always been especially
vulnerable to human interventions and their escalating demands for the sustenance of
modern standards of living. While the region has made substantial efforts to balance the

1

The OECS is a sub-regional economic union created in 1981 by the Treaty of Basseterre (See, Treaty of
Bassettere, Bassettere, 18 June 1981, online: The Organization of Eastern Caribbean States
<http://www.oecs.org>.) Today, its membership comprises the countries of Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda,
Commonwealth of Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, Saint Lucia, Saint Kitts and Nevis and Saint Vincent
and the Grenadines. The Mission of the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States is to be a Center of
Excellence contributing to the sustainable development of OECS Member States by supporting their
strategic insertion into the global economy while maximizing the benefits accruing from their collective
space.

1

interests of the marine environment against modern standards of living, the impacts of
climate change threaten to distort this equilibrium.
Most energy supplies come from the burning of fossil fuels. Combustion releases
large amounts of pollutants into the atmosphere, particularly carbon emissions that cause
global warming.2 However, for quite some time, there has been a denial of any
correlation between fossil fuel use and global warming. 3 Recently, the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has settled the science on the matter, at least for the
time being that is. They note that: ―[g]lobal atmospheric concentrations of carbon
dioxide, methane and nitrous oxide have increased markedly as a result of human
activities since 1750. […] The global increases in carbon dioxide concentration are due
primarily to fossil fuel use and land use change, while those of methane and nitrous oxide
are due to agriculture.‖4 However, there are still some who doubt the findings of the
IPCC. While there are still skeptics, the numbers are low and the IPCC appears to be the
most comprehensive and credible source of information on climate change. 5 Climate
change is real and is happening. Global average increases in air and ocean temperatures
2

Susan Soloman et al, Summary for Policymakers. In: Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis.
Contribution of Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007) at 2 [Soloman, ―Summary for
Policymakers‖].
3
See e.g. Dr. Edward F. Blick, Global Warming Myth and Marxism: How the U.N. and Marxist Economies
Have Used the Global Warming Myth to Wreck World Economies, (USA: Southwest Radio Church of the
Air, 2009) [Blick, ―Global Warming Myth‖].
4
Soloman, ―Summary for Policymakers‖, supra note 2.
5
The IPCC was formed by the World Meteorological Organization and the United Nations Environmental
Programme in 1988 to further understandings of global climate change. Since its formation, the IPCC has
published four comprehensive assessments on global climate change in addition to several ancillary special
reports. By way of example, the IPCC‘s Fourth Assessment Report drew together 450 scientists from all
over the world. In drafting the Report, 800 contributing authors gave specialized inputs while
approximately 2500 experts reviewed the document providing a total of 90,000 comments. The reports are
used worldwide, most notably by state parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change and its Kyoto Protocol, as a credible and comprehensive source of information on climate change,
its potential impacts, and options to adapt to or mitigate climate change. See generally, Rajendra Pachauri,
―A Mistake about Glaciers does not Negative Climate Change‖ The Sydney Morning Herald (30 March
2010), online: <http://www.smh.com.au> [Pachauri, ―Climate Change‖].

2

pose immediate threats to the integrity of the environment.6 The IPCC has predicted that
climate change, if unabated, will heavily impact freshwater resources,7 ecosystems8, crop
productivity9 and coastal systems and low-lying areas.10 Specifically, small island states,
such as those that constitute the OECS, are especially vulnerable to the effects of climate
change and sea-level rise due to their limited size, proneness to natural hazards and
external shocks, and low adaptive capacity. 11 Some of the immediate threats of global
warming that impact the overall tourism product and the environmental sustainability of
OECS countries include for instance, the destruction of marine ecosystems through ocean
acidification and coral bleaching, and the demolition of coastal barriers. These impacts
reduce the amenity value for coastal users and tourists. 12 Such irreversible catastrophes
inherently shock other economic activities such as the fishing industry and disrupt sociocultural norms of coastal populations. The effects of global warming are never-ending,
irreversible and cannot be ignored.13 To avoid dangerous atmospheric temperatures, the
IPPC has recommended long-term stabilization of GHG concentrations in the

6

Soloman, ―Summary for Policymakers‖, supra note 2 at 5.
Martin L. Parry et al., Summary for Policymakers. In: Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and
Vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (Cambridge: Cambridge Printing Press, 2007) at 11 [Parry, ―Summary for
Policymakers‖].
8
Ibid. Ecosystems will be affected by flooding, drought, wildfire, insects and ocean acidification impacts
perpetuated by climate change.
9
Ibid. While extreme weather affects the ability of natural resources to regenerate, rising temperatures
themselves will have a massive impact and the ability to continue growth of foods associated with
particular climates.
10
Ibid. at 12. Coasts are projected to be exposed to increasing risks, including coastal erosion, due to
climate change and sea-level rise. The effect will be exacerbated by increasing human-induced pressures on
coastal areas.
11
See, Nobuao Mimura et al., ―Small Islands‖ in Martin Parry et al., Contribution of Working Group II to
the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 2007 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2007) 687 – 716 at 689 [Mimura et al., ―Small Islands‖].
12
Ibid.
13
See, A.R.H. Goodwin, “The Future of Oil and Gas Fossil Fuels” in Trevor M Letcher, Future Energy:
Improved, Sustainable and Clean Options for our Planet (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2008) at 19 ¶ 5. [Goodwin,
―Future of Fossil Fuels‖].
7

3

atmosphere. To do this, a portfolio of adaptation and mitigation measures must be
immediately14 deployed to reduce the pernicious effects of climate change. 15
Internationally, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change16
and its Kyoto Protocol17 recognizes the need for urgent and massive reductions in carbon
dioxide (CO2) emissions in order to counter the effects of climate change. Specified
parties to these treaties are legally bound to mitigate climate change by limiting
anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGes). 18 There are two options available
for effective emission reduction: (1) development of processes that make fossil fuel
production cleaner and more sustainable;19 and (2) development of renewable forms of
energy. Though option one reduces CO2 emissions, it continues business as usual
practices, that is, the combustion of fossil fuels, which contribute to natural resource
depletion. While it is accepted that a ‗portfolio of diverse adaptation and mitigation
actions‘20 are necessary to combat climate change, renewable energy is the only initiative
that delivers permanent GHG emission reductions. It is well accepted that our energy
14

See generally, Nicholas Stern, The Economics of Climate Change: The Stern Review (Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press, 2007) at xv. Here, Lord Stern argues that ―there is still time to avoid the worst
impacts of climate change, if we act now and internationally.‖
15
Parry, ―Summary for Policymakers, supra note 7 at 20.
16
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 9 May 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107 (entered
into force 21 March 1994), online: UNFCCC <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf>
[UNFCC].
17
Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 11 December 1997,
2303 U.N.T.S. 148, online: United Nations Treaty Series <http://treaties.un.org> [Kyoto Protocol].
18
See, UNFCCC, supra note 16 at 6 ¶ 2(a). For a list of Annex I countries bound by this obligation see
page 23 of Convention.
19
See, Godfrey Boyle, Bob Everette & Janet Ramage, Energy Systems and Sustainability: Power for a
Sustainable Future (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) at 573 ¶ 14.1 [Boyle, ―Energy Systems and
Sustainability‖]. Here, the authors outline three approaches for reducing the impacts of fossil fuels: 1.
Improve energy conversion efficiency of fuel-based energy supply system, so that less fuel is required to
achieve a given level of energy output. 2. Switching to lower-carbon fuels with a lower carbon content. 3.
The use of energy conversion devices that can extract useful energy from fossil fuels directly, thus,
avoiding combustion and its associated impacts.
20
See generally, Richard J.T. Klein et al., ―Inter-relationships between adaptation and mitigation‖ in Martin
Parry et al., Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change 2007 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007) 744-777 [Klein et al.
―Adaptation and Mitigation‖].

4

future needs alternative sources of energy, ―…which when consumed, are free of
environmental impact.‖21 Renewable energy resources impose the least regrettable
impacts on the environment, human health and the economy. Apart from the contribution
to GHG emission reductions, there are several other benefits to be had from renewable
energy generation. For one, the use of renewable energy ensures a more sustainable use
of finite sources of energy. As well, the development and use of renewable forms of
energy could potentially create employment and economic development opportunities.
Additionally, renewable energy provides a hedge against volatile energy prices. This is
particularly important for OECS countries that are dependent on imported fossil fuels to
meet their energy demands. Together, these benefits explain why OECS countries are
interested in renewables in the absence of obligations to mitigate under the climate
regime.
Additionally, although the international climate change regime does not legally
bind countries in the OECS to pursue climate change mitigation, primarily, in the interest
of securing their own physical and economic existence, 22 the countries have set out to
replace, or supplement, their electricity generation with clean, indigenous and renewable
forms of energy. Statistically, the countries in the Caribbean are negligible contributors to
global carbon emissions. Despite this fact, the understanding that climate change is a
global issue and that a concerted effort is needed to address it, has also influenced
Caribbean states to rethink their energy generation practices.

23

In addition to climate

change, the issues of energy security, energy poverty, and the opportunity to ensure a
21

Goodwin, ―Future of Fossil Fuels‖, supra note 13 at 19 ¶ 5.
See, OECS Secretariat, Media Release 18/09, ―Organization of Eastern Caribbean States Secretariat
Statement for Earth Day 2009‖ (22 April, 2009), online: <http://www.caricom.org>.
23
See, Senator Conrad Enil, ―Welcome Remarks‖ (Speech delivered at the Caribbean Preparatory Meeting
on the Establishment of a Caribbean Renewable Energy Centre, 10th March 2010) [unpublished].
22

5

more sustainable use of finite sources of energy are also propelling the paradigm shift in
the energy sector towards renewable energy. 24 As well, other factors driving the
development and use of renewable energy include the potential for the creation of
employment and economic development opportunities.
At present, the region has utilized quite a few forms of onshore renewable energy:
wind power, hydropower, geothermal and solar energy. 25 However, the current amounts
of electricity generated from these sources are nowhere near the region‘s potential 26 and
do not meet the demand. Over the past two decades however, there has been substantial
international interest in the advancement of offshore renewable energy sources (wave,
tidal, ocean thermal energy conversion and offshore wind). The growing international
interest27 in the possibility of tapping into the energy potential of marine renewables has
recently influenced the renewable energy agenda at the 2009 Caribbean Renewable
Energy Forum held in Montego Bay, Jamaica. 28 Drivers for integrating marine
renewables into the Caribbean energy mix include: reduction in GHG emissions, energy
security, job creation opportunities, and opportunities for saving foreign exchange by

24

See, Andrew Thorington, ―Editorial‖ Industry Journal 8 (January 2010) at 1, online: Caribbean Electric
Utility Service Corporation <http://www.carilec.com/publications/IJJAN2010%20.pdf>. [Thorington,
―Editorial‖].
25
See, Thomas M. Scheutzlich, ―Existing and Future Opportunities for Investment in Caribbean
Renewables‖ (slide show presented to the Caribbean Renewable Energy Forum, October
2009)[unpublished] online: CREF <http://www.caribbeanenergyforum.com> [Scheutzlich, ―Existing and
Future Opportunities‖].
26
See, Caribbean Council for Science and Technology, Renewable Energy In the Caribbean; Where we
are; Where we should be, (LC/CAR/G.565/CCST/99/1/)(4 June 1999)[unpublished] at 2, online: Economic
Commission for Latin America <http://www.eclac.org> [Caribbean Council for Science and Technology,
―Renewable Energy In the Caribbean‖].
27
For instance, tidal energy in Nova Scotia, Canada is at the demonstration stage. So too is wave power in
Portugal and offshore wind in Denmark and the United Kingdom.
28
See generally, Michael Murphy, ―Tapping into the Caribbean‘s Ocean Energy Potential‖ (slide show
presented to the Caribbean Renewable Energy Forum, 16 October 2009)[unpublished] online: CREF
<http://www.caribbeanenergyforum.com>. [Murphy, ―Ocean Energy Potential‖].

6

reducing dependence on imported fossil fuels. 29 While conceptually attractive, the use of
marine renewables in the Caribbean region is largely unexplored and untapped. These
renewables are yet to be subject to rigorous feasibility assessments. In fact, marine
renewables progress in the region can be described as items for discussion on renewable
energy agendas. In the context of energy security, volatile energy prices and the
increasing burden of climate change, regulators and policy makers in the region believe
that now is the time to move beyond the identification and investigation stage of
renewable energy sources towards the deployment of renewable energy technologies. 30

1.2

Description of the Problem
Several obstacles stand in the way of renewable energy deployment in the

Caribbean. These obstacles include: lack of baseline data on resource potential, limited
technological awareness, inadequate financing, limited capacity and inadequate policy,
regulatory and legislative frameworks to encourage renewable energy development. 31 For
the most part, discussions in the region on barriers to renewable energy deployment have
focused on inadequate financing.32 However, World Bank economists believe that the
challenges to project development in the region seem more political, regulatory, legal and
institutional rather than financial. 33

29

Ibid.
Thorington, ―Editorial‖, supra note 24.
31
See, Joseph Williams, ―A Strategic Regional Approach to Sustainable Energy: Challenges, Solutions &
Role of CARICOM‖ (slide show presented to the Caribbean Renewable Energy Forum, 15 October
2009)[unpublished] online: CREF <http://www.caribbeanenergyforum.com>, [Williams, ―A Strategic
Regional Approach‖].
32
See, David Ehrhardt, ―Promoting Efficient Renewable Energy Generation in the Caribbean: Jamaica‘s
Renewables Tender and Possible Alternatives‖ (slide show presented to the Caribbean Renewable Energy
Forum, 15 October 2009)[unpublished] online: CREF <http://www.caribbeanenergyforum.com>.
33
See, Fanz Gerner, ―Towards a Regional Caribbean Energy Market‖ (slide show presented to the
30

7

Already, the coastal and marine environments in the region serve a wide variety
of highly competitive uses. The more services that are expected and demanded from the
ocean, the greater the opportunity is for unsustainable exploitation and conflict over
ocean space use. For quite some time therefore, there has been a growing interest in the
management of the uses of ocean space and the associated impacts.34 In the context of
this study, when new values, expectations and services, such as the generation of
renewable energy, are being demanded from the oceans and seas, there is a clear mandate
to guide their deployment: develop new regulatory regimes where they do not exist, and
revise existing arrangements where they do exist.35 Developing and/or revising ocean
governance regimes for marine renewables is particularly important to optimize the
management of coastal and marine resources as well as to protect the ocean environment
from damage to its long-term viability. At present, there is no marine licensing regime for
the regulation of renewable energy generation activities in the coastal and marine
environments of countries in the OECS region.

1.3

Statement of the Problem
In moving towards the deployment of marine renewables in the OECS, one of the

greatest challenges facing ocean governance regimes is the wide array of marine
activities that marine licences must regulate. Any ocean governance arrangement that

Caribbean Renewable Energy Forum, 15 October 2009)[unpublished] online: CREF
<http://www.caribbeanenergyforum.com>, [Gerner, ―Towards a Regional Caribbean Energy Market‖].
34
See, Lawrence Juda, International Law and Ocean Use Management - The Evolution of Ocean
Governance (London: Routledge, 1996) at 1. [Juda, ―Ocean Use Management‖].
35
See David Leary and Miguel Esteban, ―Renewable Energy from the Ocean and Tides: A Viable
Renewable Energy Resource in search of a Suitable Regulatory Framework‖ (2009) 3(4) Carbon and
Climate Law Review 417 at 424-425. [Leary, ―Renewable Energy from the Oceans and Tides‖].
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attempts to regulate activities in coastal and marine environments must take into account
the needs of all the stakeholders under its jurisdiction, while simultaneously, providing
appropriate terms and conditions to protect the offshore environment from damage to its
long-term viability. In this regard, the absence of a regulatory framework on the regional
and national levels in the OECS region is now a discernible obstacle to the development
of renewable forms of energy from the ocean.

1.4

Purpose of the Study
The main purpose of this study is to propose a governance framework that meets

the priority of sustainable development for the regulation of offshore renewable resources
in the OECS region. In furtherance of this mandate, the study develops an analytical
framework for evaluating the recently adopted Round 3 model of governance for the
regulation of offshore wind and other marine activities in the United Kingdom. The focus
on this Round 3 model of governance is in relation to the licensing procedures applicable
to offshore wind development. Thereafter, the study examines the appropriateness of the
application of the Round 3 model of governance to the regulation of marine renewables
in the OECS, and recommends policy and governance frameworks in that regard.
However, while the main purpose of the study is to propose a governance
framework for the regulation of renewables in the OECS, the study seeks to achieve a
wider purpose. Ancillary, therefore, but none the less important, through the process of
achieving the main purpose, the study also seeks to come to general conclusions on
principles and conditions for effective ocean governance.

9

1.5

Limitations to the Study
Governance arrangements have been proposed and established for the regulation

of several different types of marine renewables in different jurisdictions around the
world. For instance, Nova Scotia has instituted a provisional governance arrangement for
the regulation of tidal energy. Similarly, Portugal has also instituted a provisional
governance framework for the regulation of wave energy. In the United Kingdom, there
have been many attempts to regulate the development of tidal and offshore wind
resources. In this regard, Freedom-Kai Phillips notes that the United Kingdom ―…is
clearly ahead of most in terms of legislation pertaining to renewable energy broadly and
ocean-based renewables particularly.‖ 36 Therefore, in the interests of time, availability of
data and financial resources, the study will focus on assessing the effectiveness of the
United Kingdom‘s governance arrangement for the regulation of offshore wind
development. This is not for the purposes of restricting the scope of the study, but as the
decision that is commensurate with the maturity of the technology, and the critical
learnings to be had from the advanced regulatory experiences in the United Kingdom.
Specifically, the study will focus on examining the United Kingdom‘s Round 3 model of
governance for offshore wind as an appropriate governance arrangement for the
regulation of marine renewables in the OECS region. Additionally, the Round 3 model of

36

See, Freedom-Kai Phillips, ―Ocean Renewable Energy in the European Union: Understanding and
Strengthening EU-Canada Relations in the Law of the Sean and Ocean Governance‖ in Timo Koivurova et
al., Understanding and Strengthening European Union-Canada Relations in Law of the Sea and Ocean
Governance (Finland: Northern Institute for Environmental and Minority Law, 2009) at 176 ¶ 7.3.8
[Phillips, ―Ocean Renewable Energy‖].
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governance regulates all renewable energy activity in the marine environment and not
just offshore wind. Therefore, there is a wider governance lessons that policy-makers in
the OECS may adopt given that the regime transcends all forms of offshore renewables.
Further, the study is not concerned with the feasibility of any particular marine
renewable in the OECS region, nor does it attempt to advocate the use of any particular
marine renewable in the OECS region.

1.6

Significance of the Study within the Current Landscape of Legal
Scholarship
The problem and currency of the study is borne out by the title of a 2009 article

entitled, Renewable Energy from the Ocean and Tides: A Viable Renewable Energy
Resource in search of a Suitable Regulatory Framework.37 In this article, the authors note
that, internationally, ―…there has been significant progress towards the development of
commercial scale operations of ocean energy [and that] ocean energy is now on the
threshold of providing a reliable base-load source of renewable energy on a commercial
scale.‖38 They observe however, that ―[w]hile technological barriers are being overcome
the lack of clear regulatory frameworks in many countries is now emerging as a barrier to
wide-scale development of ocean energy.‖ 39 In this regard, they recommend that there is
a need for new regulatory regimes to be developed, where they do not exist, and a
streamlining of existing regulations where they do exist.40 While they remain supportive
of these recommendations, they emphasize a point which underscores these
recommendations, that is, that ―[r]egulatory frameworks need to be developed to more
37

Leary, ―Renewable Energy from the Oceans and Tides‖, supra note 35.
Ibid.
39
Ibid.
40
Ibid. at 424 - 425.
38
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suitably deal with environmental impacts of ocean energy projects.‖41 In short, the article
captures the jurisprudential significance of the issue that will be studied in this thesis in
the context of the OECS. This is particularly important. As section 1.2 above notes, the
coastal and marine environments in the OECS region serve a wide variety of highly
competitive uses. As such, there has been a growing interest in the management of the
uses of ocean space and the associated impacts. 42 In the context of this study, when new
values, expectations and services, such as the generation of renewable energy, are being
demanded from the oceans and seas, there is a clear mandate to guide their deployment:
develop new regulatory regimes where they do not exist, and revise existing
arrangements where they do exist. The key however, is to pursue these mandates in a
manner that ‗suitably deals with the environmental impacts of ocean energy projects.‘ 43
At present, the socio-political will in the OECS to explore offshore renewable
energy has not yet reached a high-level of activism as it has in many other countries
around the world. However, if the recent discussions at the 2009 Caribbean Renewable
Energy Forum are any indication, the possibility of tapping into the energy potential of
marine renewables will be soon pushed to primacy on the energy agenda‘s of Member
States. When that happens, the findings of this study would be best placed to inform the
member states of the OECS.

41

Ibid.
Juda, ―Ocean Use Management‖, supra note 34.
43
Leary, ―Renewable Energy from the Oceans and Tides‖, supra note 35 at 424-425.
42
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1.7

Thesis Structure
The study is organized in a series of interconnected chapters. Chapter 2 briefly

explores the evolving importance of ocean governance, what is meant by ocean
governance and the need to revisit governance arrangements when new services are being
demanded from the oceans and seas. Chapter 2 also introduces a two-tiered analytical
framework for the assessment of the ocean governance regime. The first tier of the
analytical framework is the New Governance Approach as articulated by Michael
Howlett, Jeremy Rayner & Chris Tollefson. 44 The second tier of the analytical framework
is Gibson et al.‘s eight core requirements for progress towards sustainable development. 45
Chapter 3 explores the concept of renewable energy, what it is and the various
technologies available for the production of clean, sustainable energy. It is a narrative
literature review of some of the benefits that encourage shifts towards renewable energy
generation practices and factors thought to discourage the worthiness of pursuing
renewable energy exploration and development.
Chapter 4 begins with a brief historical overview of the development of onshore
wind power, what it is, how it operates and continues with an overview of the advantages
and disadvantages associated with modern development and operation of onshore wind.
Thereafter, Chapter 4 explores some of the reasons why countries around the world are
moving wind power development offshore. In addition, the practical and technical
considerations of developing offshore wind energy are then discussed in relation to the
United Kingdom.
44

See generally, Michael Howlett, Jeremy Rayner & Chris Tollefson, ―From Government to Governance in
Forest Planning? Lessons from the case of the British Colombia Great Bear Rainforest Initiative‖ (2009) 11
Forest Policy and Economics 383 [Howlett et al., ―Government to Governance‖].
45
See, Robert B. Gibson et al., ―Requirements for Progress towards Sustainability‖ in Robert B. Gibson et
al., Sustainability Assessment: Criteria, Processes and Applications (London: Earthscan, 2005) at 95 - 114.
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Chapter 5 is a case study of the development of the offshore wind regulatory
regime in the United Kingdom. To date, there have been three identifiable regulatory
attempts to establish the manner in which offshore wind technologies will be allowed to
enter the marine environment. Each regulatory approach coincided with the government‘s
decision to deploy a new round of wind projects, that is, a different consents process was
used to approve Round 1, Round 2, and Round 3 projects respectively. In chronological
order, this Chapter outlines the consents approaches used to approve project applications
under each round of development. Each consent process is then considered in light of
Howlett et al.‘s three-dimensional new governance framework outlined in Chapter 2.
Thereafter, Gibson et al.‘s core requirements for progress towards sustainability, also
outlined in Chapter 2, will be used to measure the effectiveness of the substantive
outcomes of each consent process. Finally, on an evaluation of all three regulatory
regimes, the chapter comes to a conclusion as to which regime is most effective in
serving the priority of sustainable development.
Chapter 6 seeks to apply the governance lessons learnt from the United
Kingdoms‘ many attempts to regulate offshore wind to the development of an effective
governance arrangement or offshore renewables in the OECS region. The chapter begins
by outlining the energy supply and consumption context in the OECS region. Thereafter,
the chapter describes the energy strategy and legal requirements of the region. The
remaining sections are dedicated to justifying the transposition of lessons from the UK
case study through a new governance assessment of marine development practices in the
region. Specifically, Chapter 6 will explore the governance arrangement used to regulate
the development of the dolphinarium industry in Anguilla and the Ashton Marina Project
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in Saint Vincent & The Grenadines The findings of the assessment are then discussed in
relation to their similarities and differences to the UK experience. The chapter concludes
with a discussion of lessons policy-makers in the OECS could adopt in attempting to
formulate a governance framework for the regulation of marine renewables in the OECS.
Lastly, chapter 7 presents the conclusions of the study and the recommendations
to policy makers and regulators for formulating an effective governance arrangement for
renewables in the OECS region.
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CHAPTER TWO
Ocean Governance & Analytical Framework

2.1

Ocean Governance: Why does it Matter?
The oceans cover over 70% of the Earth‘s surface. From the beginning of time,

the utilization of this huge body of water and the diverse marine resources that it supports
has made life on earth possible for humans.46 Early uses of the ocean were generally
confined to subsistence fishing and trade and navigation. 47 Today, the oceans have been
pressured to provide a variety of services for the advancement of individual livelihoods
and international trade and economic development.48 These services include food and
recreational opportunities; the development of coastal and marine tourism; navigation,
shipping and commerce activities; access to immense sources of usable energy (such as
oil and gas) and other non-living resources (minerals); and the provision of a depository
for waste products of our contemporary world. 49 Above all, the oceans provide the
invaluable service of regulating the climate and weather.50 The variety of services offered
46

The importance of the oceans to human life cannot be overstated or under-estimated. The resources
provided by ocean and coastal ecosystems, as well as various ocean uses, sustain billions of people around
the world through, inter alia, the provision of food, shelter, energy, transportation, employment and
recreation. See, Oceans and the law of the sea: Report of the Secretary-General, UNGA, 64th Sess., Annex,
Agenda Item 76, UN Doc. A/64/66/Add.2 (25 November 2009) at 56 ¶ 214 [UNGA, ―Oceans and the Law
of the Sea‖]. For an overview of the importance of the oceans, see generally, Robert Costanza, ―The
Ecological, Economic and Social Importance of the Oceans‖ (1999) 31 Ecological Economics 199.
[Costanza, ―Importance of Oceans‖].
47
For a review of how ocean resource exploitation has evolved, see generally, Adalberto Vallega,
Sustainable Ocean Governance: A Geographical Perspective (London: Routledge, 2002) at 83 ¶ 5.2.
[Vallega, ―Sustainable Ocean Governance‖].
48
See, Christian Nellmann, Stefan Hain & Jackie Adler, In Dead Water: Merging of Climate Change with
Pollution, Over-harvest and Infestations in the World‟s Fishing Grounds (Norway: Grid-Arenfal, 2008) at
7 and 14. [Nellman, ―In Dead Water‖].
49
Juda, ―Ocean Use Management‖, supra note 34 at 1.
50
The oceans are commonly described as ‗the blue lungs of the planet.‘ They breathe in carbon dioxide and
exhale oxygen. When the oceans inhale and exhale, they help to regulate the climate system and generates
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underscores the importance of the seas to humans. If the expectation is that present and
future generations will continue to benefit from the dynamic oceans and seas, then the
maintenance of safe, healthy and productive seas and the attainment of principled ocean
governance are of even greater importance.51
The seemingly endless uses and services of the oceans have spawned a modern
culture of exploration and exploitation. 52 This dominant culture is aided and abetted by
our own advances in technology, 53 excessive consumption patterns, and the increasing
demands of growing coastal populations

and growing economies. 54 Coastal

overdevelopment55 and excessive marine exploitation pressures 56 have empowered
anthropogenic influences that fundamentally change the natural order of coastal and
marine ecosystems. The cumulative pressures of over-fishing, pollution, climate change
and other environmentally harmful activities are bearing down on the marine
environment.57 Simply put, the health of our seas is at risk. 58 Consequently, when the
health of the seas is at risk, so too is its capacity to provide the services that contribute to
half of the world‘s breathable oxygen. Life on Earth is therefore dependant on the health of our oceans. See
Janot Memdler de Suarez et al., Draft Policy Brief Ensuring Survival: Oceans, Climate and Security
(proceedings of the Global Oceans Conference, May 3-7, 2010) (Paris: UNESCO, 2010)[unpublished]
online: Global Forum on Oceans, Coasts and Islands <http://www.globaloceans.org > [Draft Policy Brief].
51
See, Robert L. Friedheim, ―A Proper Order for the Oceans: An Agenda for the New Century‖ in Davor
Vidas et al., Order for the Oceans at the Turn of the Century (The Hague, Boston: Kluwer Law
International, 1999) at 539 who notes that even though ―…there is no definitive evidence that the natural
world cannot provide for the needs of the future human billions, especially since it is so difficult to predict
the benefits of future technological change, it is reasonable to be cautious and plan for ways to avoid
system collapse.‖ [Friedhman, ―A Proper Order‖].
52
Costanza, ―Importance of the Oceans‖, supra note 46.
53
UNGA, ―Oceans and the Law of the Sea‖, supra note 46 at 12 ¶ 26.
54
See generally, Edward R. Carr et al., ―Interlinkages: Governance for Sustainability‖ in John Agard et al.,
Global Environment Outlook: Environment for Development (United Nations Environment Programme,
2007) 361 – 394.
55
Over half of the world‘s population lives along the coast - only 10% of the Earth‘s land - creating intense
pressure on coastal habitats and resources. See, Draft Policy Brief, supra note 50 at 1.
56
Nellmann, ―In Dead Water‖, supra note 48 at 42.
57
For a quick review of some of the threats to the marine environment, see, Nellman, ―In Dead Water‖,
supra note 48 at 26.
58
See, Jacquline Adler et al, ―Water” in John Agard et al, Global Environment Outlook: Environment for
Development (United Nations Environment Programme, 2007) at 115.
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human well-being, economic security and sustainable development for present and future
generations. 59 If left unchecked, the severity of these risks will be amplified as
technology advances and as human needs, values and expectations of the oceans continue
to change and increase. The more services that are expected and demanded from the
ocean, the greater the likelihood is of unsustainable exploitation and conflict over ocean
space use. For quite some time therefore, there has been a growing interest in the
management of the uses of ocean space and the associated impacts. 60 In other words,
when coastal and marine resources are shared by more than one stakeholder, and the
interests and activities of stakeholders in the marine environment change and/or increase,
there is a pressing need to strategically manage the oceans so as to ensure the sustainable
development and exploitation of the diverse marine resources that it supports. In short,
the governance of our oceans and seas matters.

2.1.1 The Concept of ‘Governance’
In order to define the phrase ―ocean governance,‖ it is necessary first to outline
the concept of ―governance,‖ at least in its broad sense. What is governance? Governance
is a concept that may be defined in many ways. The simple and probably the most
obvious approach is to adopt a strict legal interpretation of the governance concept. So for
instance, Biliana Cicin-Sain & Robert W. Knecht define governance as:
the architecture and makeup of the regime used to govern behaviour,
public and private, relative to an ocean area and the resources and
activities contained therein. 61
59

UNGA, ―Oceans and the Law of the Sea‖, supra note 46 at 56 ¶ 214.
Juda, ―Ocean Use Management‖, supra note 34 at 1.
61
See, Biliana Cicin-Sain & Robert W. Knecht, The Future of U.S. Ocean Policy: Choices for the New
Century (Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 2000) at 14.
60
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Governance may also be defined by referencing the values, institutions and other
non-legal mechanism that influence the decision-making process. In this regard,
Lawrence Juda in 1999 defined the concept as:
the formal and informal arrangements, institutions, and mores which
determine how resources or an environment are utilized; how problems
and opportunities are evaluated and analyzed; what behavior is deemed
acceptable or forbidden; and what rules and sanctions are applied to affect
the pattern of resource and environmental use. 62
In Juda‘s opinion, the concept of governance is not about government and
management per se, but really about the ―… mechanisms and institutions that serve to
alter and influence human behaviour in particular directions.‖ 63 The concept as defined
by Juda, is a recognition of the increasingly significant contribution that nongovernmental actors make to a governance process by simply monitoring, evaluating,
publicizing and seeking to influence management efforts.64 This interpretation of the
governance concept appears to have percolated the specialist and academic
communities. 65 The Centre for Governance at the University of Ottawa provides an
excellent working definition of governance:
Governance is about guiding. It is about the processes by which
human organizations, whether private, public or civic, steer
themselves. The study of governance involves examining the
distribution of rights, obligations and power that underpin
62

See, Lawrence Juda, ―Considerations in Developing a Functional Approach to the Governance of Large
Marine Ecosystems‖ (1999) 30(2) Ocean Development and International Law 89 at 90.
63
Ibid. at 91.
64
Ibid.
65
See, Lucia Fanning, Robin Mohan & Patrick McConney, ―Principled Ocean Governance for the Wider
Caribbean Region‖ in Lucia Fanning, Robin Mohan & Patrick McConney Towards Marine Ecosystembased Management in the Wider Caribbean (Amsterdam, Netherlands: Amsterdam University Press, 2010)
[forthcoming
October
2010],
online:
Marine
Affairs
Programme
<http://marineaffairsprogram.dal.ca/Files/Mahon,_Fanning,_McConney_Principled_ocean_governance.doc
>, who note that ―…The movement towards the use of this term reflects a global shift in awareness of the
increasing diversity of stakeholders (actors) involved in determining the patterns of actions and ideas that
we see and hear around us daily.‖
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organizations; understanding the patterns of coordination that
support an organization's diverse activities and that sustain its
coherence….
[Governance is about] interacting. Governance pertains not only to
organizations, but also to: the complex ways in which private,
public and social organizations interact and learn from one another;
the manner in which citizens contribute to the governance system,
directly and indirectly, through their collective participation in
civil, public and corporate institutions; and the instruments,
regulations, and processes that define the "rules of the game"…
The knowledge of governance has application not only in
determining the appropriate guiding mechanisms for organizations
or the evolution of society, but also as a manière de voir, or
coordination perspective, on the workings of organizations… to
support the development of socio-economic policy; an analytical
framework providing a language of problem reformulation; and a
tool to provide insights into new ways to tackle problems of
organizational design and social architecture. 66
One can debate endlessly about what it means to ―govern‖ and which definition is
best suited to convey the appropriate meaning of the concept. However, as stated above,
there is a growing trend that favours interactive decision-making – a process that places
due value on the contributions of non-governmental actors to the governing process.
Essentially, therefore, a good modern concept of governance must incorporate the
prevailing view that it establishes the framework and relationships for the exercise of
government and/or management over societal resources between state and non-state
actors. Or put in other words by Michael Sutherland and Sue Nichols, ―[g]ood
governance is based on recognition of the interests of all stakeholders and inclusion of
their interests where possible.‖67 What then is ‗ocean governance?‘

66

Cited in Sue Nichols, Michael Sutherland & David Monahan, ―Good Governance of Canada‘s Offshore
Coastal Zone: Towards an Understanding of the Marine Boundary Issues‖ (2000) 54(4) Geomatica 415.
67
See, Michael Sutherland and Sue Nichols, ―Issues in Governance of Marine Spaces‖ in Michael
Sutherland et al., Administering Marine Spaces: International Issues (Copenhagen, Denmark: The
International Federation of Surveyors, 2006) at 6 [Sutherland, ―Issues in Governance of Marine Spaces‖].
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2.1.2 The Concept of ‘Ocean Governance’
The foregoing section explored a number of definitions on the concept of
governance. Most importantly, the foregoing section provides appropriate context to
begin the discussion under this heading, that is, the concept of ‗Ocean Governance.‘
Despite the frequent occurrence of ―ocean governance‖ in scholarly work in marine
affairs and ocean law, academics note that the multi-dimensional nature of the concept
makes it extremely difficult to define. 68 Over the years, the many dimensions of the
concept has inspired a great body of academic thought. Early academic interpretations of
the concept focused on the need to manage the uses of ocean spaces while at the same
time protecting the ecosystem. Juda‘s 1996 definition reads as follows:
The management of the uses of ocean space… seeks, in accordance with
some system of politically determined values, which is either explicit or
implicit, to increase the benefits that may be derived from the resource and
non-resource use of the ocean. At the same time, it attempts to minimize
detrimental effects on the ocean environment and to ameliorate conflict of
use situations. In general it tries to provide for a directed balance among
the various uses of ocean space as well as to protect the ocean
environment from damage to its long-term viability. 69
For quite some time, the concept of ocean governance focused on the governance
issues espoused by Juda above.70 By necessary interpretation, therefore, the early

68

See, Gilles Paquet and Kevin Wilkins, Ocean Governance: An Inquiry into Stakeholding (Centre on
Governance, University of Ottawa, 2002) cited in David Vanderzwaag, Sean LeRoy & Rod Dobell, ―Ocean
Governance‖ in Workshop Backgrounders – 2003 Ocean Management Research Network National
Conference
(Ottawa,
1
November
2003)
online:
<http://www.maritimeawards.ca/OMRN/vanderzwaag.html >.
69
Juda, ―Ocean Use Management‖, supra note 34 at 1.
70
See, Robert Friedheim‘s 1999 definition: ――…the development of a set of ocean rules and practices that
are equitable, efficient in the allocation of ocean uses and resources (including the notion of sustainability),
provide the means of resolving conflicts over access to and the enjoyment of the benefits of the oceans, and
specifically attempt to alleviate ‗collective-action problems in a world of independent actors‘.‖ See,
Friedhman, ―A Proper Order‖, supra note 51 at 537.

21

characteristics/traits of ocean governance were defined by the emerging ‗ocean
governance‘ issues of that time, that being, the governmental management and control of
multiple users of ocean space and the associated impacts on the marine environment
incident to the use.
Recently however, academics have proffered the view that ‗ocean governance‘
goes beyond traditional command and control71 approaches to regulating and influencing
human behaviour in relation to the ocean. The other dimension or characteristic of the
concept advanced by Rothwell & VanderZwaag, embrace a more interactive decision
making process which not only incorporates ― …government agencies and departments
but a broader range of participants including the private sector, scientists, community
groups, non-governmental organizations, academics, First Nations and others.‖72 In light
of this interpretation of the ocean governance concept, one good definition would read:
The governance of any geographical area, including marine spaces, is actually
the management of stakeholder relationships with regard to spatial-temporal
resource use in the pursuit of many sanctioned economic, social, political, and
environmental objectives.
In keeping with the recognition of stakeholder involvement in the governing
process, Rothwell & VanderZwaag further suggest that ocean governance would offer
alternative opportunities and approaches to influence human behaviour beyond the
confines of command and control regulation. The approaches identified are ―…economic
incentives and disincentives, voluntary programs, community-based management, co-

71

Traditional command and control approaches that influence human behaviour usually refer to legally
binding sanctions such as fines or imprisonment.
72
See, Donald R. Rothwell & David L. VanderZwaag, ―The Sea Change Towards Principled Ocean
Governance‖ in Donald R. Rothwell & David L. Vanderzwaag, Towards Principled Ocean Governance:
Australian and Canadian Approaches and Challenges (London, Routledge, 2006) at 4 - 5. [VanderZwaag,
―Towards Principled Ocean Governance‖].
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management and integrated ocean/coastal planning.‖ 73

Gorina-Ysern et al., offer a

definition that is an apt summation of the participatory decision-making dimension of
ocean governance postulated by Rothwell & VanderZwaag:
The term ―ocean governance‖ covers a set of rules – some legally binding and
some not – adopted by the international community of States … for the
structured regulation, management and control of ocean uses. It also includes
the persons, bodies and institutions entrusted with administering the rules that
govern ocean space. One of the purposes of ocean governance is the
conservation of and protection of ocean habitat and marine life.
From the above articulations of the ocean governance concept, one can extrapolate
a few trends that define the scope of the term. The most obvious of these trends is that
ocean governance is primarily concerned with the management of stakeholder activities
in coastal and marine areas. 74 The other trend is that ocean governance necessarily goes
beyond the ambit of simply mitigating conflict of use inevitabilities in the marine
environment. In fact, the justification for the management of stakeholder activities in
ocean spaces is mainly two-fold: to maximize the benefits that may be derived from the
resource and non-resource use of the ocean, while at the same time, ensuring the ocean‘s
long-term viability by conserving and protecting ocean habitat and marine life. To
balance these objectives, the evolving trend in ocean governance favours interactive
decision making over traditional regulation. Ocean governance therefore, is also defined
by a strong presence of human perceptions on the value of ocean uses.
Juda noted that: ―[t]he legal regime of ocean space, like all legal regimes, attempts
to provide some order by indicating the nature, requirements, and limits of permissible
behaviour and by establishing valid expectations for that behaviour.‖ 75 The question
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Ibid.
Sutherland, ―Issues in Governance of Marine Spaces,‖ supra note 67 at 7.
75
See, Juda, ―Ocean Use Management‖, supra note 34 at 3.
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remains however, how would policy-makers go about establishing valid expectations for
permissible behaviour? One way to do this is to pursue governance objectives or
principles when seeking to manage stakeholder activities in the ocean. Statements of
principles for ocean governance can be found in a variety of sources. 76 They have
emerged through a number of directives and protocols on good governance, international
agreements, declarations and codes of conduct.77 However, the principles that often
inform ocean governance are often ill-defined and difficult to apply in practice. 78 As a
result, the list of principles will continue to grow as academics seek to clarify their
scope.79 Some of these principles include sustainable development, integration,
precaution, the ecosystem approach and community-based management.80 Consequently,
there is an ongoing movement towards adopting governance arrangements which focus
on principle-based ocean governance. 81 The adherence to principles when managing
stakeholder activities in the ocean can therefore be added to the list of trends which
define ocean governance.
The preamble to the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS),82 recognizes that ―…the problems of the ocean spaces are closely

76

Juan L. Suarez De Vivero, ―New Frontier of international Law: Recent Lecture – Marine Policy: Europe
and Beyond‖ (2007) 15 Williamette J. Int‘l L. & Disp. Resol. 167 at 168.
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VanderZwaag, ―Towards Principled Ocean Governance,‖ supra note 72 at 5.
78
See, Howard S. Schiffman, ―Moving from Single-species Management to Ecosystem Management in
Regional Fisheries Management Organizations‖ (2007) 13 International Law Students Association Journal
of International and Comparative Law 387 at 387.
79
Ibid. See also Juda, ―Ocean Use Management‖, supra note 34 at 3 where the author notes that ―over time,
once-governing principles of ocean law appear to become anachronistic in the face of changing political,
economic, social and technological conditions.‖
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VanderZwaag, ―Towards Principled Ocean Governance,‖ supra note 72 at 5. For a short list of a modern
ocean governance principles, see, David Freestone, ―Principles Applicable to Modern Ocean Governance‖
(2008) 23(3) Int‘l J. Mar. & Coast L. 385 at 391 [Freestone, ―Modern Ocean Governance‖].
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November 1994, 1883 U.N.T.S. 397, online: United Nations <http://www.un.org>, third preambular
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interrelated and need to be considered as a whole.‖ The simple fact is that the oceans are
connected, and flow into each other. To collectively govern the activity of stakeholders in
oceans around the world would therefore make good sense. UNCLOS is widely referred
to as the ‗constitution for the oceans.‘83 The regime is one of many governance
arrangements that protect marine and coastal environments. Apart from global
arrangements, Chapter 17 of Agenda 21 advocates that ocean governance ―…requires
new approaches to marine and coastal area management and development, at the national,
sub-regional, regional and global levels… .‖84 Therefore, in addition to global
arrangements, ocean governance is also needed at the national, sub-regional and regional
levels.

2.2 New Governance Assessment
The foregoing sections outlined the need for improved governance of our marine
spaces in order to protect their long-term viability by managing the manner, and extent to
which marine spaces deliver services. Articulating and improving the governance
arrangements is particularly necessary when new human needs, values and expectations
of the coastal and marine environment arise. In the context of this study, when new
services, such as the generation of renewable energy, are being demanded from our
oceans, there is a clear mandate: develop new regulatory regimes where they do not exist,

paragraph. See also, Juda, ―Ocean Use Management,‖ supra note 34 at 317 where it is noted that
―interdependence, [refers to] the concept that what happens here has effects there, remains a reality in
ocean space.‖
83
UNCLOS is commonly referred to as ―A Constitution for the Oceans‖. This phrase was coined by
Tommy T. B. Koh used to describe the intention of the drafters of the treaty. See, Myron H. Nordquist,
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982: Commentary (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff
Publishers, 1985) at 11.
84
See, Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, 3 -14
June 1992 , Volume I, Resolutions Adopted by the Conference, UN. Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev1 (Vol. 1),
(1993) at 238 ¶ 17.1 [Rio Declaration].
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and revise existing arrangements where they do exist. 85 One way in which policy-makers
and regulators may go about achieving this mandate is to begin by looking at the existing
regulatory regime, irrespective of whether said regime permits renewable energy
generation activity in the marine environment. In this respect, the New Governance
Approach as articulated by Michael Howlett, Jeremy Rayner & Chris Tollefson, 86 is
particularly useful. Briefly, this approach is not about adopting or advocating a certain or
definitive approach to solving public problems. Rather, it is a way of taking stock of
political practices, institutional structures and regulatory instruments which will assist in
understanding how a particular regulatory regime operates. However, before exploring
Howlett et al.‘s spin of New Governance theory, it is first necessary to outline the New
Governance theory itself.

2.2.1 The New Governance Theory: Governing without Government
The title of Rosenau & Czempiel‘s book, Governance without Government:
Order and Change in World Politics, 87 captures the basic but fundamental concept of
New Governance theory – governance without government. Noted above, is the
increasing awareness among scholars that ‗governance‘ and ‗government‘ are not
synonymous terms even though they both share goal-oriented activities.88 ―Government
occurs when those with legally and formally derived authority and policy power execute
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and implement activities... .‖89 Simply then, governing is what governments do.90 On the
other hand, ―…governance refers to the creation, execution, and implementation of
activities backed by shared goals of citizens and organizations, who may or may not have
formal authority and policing power.‖91 The pillars upon which New Governance
scholarship are built are a testament to the truth of the growing perception that
‗governance‘ and ‗government‘ are not synonymous.92 The New Governance approach
can be described as a collection of wide-ranging processes developed to effect public
objectives using methods that differ in one way or another from classical forms of law. 93
According to Douglas Nejaime, 94 the cause of New Governance scholars has been
motivated by critiques95 of rights-based, state-centered, top-down strategies which led to
an institutional turn towards flexible, collaborative public-private partnerships that seek
to destabalize the priority of traditional modes of governance. In this respect, the New
Governance model identifies horizontal networks of public, private and non-profit

89

Ibid.
Howlett et al., ―Government to Governance‖, supra note 44 at 385 ¶ 2.1.
91
Bingham et al., ―The New Governance,‖ supra note 90 at 547.
92
For a brief overview on the distinction between ‗government‘ and ‗governance‘ see R. A. W. Rhodes,
―The New Governance: Governing without Government‖ (1996) 44(4) Political Studies 652 [Rhodes,
―Governing without Government‖].
93
See, David M. Trubek & Louise G. Trubek, ―The Coexistence of New Governance and Legal
Regulation: Complementarity or Rivalry?‖ (Paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the Research
Committee on the Sociology of Law, July 2005) [unpublished], online: < http://www.reds.mshparis.fr/communication/docs/trubek.pdf>. [Trubek, ―Coexistence of New Governance‖]. The authors equate
the understanding of New Governance to ‗soft law‘: see, David M. Trubek & Louise G. Trubek, ―Hard and
Soft Law in the Construction of Social Europe: The Open Method of Coordination‖ (2005) 11(3) Eur. L.J.
343.
94
See, Douglas Nejaime, ―When Governance Fails‖ (2009) 79 Ohio St. L.J. 323 at 323 and 331. [Nejaime,
―When Governance Fails‖].
95
See, Myungsuk Lee, ―Conceptualizing the New Governance: A New Institution of Social Coordination‖
(Paper presented to the Institutional Analysis and Development Mini-Conference, May 2003) [unpublished]
at 2, online: Indian University <http://www.indiana.edu> [Lee, ―Conceptualizing the New Governance‖].
Here the author notes that ―[t]he popularity of governance has something to do with the distrust about the
government. Many people have been disappointed with the ability of the government to tackle social
problems. [This] leads to reconsideration of the traditional theories of public administration.‖ See also,
Rhodes, ―‖Governing without Government‖, supra note 94 at 666. Therefore, there is need to get
stakeholders to cooperate to pursue their joint affairs.
90

27

organizations as the new structures through which governance is administered. 96 In
theory, the approach suggests ―…that co-ordination by [alternative modes of governance
to traditional top-down hierarchical government control through laws and regulations]
can lead to more effective rules and opportunities for political participation… .‖ 97 In this
respect, Douglas Nejaime98 notes that the New Governance approach places primacy on
collaborative processes; stakeholder participation; local experimentation‘ public/private
partnerships; and flexible, policy formation, implementation and monitoring. Theory
aside, in recent years, the landscape of public administration is slowly reshaping to reflect
this new paradigm of solving public problems.99 Consequently therefore, the New
Governance approach is instigating change in a wide spectrum of policy issues and fields,
ranging from employment and environmental protection; to welfare, family, health and
education laws; to criminal justice administration; and to torts and consumer
protection.100 By no means is this an exhaustive list.
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2.2.2 New Governance Approach as articulated by Michael Howlett, Jeremy
Rayner & Chris Tollefson
In their article, ―From government to governance in forest planning? Lessons
from the case of the British Columbia Great Bear Rainforest Initiative,‖101 Michael
Howlett, Jeremy Rayner & Chris Tollefson, question the body of literature that suggests
as a fact or otherwise, that there has been a shift from government (traditional top-down
hierarchical government control) to governance (flexible, collaborative public-private
partnerships) in forest policy. They support their criticism by examining the 2006 Great
Bear Rainforest Initiative in British Columbia; an initiative that is ―often-touted as a bold
exemplar of plurilateral ‗network governance.‘‖102 They espouse and evaluate their
skepticisms of the acclaimed shift to governance by constructing a three dimensional
analytical structure that isolates the modes of governance: the political dimension, the
institutional dimension and the regulatory dimension.
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Fig. 1
The Political Dimension of Michael Howlett, Jeremy Rayner & Chris Tollefson‘s
analytical structure
Source: Michael Howlett et al.
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Fig. 2
The Institutional Dimension of Michael Howlett, Jeremy Rayner & Chris Tollefson‘s
analytical structure.
Source: Michael Howlett et al.
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Fig. 3
The Regulatory Dimension of Michael Howlett et. al.‘s , Jeremy Rayner & Chris
Tollefson‘s analytical structure.
Source: Michael Howlett et al.
Having isolated the modes of governance, the authors were able to take stock of
the political practices, institutional structures and regulatory techniques as they existed.
But more important, the isolation allowed them to track the complexity of the changes
involved in any shifts among those modes of governance so that they may come to a
conclusion about whether there had been a shift from government to governance. It
would be helpful at this time to reference the authors‘ definition of governance:
‗Governance‘ is all about establishing, promoting and supporting a
speciﬁc type of relationship between governmental and non-governmental
actors in the governing process and a central dimension of any governance
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mode is its placement on a spectrum of governing arrangements ranging
from hierarchical to plurilateral [my emphasis].103
In sum therefore, the application of this analytical framework to a particular field
of governance (employment, environmental protection, health, welfare, etc.) would
simply describe the governance arrangement of that field in reference to the three modes
of governance. What is the value of this framework? The answer to this question is
perhaps best served by a brief outline of the three dimensions.
The first dimension created by the authors is the political dimension. In this mode
of governance, the authors were mainly concerned with one question: ―whether political
power – that is, the ability to make legitimate, authoritative decisions allocating societal
resources – favours state or non-state actors.‖104 It can be argued on end about what it
means for political power to be vested in the state and what it means for that power to be
vested in society-driven actors.105 Earlier, it was noted that ―many people have been
disappointed with the ability of government to tackle social problems.‖106 At the same
time, New Governance scholars argue that the social trait of non-state actors would
influence more effective rules and solutions to social problems. 107 These are issues that
the framework forces one to consider after having identified whether the political power
in the regime favours state or non-state actors.

103

Ibid. at 385 ¶ 2.1.
Ibid. at 385 ¶ 2.2.
105
See for instance, Peter M. Haas, ―When does power listen to truth? A Constructivist approach to the
policy process‖ (2004) 11(4) Journal of European Public Policy 569 [Haas, ―When does power listen to
truth?‖]. Here, the author puts forward the view that the ability of state-centered decision-makers to master
new ideas has limits, and when those limits are reached, there is a need to defer or delegate to authoritative
actors with a reputation for expertise. In this view, the article debates about what it means for political
power to be vested in state versus non-state actors when scientific issues such as sustainable development is
at the heart of the decision-making process.
106
Lee, ―Conceptualizing the New Governance‖, supra note 97.
107
Above at 26 ¶ 2.2.1.
104

33

The other two dimensions recognize that there is more to a governance
arrangement than political power. The second dimension for instance, is symbolic of the
fact that ―institutions set the framework for the exercise of power.‖108 In this dimension,
the authors were concerned with the constitution and composition of institutional
structures: Are the institutions formally or informally constituted? Are the institutions
composed of state or non-state actors? According to the authors, these characteristics
determine ―…the abilities of various state and non-state actors to prevail in policy
disputes and decisions, as well as the possibilities for the choice of the policy instruments
used to implement the mode of governance.‖ 109
The third dimension focuses attention on the nature of the legal instruments used
in the governance arrangement under study. The authors were concerned about whether
the legal regime is characterized by traditional top-down hierarchical government control
through laws and regulations or market-oriented regulation which are generally flexible
and voluntary. In each of the dimensions, the focus is on locating the governance
arrangement, (is it State (hierarchical)? or Non-State (plurilateral)?), of each mode of
governance (political, institutional, regulatory). The authors describe the key to using the
framework in the following terms: ―…movement along the horizontal ‗hierarchical‘ to
‗plurilateral‘ axis is seen as being associated with changes along three distinct but
overlapping vertical dimensions: namely institutional structures, political practices and
regulatory techniques… .” 110 In other words, in moving across the horizontal axis, the
fundamental question is whether there is one actor or many actors in each mode of
governance, and who those actors are.
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This framework does not achieve a particular policy objective. Nor does it
advocate a certain approach to solving public problems or how societal resources should
be distributed. The value in this framework is that it provides a means by which one may
understand, analyze, and thereafter, critique a particular governance arrangement. So for
example, when formulating or revising ocean governance arrangements that permit
renewable energy generation activity, or policies that guide those governance
arrangements, one would want to begin by understanding the political, institutional and
regulatory nature of the governance arrangement under study. An understanding of the
nature of the regime under study would lead to an awareness of where amongst the three
dimensions the power to make decisions respecting societal resources is concentrated, or
shared as the case may be.
The only drawback to Howlett et al.‘s framework, if it can be considered a
drawback at all, is that it stops at an evaluation of the decision-making process that leads
to decisions and substantive outcomes. The framework fails to indicate what a
substantively good outcome would be. Put another way, in the context of this study, the
framework would be unable to assist in a determination of whether a particular ocean
governance arrangement that permits renewable energy generation activity is effective. In
this regard, there is a need to formulate a substantive standard against which the
effectiveness of those regimes can be measured. Simply put, a regime consists of a set of
principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures, which define an issue-area of
co-operative use and activity among citizens. One immediate question is what do we
mean by ―effectiveness‖ or ―regime effectiveness.‖ Arild Underdal defines the concept
quite nicely: ―In common-sense understanding, a regime can be considered effective to
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the extent that it successfully performs a certain (set of) function(s) or solves the
problem(s) that motivated its establishment.‖ Critical to the activity of this study, he
notes further that:111
Any attempt at designing a conceptual framework for the study of regime
effectiveness must … cope with at least three (sets) of questions: (1) what
precisely constitutes the object to be evaluated? (2) Against which
standard is this object to be evaluated? and (3) How do we go about
comparing the object to this standard – in other words, what kinds of
measurement operations do we have to perform to attribute a certain score
of effectiveness to a certain regime?
The application of Howlett et al.‘s framework contributes to an understanding of a
particular governance arrangement, i.e., the object to be evaluated (Underdal‘s first
question). The focus now is on the subject matter of Underdal‘s second question, i.e., the
standard against which the governance arrangement is to be evaluated. At the outset of
this brief discussion, it should be noted that in the context of this study, many standards
are available to measure the effectiveness of offshore renewable energy regimes. Because
these regimes impact ocean use and management, suitable criteria for effectiveness can
be located in principles that advocate certain standards for stewardship of the oceans and
seas. As previously noted, statements of principles for ocean governance can be found in
a variety of sources: directives and protocols on good governance, international
agreements, declarations and codes of conduct. The principles that inform ocean
governance are often ill-defined and difficult to apply in practice. As a result, the list of
principles will continue to grow as academics seek to clarify their scope. Some of these
principles include sustainable development, integration, precaution, the ecosystem
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approach and community-based management.112 Any of these principles may serve as
legitimate criteria for measuring the effectiveness of substantive outcomes of offshore
renewable energy regulation. Any of these principles may serve as the standard by which
renewable energy generation activity affecting the coastal and marine environments can
be judged. The following section briefly introduces a sustainable development criteria
which will be used to measure the effectiveness of the offshore wind regime in the United
Kingdom.

2.3

Sustainable Development: A Criteria for Measuring the
Effectiveness of Offshore Renewable Energy Governance Regimes
Section 2.1 above outlined the tragedy of our ocean‘s health. Ocean resource

exploitation is bearing down on the health of the oceans and seas, and creating a wide
range of difficulties that call for close co-operation between science and policy.
Adalberto Vallega in his book Sustainable Ocean Governance: a Geographical
Perspective, 113 consider two important questions central to this study:
What is the conceptual framework necessary to design ocean governance
strategies consistent with the need to protect the ocean ecosystem? What
assessment of the ecosystem is needed, and what principles should be
adopted to best utilise its resources?114
In dealing with these questions, it was argued that there should be a strict
reference to the concepts of sustainability – the contextual pursuit of three goals: (a) the
integrity of the ecosystem; (b) economic efficiency; and (c) social equity including a
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guarantee of the rights of future generations. 115 This view has generated discussions in
marine affairs.116 In the context of the challenges posed to the marine environment by
human use, one author, Edward Miles, 117 conveyed the informed ideology as follows:
―There is an urgent need to breathe life into the notion of ―sustainability‖ to make it into a
fundamental norm of the new world ocean regime.‖ Therefore, sustainable development
is an appropriate standard against which the effectiveness of offshore renewable energy
regimes can be evaluated.
In the 1990‘s, sustainable economic development has become the most heralded
concept in the international community on issues respecting the economy, society and the
environment. The origin of the term can be traced back to the publication of 1987
Brundtland Report;118 a document which is credited as having signaled the urgency of
rethinking our ways of living and governing.119 The report defined sustainable
development as ―development that meets the needs of the present without compromising
the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.‖ 120 Since the Brundtland Report,
there has been a multitude of elaborations of the ‗sustainable development‘ definition.
Those elaborations entertain a wide range of perceptions on the scope and implications of
the concept. In the midst of conceptual uncertainty, it is helpful to identify shared basic
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characteristics of the concept. Gibson et al. have proposed a list of basic characteristics
that provide an appreciation of the sustainable development concept:121
The concept of sustainability is a challenge to conventional thinking and
practice.
The concept of sustainability is in all its formulations concerned about the
long as well as short-term well-being.
Sustainability covers the core issues of decision making (the pursuit and
maintenance of necessities and satisfactions, health, security, diversity and
equity, ecology and community, preservation and development, etc.).
Sustainability demands recognition of links and interdependencies.
Sustainability must be pursued in a world of complexity and surprise, in
which precautionary approaches are necessary.
The concept of sustainability recognizes both inviolable limits and endless
opportunities for creative innovation.
Sustainability is open-ended.
The means and ends are necessarily intertwined.
The concept of sustainability is both universal and context dependent.
Gibson et al. caveat however, that sustainable development/sustainability cannot
be defined as one set of characteristics because they are all dependent on elaboration and
specification in context.122 The authors use these core characteristics to formulate generic
sustainability criteria to be applied in assessment evaluations and decision-making.123
‗Sustainability criteria‘ would necessarily refer to the body of rules or tools for measuring
sustainability and/or identifying unsustainable practices. Any list of rules or tools for
measuring sustainability are debatable at best as there will always be openings for
learning and revision. 124 It is no surprise therefore, that there are also copious
elaborations on good sustainable development assessment criteria. To this extent,
measuring sustainability has become a major issue as well as a riving force in the
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discussion on sustainable development.125

After having reviewed a wealth of

sustainability literature, Gibson et al., propose eight points which constitute a minimal set
of core sustainability requirements for measuring progress towards sustainability: 126
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Socio-ecological system integrity
Livelihood sufficiency and opportunity
Intragenerational equity
Intergenerational equity
Resource maintenance and efficiency
Socio-ecological civility and democratic governance
Precaution and adaptation
Immediate and long-term integration

These requirements, however elaborated and juxtaposed, determine what
objectives are favoured, which options are considered and preferred, what effects are
judged desirable, acceptable or intolerable in the pursuit of sustainable development.127
To compliment the application of the Howlett et al. framework, this minimal set of core
sustainability requirements for measuring progress towards sustainability will be used to
evaluate the UK offshore wind energy consents regime. The following subsections briefly
consider each criterion.

2.3.1 Socio-ecological System Integrity
This sustainability criterion builds on the point made at the outset of this chapter,
that is, humans are dependent on the integrity of biophysical systems such as the ocean
and seas for the continuance of life and for the provision of a range of sufficiency

125

See, Naim Hamdia Afgan and Maria de Garça Charvalho, ―Sustainability‖ in Sustainable Assessment
Method for Energy Systems: Indicators, Criteria and Decision-Making Proceedure (Boston, Kluwer
Academic Publishers, 2000) at 24 ¶ 4.2 [Afgan et al., ―Sustainability‖].
126
Gibson et al., ―Sustainability Assessment‖, supra note 123 at 235-236.
127
Ibid. at 89.

40

demands.128 According to Gibson et al., this dependency warrants the making of
decisions that seek to build human-ecological relationships for establishing and
maintaining the long-term viability of socio-ecological systems.129 As well, the authors
propose that decisions should simultaneously seek to build human-ecological
relationships in a manner that favours the protection of irreplaceable life support
functions. 130 Notably, in making decisions based on this sustainability criterion, Gibson et
al. add the caveat that ―… the objective is not to prevent system change but to organize
and manage our activities so that the changes we influence still preserve the system
conditions and services upon which we rely.‖ 131 Therefore, the criterion goes beyond the
need to reduce human-induced stresses on socio-ecological systems. 132 In addition to
maintaining the integrity of socio-ecological systems, this criterion advocates that there
should be a focus on adjusting and reconstructing human governance systems ―… to
establish more modest, sensitive and flexible relations with the biophysical system.‖ 133

2.3.2 Livelihood Sufficiency and Opportunity
In the main, human well-being depends on the integrity of socio-ecological
systems. However, in addition to environmental concerns, human-well being is also
dependant on material goods and services for the attainment of livelihood sufficiency and
opportunities for continued improvement.134 In this regard, this criterion forces decision-
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makers to consider the contribution a particular undertaking may make to ensuring that
everyone has sufficient material goods and services for a decent life and opportunities for
improvements.135 In other words, this criterion forces a recognition and consideration of
the fact that ―…ignoring destitution, oppression and desperation [concerns, for instance]
is unsustainable as well as morally unacceptable.‖ 136 Therefore, in considering whether a
particular undertaking contributes to livelihood sufficiency and opportunities, decisionmakers must necessarily involve in the process ―…those whose present needs are
allegedly being addressed or potentially affected.‖137 Lastly and most importantly,
Gibson et al. note that in seeking to advance livelihood sufficiency and opportunities for
present generations, decision-makers must pursue these improvements in ways that do
not compromise future generations‘ possibilities for the same. 138

2.3.3 Intragenerational Equity
According to Gibson et al., for progress towards sustainability, decision makers
should ensure that proposed undertakings that can contribute to sufficiency and
opportunity are ―…pursued in ways that reduce dangerous gaps in sufficiency and
opportunity […] between the rich and poor.‖139 In essence, this criterion advocates that
decisions should make positive contributions towards the concept of ‗livelihood equality,‘
i.e. ―…the right of all peoples within the current generation to fair access to the Earth‘s

135

Ibid. 98.
Ibid. at 99.
137
Ibid.
138
Ibid. at 98.
139
Ibid. at 101.
136

42

natural resources.‖140 In the context of this study, decision makers are to consider whether
in approving marine renewables, the costs and benefits are shared equally among all users
of the sea. Is the effective decision fair to all users of the sea?

2.3.4 Intergenerational Equity
Also, for progress towards sustainability Gibson et al. require that decision
makers ―[f]avour present options and actions that are likely to preserve or enhance the
opportunities and capabilities of future generations to live sustainably.‖141 The focus here
is on making a choice between preserving and exploiting ecological systems and
associated resources for the benefit of future generations. The criterion does not advocate
which choice is better for sustainability. What it does however, is to demand that
decision-makers of proposed undertakings give careful attention to future effects,
consider the particulars of each case, respect the inevitable uncertainties, and in light of
all of this, decide whether future generations would approve the proposed undertaking
had they been the decision-makers. 142

2.3.5 Resource Maintenance and Efficiency
In the context of this study, the application of this criterion will focus on resource
maintenance. Here, for progress towards sustainability, decision makers must ensure that
approval decisions on proposed undertakings reduce threats to the long-term integrity of
140
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socio-ecological systems by reducing extractive damage. 143 In other words, decision
makers must take into consideration the existing stresses on ecosystems and associated
resources, and permit development initiatives under conditions that ensure careful
extraction of resources. Essentially, therefore, decisions should ensure that natural capital
is maintained at or near current levels.

2.3.6 Socio-ecological Civility and Democratic Governance
As another core requirement for progress towards sustainability, Gibson et al.
propose that there should be a greater focus on better governance and developing better
governance arrangements. This criterion is reflective of the simple point that
sustainability is a challenge to conventional thinking and practice. And so, Gibson et al.
propose that if the previously mentioned core requirements are to be met, decision
makers must begin by recognizing that current decision-making structures and processes
are ineffective.144 What is required to secure progress towards sustainability is
governance thinking and arrangements that ―… move away from development for the
people to development with and by the people.‖145 Therefore, central to this criterion is
the application of sustainability principles through more transparent and better publicly
informed deliberations. Through more transparent and better publicly informed
deliberations, the desired result is a greater focus on sociological civility, i.e., ―…to be
more thoughtful, open and flexible, and to examine our capacities and objectives in a
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more integrated way, with more humility, more far-sightedness, and more commitment to
continuous learning and adjustment.‖146

2.3.7 Precaution and Adaptation
Precaution and adaptation are some of the most heralded principles in
environmental decision-making processes. Principle 15 of the 1992 Rio Declaration
encapsulates the very basic understanding of the precautionary principle: 147
―[w]here there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full
scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing costeffective measures to prevent environmental degradation.‖
In sustainable decision-making, Gibson et al., propose that, in the main, a
precautionary approach would seek to avoid undertakings that may imperil progress on
other core requirements for sustainability. However, at the same time, a precautionary
approach would also seek ―to act on incomplete but suggestive indicators of significant
risk to social and ecological systems that are crucial for sustainability.‖ 148 Given the
obvious complexity, Gibson et al.‘s guidance to decision-makers is to ―[r]espect
uncertainty, avoid even poorly understood risks of serious or irreversible damage to the
foundations for sustainability, plan to learn, design for surprise and manage for
adaptation.‖149
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2.3.8 Immediate and Long-term Integration
The final core requirement for progress towards sustainability sets the policy
objective for meeting all the other requirements. The policy objective is that decisions
should ―[a]ttempt to meet all requirements for sustainability together as a set of
interdependent parts, seeking mutually supportive benefits.‖ 150 In other words, according
to this requirement, the goal of sustainable decision-making is to effect decisions that
seek to pursue all of the requirements at once so as to make gains in each area. This
requirement recognizes the fact that because all the requirements overlap and are
interdependent, failure or gains on one requirement will affect progress on others. 151 So
for instance, Gibson et al. note that ―[g]ains in livelihood sufficiency and opportunity will
collapse if the integrity of supporting socio-ecological systems is compromised and key
ecological functions are not maintained.‖ 152

2.4

Conclusion
This chapter outlined the need for improved governance of marine spaces in order

to protect their long-term viability by managing the manner, and extent to which marine
spaces deliver services. Articulating and improving the governance arrangements is
particularly necessary when new human needs, values and expectations of the coastal and
marine environment arise. In the context of this study, this chapter highlighted the fact
that when new services, such as the generation of renewable energy, are being demanded
from our oceans, there is a clear mandate: develop new regulatory regimes where they do
150
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not exist, and revise existing arrangements where they do exist. Part two of this Chapter
developed a two-tiered analytical framework in which policy makers and regulators may
go about achieving this mandate. The first tier of the analytical framework is the New
Governance Approach as articulated by Michael Howlett, Jeremy Rayner & Chris
Tollefson.153 The concept of this approach is particularly useful for policy makers and
regulators. For one, the approach is not about adopting or advocating a certain course of
action, procedure or method to solving public problems. Rather, it is a way of taking
stock of political practices, institutional structures and regulatory instruments and
deciding where amongst these dimensions the power to make decisions respecting
societal resources is concentrated. In other words, therefore, the value in the first tier of
the analytical framework is that it provides a means by which regulators may understand,
analyze, and thereafter, critique a particular governance arrangement. This is a useful first
step when trying to create new governance regimes or revise those already in existence as
one would necessarily want to begin by understanding the political, institutional and
regulatory nature of the governance arrangement under study. The only drawback to
Howlett et al.‘s framework, if it can be considered a drawback at all, is that it stops at an
evaluation of the decision-making process that leads to decisions and substantive
outcomes. The framework fails to indicate what a substantively good outcome would be.
For any policy-maker or regulator, this would necessarily be their focus. In this regard,
the second tier of the analytical framework was created to address the shortages of the
first tier. In essence, the second tier is a substantive standard against which the
effectiveness of governance regimes such as those governing offshore renewable energy
can be measured. Many standards are available to measure the effectiveness of offshore
153
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renewable energy regimes. Because these regimes impact ocean use and management,
suitable criteria for effectiveness can be located in principles that advocate certain
standards for stewardship of the oceans and seas. It was noted at the outset of the
Chapter, that statements of principles for ocean governance can be found in a variety of
sources: directives and protocols on good governance, international agreements,
declarations and codes of conduct. Some of these principles include sustainable
development, integration, precaution, the ecosystem approach and community-based
management. Any of these principles may serve as legitimate criteria for measuring the
effectiveness of substantive outcomes of offshore renewable energy regulation.
Ultimately, Gibson et al.‘s core requirements for progress towards sustainable
development was chosen as the second tier of the analytical framework as they constitute
a workable minimal set of core sustainability requirements extrapolated from a wealth of
sustainability literature.
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CHAPTER THREE
The Main Drivers for Developing Renewable Sources of
Energy

3.1

Introduction and Chapter Overview
Energy is essential for the continued development of modern economies and for

the maintenance of modern standards of living. 154 In the contemporary world, there is a
high demand for energy for the execution of daily activities. The intrinsic value of energy
to all human activity is realized in the proclamation of energy as a ―…basic human
need.‖155 It is needed to deliver adequate food, water, shelter, education, health care and
employment. Indeed, without it, all human activity and development would come to a
complete and instantaneous standstill. 156 As the world‘s population increases at an
exponential rate and aspires to a standard of living on the basis that now prevails in the
global north, the demand for a consistent and reliable supply of energy will also increase
exponentially. 157 Already, the International Energy Agency has projected that world
primary energy demand will increase by 40% between 2007 and 2030. 158
Conventionally, most energy is supplied from the burning of fossil fuels – oil, gas
and coal. 159 Today, fossil fuels remain the dominant sources of primary energy

154

See, Afgan et al., ―Sustainability‖, supra note 127 at 15 who confirm the fact that energy resources are
the bricks for building our civilizations.
155
See, the International Renewable Energy Agency, Our Mission: Background, online: The International
Renewable Energy Agency <http://irena.org>. [IRENA, ―Background‖].
156
Ibid.
157
See, Trevor M. Letcher, Future Energy: Improved, Sustainable and Clean Options for our Planet
(Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2008) at 25.
158
See, International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook 2009: Executive Summary, (Paris,
OECD/IEA, 2009) at 4 [IEA, ―WEO 2009‖]. Developing Asian Countries are the main drivers for this
growth, followed by the Middle East.
159
UNCTADTDBOR, The Future Energy Matrix and Renewable Energy: Implications for Energy Security
and Food, UNCTADTDBOR, 2nd Sess., UN Doc. TD/B/C.I/MEM.2/8 (12 January, 2010) 1 at 1 ¶ 1.

49

worldwide.160 In recent years, dependence on fossil fuels has created many challenges for
the environment, the economy and the global energy system. 161 The emerging scientific
consensus is that dependence on fossil fuel combustion for the production of energy
results in increased GHG emissions which, in turn, affect air quality and contribute to the
rise in global temperatures. The prevailing reliance on fossil fuels also means that importdependent energy economies face an increased threat to receiving reliable supplies of
energy in an energy market characterized by unequally distributed fossil fuel sources and
fluctuating fuel costs.162 Together, ―[a]ll these factors contribute to the urgent need to
transform the energy sector - which primarily relies on fossil fuels – to one that uses
renewable energies and energy efficient measures.‖163 Strictly speaking, therefore,
renewable energies combined with enhanced energy efficiency measures are necessary to
meet the energy challenges of our time. However, some academics argue that energy
conservation and improvements have an overall higher potential to contribute to energy
solutions than renewable energies. 164 This fact does not take in any way negate the
importance of fuel switching to more sustainable sources of energy. It is perhaps best to
think of both measures as a set of interdependent parts, seeking mutually supportive
benefits. As this study centers on renewable energies, this chapter will concentrate on the
literature advocating a move away from carbon-based sources of energy in an effort to
slow or possibly halt the adverse effects of exclusive reliance on hydrocarbons. In this
160
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respect, apart from energy efficiency measures, the focus must now be on the
development of clean, safe, smart, sustainable and indigenous renewable energy
generation technologies that impose the least regrettable impacts on the environment,
human health and the economy. 165 Renewable energy refers to all forms of energy which
are ―alternative‖ to ―conventional‖ fossil and nuclear fuels. 166 They include biomass,
geothermal energy, hydropower, ocean energy (wave, tidal, ocean thermal energy,
offshore wind), solar energy, and wind energy.
Not surprisingly, renewable energy generation has been at the fore of international
community efforts for decades. 167 Recently, international regard for renewable energy
sources has been codified in the Statute of the International Renewable Energy Agency.168
As of 22 August 2010, 148 States have signed the Statue and 34 States have ratified it.169
The Statute has entered into force on 8th July 2010. Generally, the treaty calls for
―…widespread and increased adoption and use of renewable energy with a view to
sustainable development.‖170 Within the text, State Parties also recognize the real
opportunity offered by renewable energy sources for gradually alleviating global
problems of energy security, volatile energy prices, energy access, climate instability and
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sustainable development.171 Internationally, therefore, there has been much consensus on
the urgent need and the attendant benefits of a shift to sustainable, renewable energy
generation practices.
This chapter briefly outlines the factors considered to influence the adoption of
renewable energy policies and technologies. Specifically, the chapter explores the
contributions renewable energy makes to environmental preservation; the contribution
renewable energy makes to the attainment of Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) by
providing increased access to energy; and the contribution renewable energy could make
to alleviate the problem of energy insecurity. Briefly, the chapter thereafter makes an
explicit link between the benefits to be had from renewable energies and Gibson et al.‘s
eight core requirements for progress towards sustainability. Lastly, the chapter briefly
identifies some of the barriers to the deployment of renewable energy technologies.

3.2

Renewable Energy Contributes to Environmental Preservation
Conventionally, natural resources like coal, oil and gas, have been extracted to

produce energy for human consumption. This simple fact links the business of energy
production to that of environmental preservation. Regrettably, every extraction has had
real and tangible impacts on the environment.172 On the other hand, clean, renewable
processes of energy generation gradually reduce the effects of deforestation,
desertification, biodiversity loss and climate degradation commonly associated with
171
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conventional methods of energy generation. 173 As such, the environmental benefits of
switching to renewable energy are well established.
In many parts of Africa, there is a heavy reliance on the burning of firewood and
charcoal to meet energy needs, 174 and to sustain a charcoal trade industry for income
generation.175 This practice has encouraged and intensified massive deforestation. 176 In
turn, deforestation causes soil erosion, floods, drought, desertification, loss of
biodiversity, 177 and accounts for almost 20% of global CO2 emissions, among many
other things. These effects ultimately undermine the integrity of the socio-ecological
system.178 Unfortunately, despite the stresses placed on the regenerative capacities of
forests, the inextricable links of the charcoal trade industry to income generation and
energy needs in Africa only serve to encourage the continued growth of the industry and
further forest exploitation. 179 The charcoal trade industry cannot be stopped anytime
soon.180 However, reduction of its harmful impacts can be achieved through the
implementation of measures that promote sustainable production and use of wood and
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charcoal, 181 and the use of alternative energy resources. 182 Therefore, although renewable
energy resources like biomass are only part of the solution, they help to curb
deforestation pressures from the charcoal industry. 183 Many renewable energy projects
have been launched for this purpose.184
The fossil fuel industry is also adding to the degradation of the environment and
the resulting depletion of natural resources. Most energy supplies come from the burning
of fossil fuels. Combustion releases large amounts of pollutants into the atmosphere,
particularly carbon emissions that cause global warming. 185 However, for quite some
time, there has been a denial of any correlation between fossil fuel use and global
warming.186 Recently, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has for the
time being, settled the science on the matter187 However, there are still some who doubt
the findings of the IPCC. While there are still skeptics, the numbers are low and the IPCC
appears to be the most comprehensive and credible source of information on climate
change.188 Climate change is real and is happening. Global average increases in air and
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ocean temperatures pose immediate threats to the integrity of the environment. 189 The
IPCC has predicted that climate change, if unabated, will heavily impact freshwater
resources,190 ecosystems191, crop productivity192 and coastal systems and low-lying
areas.193 Specifically, small islands are especially vulnerable to the effects of climate
change and sea-level rise due to their limited size, proneness to natural hazards and
external shocks, and low adaptive capacity. 194 Some of the immediate threats of global
warming that impact the overall tourism product and the environmental sustainability of
Small Island Developing States include for instance, the destruction of marine
ecosystems through ocean acidification and coral bleaching, and the demolition of coastal
barriers. These impacts reduce the amenity value for coastal users and tourists. 195 Such
irreversible catastrophes inherently shock other economic activities such as the fishing
industry and disrupt socio-cultural norms of coastal populations. The effects of global
warming are never-ending, irreversible and cannot be ignored.196 To avoid dangerous
atmospheric temperatures, the IPPC has recommended long-term stabilization of GHG
concentrations in the atmosphere. To do this, a portfolio of adaptation and mitigation
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measures must be immediately197 deployed to reduce the pernicious effects of climate
change.198
Internationally, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change199
and its Kyoto Protocol200 recognizes the need for urgent and massive reductions in carbon
dioxide emissions in order to counter the effects of climate change. Specified parties to
these treaties are legally bound to mitigate climate change by limiting anthropogenic
emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGes). 201 There are two main options available for
effective emissions reduction: (1) development of processes that make fossil fuel
production cleaner and more sustainable;202 and (2) development of renewable forms of
energy. Though option one reduces CO2 emissions, it continues business as usual
practices that contribute to natural resource depletion. While it is accepted that a
‗portfolio of diverse adaptation and mitigation actions‘203 are necessary to combat climate
change, renewable energy is the only initiative that delivers permanent GHG emission
reductions. It is well accepted that our energy future needs alternative sources of energy,
―…which when consumed, are free of environmental impact.‖204 However, an alternative
view would seek to claim that there is much bigger picture, that is, that all sources of
energy, renewable and non-renewable, are associated with benefits and harm. So for
instance, on the one hand, fossil fuel generation produces the ‗harm‘ of GHG emissions.
197
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On the other hand, renewable energies such as wave, wind, tidal, etc., produce some
environmental impact (harm) associated with construction. Therefore, for governments, it
is really a matter of making appropriate choices about what combination of energy
sources brings the lowest harm while providing the greatest benefit. This view aside, it is
generally accepted that renewable energy resources impose the least regrettable impacts
on the environment, human health and the economy. 205 In conjunction with climate
change mitigation agendas, these characteristics give significant impetus to renewable
energy development. In fact, some authors argue that global warming is the driving force
behind renewable energy development.206
Lastly, if the events of the recent oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico have taught world
leaders anything about conventional energy generation practices, it is the unadorned fact
that ―[t]he time has come, once and for all, for [nations] to fully embrace a clean energy
future.‖207 However, it is also argued that the oil spill is no new lesson, but a blatant and
cruel reminder of environmental limits – a recurring fact to which world leaders are
wise.208 Nevertheless, the message is clear; incorporating renewable forms of energy into
the energy mix has great potential to contribute to the overall preservation of the
environment.
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3.3

Renewable Energy contributes to the attainment of Millennium
Development Goals by providing increased Access to Energy
Approximately 3 billion people in rural areas in developing countries rely on

traditional biomass (wood, charcoal and dung) for cooking and heating. 209 Seven hundred
(700) million people in Least Developed Countries lack access to modern energy
services. 210 Six hundred (600) million people in Sub-Sahara Africa suffer the same
fate.211 Worldwide, an estimated 1.5 billion people lack access to energy. 212 ‗Access to
energy‘ is defined as: ―access to clean, reliable and affordable energy services for
cooking and heating, lighting, communications and productive uses.‖ 213 Unfortunately,
projected population growths only serve to widen the gap between the haves and the
have-nots of access to modern forms of electricity. In 2000, world leaders committed to
the attainment of eight MDGs.214 Of those goals, the 2015 deadline to cut world poverty
in half is fast approaching.215 Access to energy is central to achieving the MDGs. 216 The
current trends on lack of access to modern energy services poses a significant barrier to
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the creation of socio-economic opportunities for development. 217 Hindering development
is fundamentally incompatible with poverty eradication agendas. Without increased
access to energy, the 2015 deadline and all other MDGs will not be met.218
Currently, the energy impoverished of the world are plagued by a plethora of
extreme disadvantages and living conditions. Traditional indoor combustion of wood,
charcoal and dung to meet energy needs has had significant health consequences. 219 The
practice causes high mortality rates in women and girls in West Africa who are
traditionally responsible for this method of energy generation. 220 Populations lacking
access to energy are also deprived of access to food, clean water and sanitation, maternal
health, 221 basic healthcare services and equipment,222 and increased opportunities for
education223. These problems are all intensified by increasing global temperatures, the
ongoing global financial crisis and the instability of energy prices. 224 Access to energy is
therefore a key fundamental to reducing existing hardships in developing countries by
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encouraging improved productivity, greater income-generating capacities,225 economic
progress and overall human development 226.
It is estimated that in order to cut poverty statistics in half and affect associated
negatives by 2015, an additional 1.2 billion people will require access to electricity and
1.9 billion people will need access to modern fuels. 227 Given the necessity, how best can
nations expand access to modern energy for the world‘s poor without stunting climate
change initiatives? World leaders have agreed that renewable energy has huge a potential
to provide ―decentralised access to energy, particularly in developing countries, and
access to energy for isolated and remote regions and islands.‖228 In sum, the following
syllogism is indisputable: The increased use of renewable energy can assist in providing
increased access to energy; Increased access to energy is central to the attainment of the
MDGs; Therefore, the increased use of renewable energy could make a significant
contribution towards the attainment of the MDGs.

3.4 Renewable Energy contributes to Energy Security
Globally, fossil fuels continue to play a major role in energy supply. 229
Industrialization, urbanization and rapid economic and population growth are driving
world fossil-energy demand, and this is projected to increase by 40% between 2007 and
2030.230 For quite some time, increases in global energy demand have raised international
concern regarding the ability to secure affordable, consistent and reliable supplies of
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energy to meet growing demands. 231 When energy demands exceed supply, there is a
shortage of energy resources, which means that some energy demands will not be met.232
The transportation industries, for instance, are almost entirely dependent on petroleum. 233
Where supply fails to meet demand, the transportation systems become vulnerable to
market pressures and volatile costs. If we take into account all other fossil-fuel dependent
activities in our modern societies, when supplies fail to meet demand, there is significant
threat to economic prosperity and, even national security. 234 Simply put, economies are
faced with the trouble of allocating scarce resources when demands exceed supply.
Because efficiency occurs at equilibrium, there is immense pressure to balance out the
demand. To do some of this, the usual recourse is to increase the price of energy. This
increase in fuel costs amplifies energy security concerns when energy demands exceed
supply. In short, supply and demand determine the value of energy. 235 One alternative to
paying higher fossil fuel costs is to reduce import demand or increase indigenous supply
through the development of renewable forms of energy. 236
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The International Energy Agency describes energy security as ―the uninterrupted
physical availability [of energy] at a price which is affordable, while respecting
environmental concerns.‖237 In very basic terms, energy security refers to the security of
energy supply. 238 Typically, when one speaks of a secure supply of energy, it is often in
relation to a secure supply of fossil fuels (coal, oil and gas). There is a popular fear that
meeting the world‘s increasing energy demands is speedily depleting global fossil fuel
reserves. The fear of a peak in fossil fuel extraction often leads to questions of energy
security and intergenerational equity. 239 However, the International Energy Agency has
predicted that there are enough reserves to supply the projected demand increase. 240 Coal
for one, is the most abundant fossil fuel in the world. It is geographically dispersed and is
set to play a dominant role in future energy supply. 241 Its main drawback is its high
carbon content which, as discussed, contributes to global warming. On the other hand,
natural gas energy emits lesser amounts of carbon than coal and oil. 242 It is estimated that
world oil and gas reserves are enough to cover the increase in demand through to 2030
and beyond. 243 However, world oil and gas reserves are concentrated in countries like
237
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Russia, but more so, in the Middle East.244 Though it is predicted that there are enough
reserves to supply the projected demand increase, these reserves are attended by many
risks in the global energy system. If the geopolitics of energy demand and supply are
appropriately observed, it becomes clear that one of the real problems in assuring a secure
supply of energy is the fact that oil and gas reserves are not widespread, but that they are
concentrated in the hands of very few countries. 245 At the end of the 2009 oil and gas
year, it was estimated that the twelve (12) countries that form the membership of the
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, (OPEC), control 79.6% of World
proven oil resources.246 It is further estimated that 70% of OPEC oil reserves are
concentrated in the member states from the Middle East.247 To put the energy security
situation into proper geopolitical context, it is helpful to note the dominance of some
Middle Eastern countries over the world‘s proven oil reserves. So for instance, at the end
of 2009, Saudi Arabia held roughly 19% of the world‘s total reserves, while Iran held
10%, and Iraq, 8%.248 The character of these resource-rich countries in the Middle East is
particularly important.
Middle Eastern reserves are historically under threat from political instability and
conflict characteristic of the region. 249 The World Energy Outlook has continually
predicted a future mismatch between countries that demand energy and those that supply,
wherein there is a growing dependence of the former on the latter for energy. 250 This is
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today‘s reality for many import-dependent countries around the world. 251 This reality
forces an increase in international trade between the haves and the have-nots.252 Industry
strikes and terrorism, for example, are acts of political instability characteristic of oilproducing regions that threaten a ‗secure supply of energy‘ by lowering oil production
and increasing the risk of future production shortfalls. 253 It is this political instability and
conflict that is the main issue of concern for all ‗have-nots‘ that increasingly depend on
these high-risk reserves.254 Political instability creates global uncertainties about retaining
supplies of energy in the near and distant future. As previously noted, secure, reliable and
affordable energy sources are fundamental to economic stability and development.
Therefore, these uncertainties are highly disfavoured by import-dependent countries.
Additionally, by affecting production, political instability indirectly increases the
price of oil and adds to concerns over price volatility and energy affordability. 255 As well,
the very fact that few countries dominate the remaining oil reserves means that they have
a great influence over the cost of oil. As world oil consumption continues to rise, global
distribution of oil reserves will continue to shift in favour of Middle Eastern countries. 256
Because most reserves are concentrated in the hands of a few, and that share continues to
increase, it gives Middle Eastern countries and Russia considerable market power and
251
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ability to influence the price of their product.257 So for example, oil price volatility from
the Middle East coupled with the world‘s heavy reliance on Middle Eastern oil represents
a legitimate energy security risk to all oil importing economies dependent upon that
region.258 In sum, price volatility can negatively impact energy affordability. Such
impacts are undesirable.
In addition to the risks associated with the location of oil and gas reserves in highrisk regions, energy security is also concerned with the ‗uninterrupted physical
availability of energy‘. 259 Supply disruptions have great potential to engender higher
energy costs for consumers,260 and significantly affect modern economic activity. A
supply disruption in gas for example, ―… could cost the United Kingdom up to £600
million in lost output.‖261 These disruptions:
… may occur at any point in energy supply chains; may originate at a
range of geographical locations; may affect one or more fuel types; may
occur in isolation or simultaneously; and may be of either short or longterm duration.262
Supply disruptions may be geopolitically, environmentally, technically or
economically induced. 263 Noted above is the ability of market factors like political
instability to impact upon the exploration and production of energy. 264 Other political
factors may also cause disruptions. Acts of terrorism and piracy 265 on key sea-lanes266
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and pipelines267 are major contributors to short and long-term supply disruptions, and
render transportation methods inefficient.268 Additionally, the use of power grids makes
modern energy infrastructures vulnerable to cyber attacks.269 Cyberspace allows hackers
to inflict equipment sabotage, seize control of gas pipelines and steal information. 270 The
potential to disrupt energy supplies is obvious. This end result is attractive to terrorist
hackers.271
A fracture in state relations and/or negotiations may also provoke supply
disruptions. 272 History further proves that use of force may also result in supply
disruptions in the form of embargos.273 Furthermore, the revival of pervasive resource

(London: Visiongain, 2010). See also, Randy Fabi, ―Piracy off Nigeria delays oil Projects‖ Reuters (29
January 2009) online: <http://uk.reuters.com>. But more recently ―Oil Hub off Cameroon New Frontier for
Pirates‖ The Gulf (19 May 2010) online: The Gulf Times <http://www.gulf-times.com>. Additionally, the
tapping into pipelines cause risk of explosions, oil spills and other accidents – see, Martha Harris, ―Energy
and Security‖ in Michael E. Brown, Grave New World: Security Challenges in the 21st Century
(Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2003) at 165 [Harris, ―Energy and Security‖].
266
See, Maro Silver, ―Somalia: State Failure, Piracy and the Challenge to International Law‖ (2010) 50 Va.
J. Int‘l L. 553 at 555 where the author argues that if left unabated, piracy threatens the safety of sea-lanes
that transport almost half of the world‘s cargo. The author illustrates the threat to international energy
supplies by drawing on the recent hijacking of a Saudi oil super taker (MV Sirius Star) in 2008 which was
released in 2009 after a ransom of $3 million was paid to pirates.
267
Terrorists are cognizant of the socio-economic and political dependence on oil and gas for continued
development and stability. Therefore, to effect economic hardship and internal political instability on the
enemy territory, terrorists attack the pipelines which supply the resources that fuel foreign progress.
Pipelines are easily sabotaged. The wrecking of a critical pipeline can stall transportation operations for
weeks thereby interrupting supply. These attacks also affect local operations by forcing repair constructions
which ultimately have dollar burdens that consumers must satisfy. See, Dr. Gal Luft, ―Pipeline Sabotage is
Terrorist‘s
Weapon
of
Choice‖
(2005)
Pipeline
and
Gas
Journal,
online:
<www.pipelineandgasjournal.com>. Over the years, there have been countless attacks on Middle Eastern,
South Asian and Russian pipelines.
268
Note also that conflicts effect disruptions in supply posing physical security threats to energy
installations and personnel. Barton et al., ―Energy Security‖, supra note 238 at 460 ¶ 4.
269
See, Daniel Ventre, ―China‘s Strategy for Information Warfare: A focus on Energy‖ (18 May, 2010)
Journal of Energy Security, online: < http://www.ensec.org/index.php>.
270
Ibid.
271
Ibid.
272
See for instance, ―European Union protests as Russia turns off Gas‖ The Telegraph (6 January 2009)
online: The Telegraph <http://www.telegraph.co.uk>. Here, a Russian company attempted to raise the price
of natural gas to be sold to Ukraine. In the midst of the dispute, Russia reduced the volume of gas supplied
to Ukraine and other European countries after allegations of siphoning off gas without paying. That
pipeline supplied approximately 15% of EU gas imports. On average however, European countries rely on
Russia for 23% of their imported gas. See, Pascual, ―Geopolitics of Energy‖, supra note 253 at 20.
273
See generally, Jay Hakes, ―35 Years After the Arab Oil Embargo‖ (6 October 2008) Journal of Energy

66

nationalism274 driven by high oil prices also threatens an uninterrupted energy flow.
States like Russia and those belonging to OPEC are conducting resources nationalism
activities in order to restrict access to energy resources, so that they may use their
dominance over reserves to strategically coerce economic and foreign policy goals. 275 A
consistent and reliable supply of energy is likely to be affected where reserves are used
for political purposes which conflict with commercial objectives. 276 For instance, the
vesting of control over oil resources in national oil corporations which are sometimes less
effective than their international peers, result in ―…decreased productive capacity and
ultimately, supply shortages.‖277 Lastly, the gradual resurgence of ‗oil violence‘ in oil
producing countries like Nigeria holds grave potential to affect oil output. 278
Natural disasters such as typhoons, hurricanes 279 and earthquakes, whether
occurring locally or regionally, may also disrupt energy supplies by causing damage to

Security, online: Journal of Energy Security <http://www.ensec.org/index.php>.
274
See generally, Daniel Möcklii, Strategic Trends 2010: Key Developments in Global Affairs (Zurich:
Switzerland, Centre for Security Studies, 2010) at 85 and 92.
275
See, Joseph A. Stanislaw, Power Play – resource nationalism, the global scramble for energy, and the
need for mutual interdependence (Washington, D.C.: Deloitte Developments LLC, 2009) at 4. It is argued
here, that use of energy resources in this way may very well be an alternative to the use of force by
governments. See, Daniel Moran & James A. Russel, Energy Security and Global Politics: The
Militarization of Resource Management (London: Routledge, 2008) at 3. Russia for instance has repeatedly
demonstrated its willingness to us gas as a political weapon most vividly during confrontations with
Ukraine in January 2006 and February 2008. For a case study on ways in which Iran, Venezula and Russia
have used their energy wealth and leverage to strengthen their regional influence over more vulnerable
neighbours, see, Pascual, ―Geopolitics of Energy‖, supra note 253 at 17.
276
DTI, ―Meeting the Energy Challenge‖, supra note 254 at 32 ¶ 1.18.
277
See, Dr. David R. Mares, ―Resource Nationalism and Energy Security in Latin America: Implications
for Global Oil Supplies‖ James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy, Rice University (20 January 2010)
online: Baker Institute <http://www.bakerinstitute.org> at 11.
278
Dr. Victor Ojakorotu & Lysias Dodd Gilbert, Checkmating the Resurgence of Oil Violence in the Niger
Delta of Nigeria (2010) online: <http://www.iags.org/Niger_Delta_book.pdf>. On 19 June 2008, the
Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), through a series of kidnappings of oil
workers and sabotage of onshore pipeline infrastructure, kept between 600,000 and 900,000 barrels a day of
Nigerian high-quality crude output offline. See, Pascual, ―Geopolitics of Energy‖, supra note 253 at 13 –
14.
279
See, Robert Bamberger, Energy Policy: Conceptual Framework and Continuing Issues (US:
Congressional Research Service, 2007) at 1 where it was reported that hurricanes Katrina and Rita
shutdown more than 5 million barrels per day of refining capacity in Texas and Louisiana and initially shut
down 25% of US crude oil production and 20% of natural gas production.

67

energy infrastructure.280 As well, extreme weather events may also interrupt supplies by
delaying shipment, although only temporarily. The likelihood of accidents (oil spills 281,
collision282) and technical failures (plant breakdown) during extraction, processing and
transportation are additional risks to energy security. 283
Energy security means different things to different players in the global energy
market, depending on whether the player in question is a have or a have-not in regard to
energy supply. 284 The discussion in this chapter focused on the have-nots in the regime.
Have-nots are especially vulnerable to supply interruptions because of their dependence
on fossil fuels. The energy security challenge, therefore, is to minimize exposure to
uncontrollable and unpredictable security risks by isolating vulnerable energy economies
from supply disruptions and volatile prices. Among other initiatives, isolation can be
achieved over the long-term through diversification of fuel type and fuel source.285
Internationally, it is recognized that diversification by shifting to renewable energy is one
way in which oil import states may gradually alleviate risks to cheap and reliable energy
flows. 286
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3.5

The Relationship between Gibson et al.’s Criteria for Sustainability
and the benefits to be had from Renewables
This section seeks to make the link between the benefits to be had from renewable

energies outlined above and Gibson et al.‘s eight core requirements for progress towards
sustainability outlined in the latter part of Chapter 2. As to the benefits to be had from
generating renewable energy, the first point made in this chapter is that incorporating
renewable forms of energy into the energy mix has great potential to contribute to the
overall preservation of the environment. Specifically, it was noted that renewable
processes of energy generation has the potential to gradually reduce the effects of
deforestation, desertification, biodiversity loss and climate degradation commonly
associated with conventional methods of energy generation. These potential benefits of
renewable energies find favour with Gibson et al.‘s requirement for socio-ecological
system integrity, intergenerational equity, intragenerational equity and resource
maintenance.
Secondly, it was noted that renewable energy contributes to the attainment of
MDGs by providing increased access to energy. Here, it was noted that access to energy
is fundamental to reducing existing hardships in developing countries by encouraging
improved productivity, greater income-generating capacities, economic progress, local
development and overall human development. These benefits ultimately find favour with
Gibson et al.‘s requirements for livelihood sufficiency and intragenerational equity.
Lastly, it was noted that renewable energy could make a significant contribution
to energy security. In the main, the use of renewables puts a hedge against volatile energy
prices making energy more affordable. This benefit would make considerable gains on
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Gibson et al.‘s requirement

for livelihood sufficiency and opportunity and

intergenerational equity.
In sum therefore, issues such as environmental preservation, GHG emission
reductions, attainment of MDGs, energy security – all benefits of renewable energy –
flow naturally from Gibson et al.‘s core requirements for progress towards sustainability.
In other words, the general principle that may be extrapolated from the foregoing is that,
taken by itself, there can be no question that the concept of renewable energy is a
sustainable initiative.

3.6

Barriers to the Deployment of Renewable Energy Technologies
Today, many countries around the world have successfully incorporated forms of

renewable energy into their supply systems. These renewables include biomass,
geothermal energy, hydropower, ocean energy (wave, tidal, ocean thermal energy,
offshore wind), solar energy and wind energy. Outlined above are some of the factors that
have driven the evolutionary shift in these supply systems. However, despite the great
potential for renewable energy to assist in bridging the challenges to the world‘s energy
future, several factors hinder deeper integration of renewables into the global energy mix.
While it is possible to make a general list of these hindrances, the character and extent of
the hindrances are region and country specific. Generally, cost and financing, technology
and technological capacity, food security, lengthy permitting procedures, lack of policy,
regulatory and legislative frameworks and insufficient awareness of the opportunities for
renewable energy are all factors that provide resistance, delay or obstruction to renewable
energy deployment. In addition to being country specific, some barriers to renewable
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energy deployment are also specific to particular forms of renewable technologies. The
following chapter explores some of these barriers in relation to offshore wind.

3.7

Conclusion
The desire for continued socio-economic development has often brought

regrettable impacts upon the natural environment on which they depend. Decades of
unsustainable development and denial are backfiring. Limits to the resilience of our
environment are now on prominent display in the international arena, along with the
challenges of energy security, volatile energy prices, failure to meet the demands and
objectives of the MDGs, and the need for a sustainable way forward. The international
community has now come to the consensus that renewable energy offers a key
opportunity for gradually surmounting these difficult hurdles. 287
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CHAPTER FOUR
Wind Energy – From Onshore to Offshore: Issues and
Challenges

4.1

Introduction and Chapter Overview
In keeping with the objective to propose a policy and governance framework for

the regulation of offshore renewable energy development in the OECS, this chapter is a
narrative literature review of those technologies that impact ocean use and management.
Though there are tidal, ocean thermal energy conversion, wave and wind forms of
offshore energy, this chapter focuses only on wind energy. This is not for the purposes of
restricting the scope of the study, but as the decision that is commensurate with the
maturity of the technology, and the critical learnings to be had from the regulatory
experiences in the United Kingdom. The chapter begins with a brief historical overview
of the development of onshore wind power, what it is, how it operates and continues with
an overview of the advantages and disadvantages associated with modern development
and operation of onshore wind. Thereafter, chapter 4 explores some of the reasons why
countries around the world have begun to move wind power development offshore. The
practical challenges of developing offshore wind energy are then discussed in relation to
the United Kingdom.
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4.2

Wind Energy: A Brief History of is Evolution
Wind is an abundant and renewable resource that can supply a significant

percentage of the world‘s electricity demands. 288 Harnessing its energy potential is
nothing new. Early uses of wind can be traced to Christopher Columbus‘ first voyage to
the ‗New World‘ in 1492. Trade winds were used to propel La Niña, La Pinta and Santa
María from Palos, Spain, across unexplored waters to San Salvador in the Bahamas. 289
Additionally, for over 800 years, wind energy has been used to power windmills in
Europe for grinding grain into flour and meal and to provide power for agriculture and
other industrial activities.290 Additionally, windmills contributed to the expansion of
railroads in the ‗Wild, Wild West‘ of America by pumping water for use by steam
locomotives in the industrial era.291 In turn, the construction of new railroad networks
enabled westward expansion in America by facilitating cheaper transportation and
distribution of goods and services. Railroads spurred big business and economic growth
and are credited to have made an indelible contribution to American Industrialization. 292
Wind energy, therefore, made early rural electrification, 293 industry, trade, travel,
communication and overall economic growth possible.
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Wind energy also served as one of the solutions to negate escalating oil prices
during the 1970 oil crises.294 In the past few decades, heightened risks to energy security
and the issue of climate change have redirected interest towards wind energy
development.295 With this renewed interest, onshore wind energy grew and matured into
one of the first renewable technologies deployed commercially. 296 Generally, harvesting
the energy potential of wind becomes possible when atmospheric winds rotate a rotorblade propeller on a wind tower rotator shaft that turns a wind turbine. 297 Today, the
technology has gained global popularity and leads the way in renewable energy
generation.298 All the same, the onshore wind does not come without a few inherent
disadvantages.

4.3

Problems Associated with Onshore Development
There are several problems associated with onshore wind development. This

section briefly touches upon the following points: (1) The negative impact wind farms
pose to wild life conservation; (2) The high cost and intermittent nature of wind energy;
(3) The conflict wind farms pose to other land uses and interests which has sparked
strong ‗not in my backyard‘ protest.
There has been much apprehension about the negative impact wind farms pose to
wildlife conservation. Specifically, the rotating blades used to harness energy from the
294
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wind are of great concern because of their potential to contribute to increased bird and bat
mortality. However, it is argued that while wind farms increase risks to bird mortality,
their contribution to bird mortality is less significant than death caused by cats,
electrocution by electrical transmission wires, collisions with windows, poisoning by
pesticides and other pre-existing threats to bird life.299 Regardless of the amount of bird
deaths caused by wind farms in comparison to other pre-existing threats, the point to note
is that wind farms present legitimate risks to wild life.
One early disadvantage to the development of wind energy was its inability to
compete with considerably lower costs of generating energy from fossil fuel sources. 300
However, ―[o]wing to the increasing cost of fossil fuels, the value given to GHG
emission reductions and the reducing costs of wind turbine technology, wind projects are
beginning to compete directly with fossil-fuel plants as a source of electricity generation
in the windiest countries.‖301 Though these factors are slowly bridging the gap between
the cost of fossil fuel electricity and the cost of wind generated electricity, 302 the ability of
wind to be economically competitive varies from site to site and country to country, and
depends greatly on available wind speeds, the turbine technology used, and many other
variables. 303 Apart from its influence on the cost of energy, the variability of wind speeds
poses other interconnected disadvantages. For, though wind is an abundant resource, its
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variability means that it is not always predictable. 304 The electricity generated is
intermittent and creates risks of possible shortfalls in supply. 305 Therefore, for modern
purposes, wind power would require the use of batteries to store surplus energy, or
supplementary energy, in order to ensure that the generated supply of electricity matches
the actual demand.306
Additionally, to meaningfully effect emission reductions and meet modern energy
demands, wind farms would have to be constructed in great numbers and would,
therefore, require large areas of land. 307 In any given area, but more so in densely
populated areas and/or small countries, there is simply not enough land available to
construct wind turbines.308 Worse, there is not enough available land ―… with the right
ingredients for a wind project: strong and steady winds, a welcoming community and
easy access to transmission.‖ 309 If onshore wind development continues to grow, at some
point in time, construction will inevitably conflict with other land uses and interests
(unless of course construction is located in remote areas which are burdened with
expensive transmission costs310). One immediate concern is the proximity of wind
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turbines to residential areas. Traditionally, onshore wind turbines have often been
characterized by their negative visual311 and noise impact,312 which homeowners claim
contribute to the decline of property values 313. Proponents argue that this kind of
opposition to wind farms is not entirely genuine. 314 They claim that ―… those who find
wind turbines to be unsightly often ignore the great many forms of visual blight that litter
our landscape, among them cellphone towers, water towers, electric transmission lines,
radio towers and billboards.‖ 315 Despite, the soundness of this fact, the ‗not in my
backyard syndrome‘ or ―nimbyism‖ in relation to onshore wind farm development is
exceptionally vibrant, well organized and influential. 316 In the United Kingdom for
instance, there are over 150 groups that have fought tirelessly against the construction of
wind farms in their backyards.317 These groups have continually ―…stymied a reliable
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blockade‘‖].
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flow of projects‖318 and have now become significant barriers to renewable energy
development.319 One way to ―overcome‖ this barrier is to move development to the
offshore terrain320 where there is less nimbyism, 321 more development space, and more
opportunities for achieving a sustainable supply of electricity 322.

4.4

Wind Energy: Moving Onshore to Offshore
Until recently, harnessing clean, renewable energy from the winds was an

undertaking reserved for onshore development. Technology advanced by Denmark
opened this exclusive industry to the wide expanse of the offshore marine territory. In
2002, the Horns Rev wind farm sited 14-20 km off the Danish west coast came into
operation. With an installed capacity of 160 MW, the project signaled the end of a
pioneering phase in offshore wind energy development and is credited as having
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wind power—Protected seascapes, environmentalists‘ attitudes, and the technocratic planning perspective‖
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―…focused the attention of the [wind] industry.‖ 323 For quite some time, Denmark stood
as the leading producer of offshore wind energy in the world. However, as the idea of
exploiting the energy potential of more consistent winds in the offshore terrain quickly
spread to other marine countries, Denmark‘s dominance over the evolving industry was
fettered. To date, most development has been concentrated in North European countries:
Denmark, Sweden, Ireland, Netherlands and the United Kingdom. Of these countries, the
United Kingdom government and the devolved administrations of Scotland, Wales and
Northern Ireland have shown a keen interest in developing the winds along their
20,000km long coastline and the vast area of the adjacent sea. This keen interest has
spurred a massive growth in offshore wind energy. In 2008, the United Kingdom
overtook Denmark as the world leader in installed offshore wind capacity, and continues
to lead the way forward in offshore wind development.324

4.5

Impetus for Offshore Wind Development in the United Kingdom
Many factors have influenced the leadership and continued growth of offshore

wind energy generation in the United Kingdom. This section briefly outlines some of the
political factors that have encouraged offshore wind development in the UK. On one
hand, international and domestic obligations to reduce GHG emissions have driven the
development offshore wind in the UK. On the other hand, the desire to meet renewable
energy targets at the European Union and National level has also given significant
323
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political impetus for the development of offshore wind. Further, the ability of offshore
wind to contribute to energy security is also a factor that stimulates development.
The impetus for the development in the United Kingdom is often traced to
Denmark‘s publication of the European Wind Atlas325 which effectively documented and
mapped wind climate, magnitude and distribution of wind resources in European
Community countries, both onshore and offshore. The 1989 study identified the United
Kingdom as having the greatest wind resource of any European nation and, therefore,
best placed for offshore wind development. 326 This finding has been echoed in recent
wind capacity assessments, confirming that offshore wind power generation can
contribute to wider renewable energy production, and in turn, the related policy
objectives of emission reduction and security of energy supply in the United Kingdom. 327
For these reasons, offshore wind electricity generation has always formed a core part of
the United Kingdom‘s energy policy framework for a path towards a low carbon
economy. 328
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The United Kingdom is bound by international and domestic obligations to reduce
GHG emissions. Internationally, the Kyoto Protocol329 requires that the United Kingdom
cut its emissions by 12.5% below 1990 levels by the first commitment period, 2012.330 At
the domestic level, Parliament passed the Climate Change Act 2008.331 The Act
represents the first of its kind in the international community. It sets long-term, legally
binding targets for the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. By 2050, 332 the United
Kingdom must achieve an 80% cut relative to 1990 levels, and in the interim, at least a
34% cut in emissions by 2020. 333 Because two-thirds of the United Kingdom‘s emissions
come from energy use, the Act serves as a driver for large-scale adoption of low-carbon
sources of energy, such as offshore wind. To meet these targets, the government
published the UK Low Carbon Transition Plan: National Strategy for Climate and
Energy334 to serve as a roadmap to 2020 and beyond. The plan requires that 40% of
electricity be generated from low carbon sources --- renewables, nuclear and carbon
capture and storage --- if a 34% emission cut by 2020 is to be met. 335 Renewable energy
is expected to supply 30% of the low carbon energy target (40%).336 Finally, in
recognition of the indelible role renewable energy is to play in the UK Low Carbon
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Transition Plan, the government developed also, a Renewable Energy Strategy337 to
secure its advancement. The final renewable commitment is to ensure that 15% of the
total electricity supplied comes from renewable sources by 2020. 338 It is anticipated that
offshore wind energy will be the prime contributor to the overall renewable energy
generation target.339 At the Community level, it is expected that by 2030, approximately
half of Europe‘s wind electricity will be produced offshore.340
As well, by generating 15% of total electricity supply from renewable sources,
the United Kingdom would be able to reduce ―…overall fossil fuel demand by 10% and
gas imports by between 20-30% against what they would have been in 2020.‖ 341 Because
offshore wind is expected to meet the bulk of the 15% target, it contributes to improving
energy security in the UK by helping to recover some measure of energy self-sufficiency.
Oil, gas and coal account for 90% of energy needs in the United Kingdom. 342 Over the
past decade, oil and gas reserves have been on the decline. 343 Presently, the United
Kingdom does not retain a secure supply of these high-demand fossil fuels. The potential
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contribution that offshore wind can make to energy security is therefore a major factor
that has and continues to influence development of the offshore wind industry in the
United Kingdom.

4.5.1 Other Practical and Technical Advantages to Locating Wind Farms
Offshore
As previously noted, moving wind farms to the offshore terrain has many
practical advantages. These advantages include: (1) more development space; (2) greater
turbine sizes; (3) easier delivery of turbine technology by sea; (4) less nimbyism and land
acquisition complexities; and (5) greater average wind speeds. Firstly, the wide expanse
of the ocean provides more development space for the construction of major projects. 344
This is especially important given the increasing technological trend to use larger wind
turbines with rotor diameters of 60M or more, in order to generate more, and significantly
cheaper, electricity. 345 Unlike onshore development, the wide expanse of the ocean does
not restrict wind turbine size;346 instead, it better accommodates advancements in wind
generation technology. For instance, delivery of massive wind turbines to offshore sites is
relatively easier by barge or ship, in comparison to delivery by land for onshore works. 347
Additionally, erection of large structures in the ocean is easily facilitated by the use of
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existing know-how and technology, such as cranes, which are used in the offshore oil and
gas industry. 348
Additionally, the Crown Estate, as a body corporate, is charged with the
management of land, other property, and the rights and interests that are vested in the
Crown.349 The seabed extending to 12 nm from the baseline (the territorial sea) forms part
of Crown ―land‖ and is ―owned‖ and regulated by the Crown Estate. Once declared, a
coastal State also holds exclusive rights to the exploration and use of natural resources in
the exclusive economic zone. Therefore, by moving offshore, developers escape land
acquisition complexities and delays associated with onshore wind development. 350
Moreover, because onshore topography negatively impacts average wind
speeds, 351 the resource potential is much greater offshore, i.e., the wind strength is much
stronger and less turbulent over the seas. 352 In addition, the further out to sea a turbine is
built, the greater its potential to capture more wind energy. 353 As well, the further out to
sea a turbine is built, the greater the potential is for noise and visual impact reduction. 354
Together, these offshore factors present a unique development opportunity for offshore
wind farms to generate unlimited amounts of electricity. 355 Lastly, because land space for
development is scarce, experience in offshore wind farm development has been rapidly
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increasing. 356 The offshore industry is, admittedly, not in its prime, but it is well beyond
its infancy.

4.6

Problems Associated with Offshore Wind Development
As one might expect, the disadvantages of offshore wind farms are drastically

different from their onshore counterparts. While there is less concern about noise and
visual impacts,357 there is great concern about high capital costs, increased dangers of
construction at sea, collision risks to migratory birds, noise impact on marine mammals
and fish, and impacts on commercial fishing and other existing uses and interests in the
marine environment such as shipping and navigation. This section briefly outlines each of
these problems associated with offshore wind development.
One of the biggest drawbacks to going offshore is the high capital, operation and
maintenance,358 and decommissioning costs associated with the development.359 It is
estimated that offshore wind is still some 50% more expensive than onshore wind. 360 The
difference in overall cost can be traced to the complex and specialized nature of offshore
wind energy development.361 In particular, challenging weather and wave conditions,362
356
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water depth at site location, and the distance to onshore grid systems, 363 are just a few of
the factors that influence the excessive cost of developing and maintaining a wind energy
industry offshore.364 Though offshore wind is 50% more expensive than onshore wind, it
is believed that the costs are offset by the ability to generate several hundred megawatts
of electricity, due to high offshore wind. 365 The expected benefit of more wind is one of
the prime driving forces for offshore wind development in several countries. 366
International demand for cleaner and more reliable sources of electricity is also driving
developers to look at offshore wind power as viable potential energy sources despite
concerns about costs.

367

In the recent past, technological developments have

dramatically improved the economic viability of offshore projects. It is predicted,
therefore, that continued technological learning will improve offshore wind economics in
the future.368
Even so, the popular acceptance of offshore wind turbines as a sustainable and
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emission-free form of energy does not mean that the technology has no negative impacts
on the marine environment and, thus, may not conflict with marine conservation
initiatives. First, while data on collision mortality with offshore wind farms is limited, 369
there is some consensus that offshore wind farms fatally impact several species of
seabirds, terrestrial birds370 and migratory birds,371 though not significantly. Apart from
collision risks, other impacts include: ―short-term habitat loss during construction phase;
long-term habitat loss due to disturbance from wind turbines installed and from ship
traffic during maintenance; barriers to movement in migratory routes; and disconnection
of ecological units.‖372
Noise associated with the construction and operation of offshore wind turbines can
also negatively affect marine mammals. 373 Noise pollution is produced not only from the
turbines themselves, but also from the heavy helicopter and boat traffic associated with
construction and operation. Noise in the marine environment ultimately distorts
mammals‘ ability to use their hearing for communication, orientation, finding prey and
echolocation. 374 Noise distortions could therefore cause stress and increased vulnerability
to diseases. 375
Potentially, noise can also affect fish species. To date, data regarding noise impacts
369
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on fish are still limited. 376 Generally however, any noise impacts would be relatively
short-term as they coincide with construction works. 377 In addition, though there are some
negligible impacts, the installation of turbine foundations in the ocean have been found to
increase general biodiversity of fish and benthos species in the wind farm area, thereby
creating new local ecosystems.378 However, though biodiversity may be boosted in wind
farm areas, the very operation of wind farms in the ocean could potentially cause
disruptions to commercial fishing activities. 379 The issue of concern for most fishermen is
that the construction of wind turbines in fishing grounds restricts their access to those
areas for the operational life of the wind farm. 380 While it is believed that commercial
fisheries have not been significantly impacted by wind farms, the situation is likely to
change in the future with the projected growth of offshore wind farms. 381 Already,
existing offshore industries, such as oil and gas, aggregate dredging, and ports and
telecommunications, legally oust and/or restrict access to fishing grounds in their
development areas. Compounding the problem are designated conservation areas that also
restrict the freedom to fish the seas. Therefore, an offshore wind industry that causes the
same, albeit for safety purposes, will inevitably frustrate free access for fishermen and
ultimately impact commercial fishing. 382 Furthermore, even in the absence of regulations
that restrict access, fishermen legitimately fear the risk of collision with structural
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impediments in the sea that support turbines. 383 Impediments in the sea bottom may also
restrict the types of fishing gear that may be used. For instance, bottom-set drift nets are
only useable if the seabed is smooth.384 Any cables and other structures that cannot be
buried would potentially impact fishing practices. 385 The fact is that fishermen need
unrestricted access to fishing grounds and between fishing grounds. Wind farms have
great potential to negatively impact a fisherman‘s livelihood. It is predicted, however,
that future wind farm layouts and turbine technology will increase maneuverability
between turbines and, therefore, increase the probability of returning to fishing as usual
practices.386
There has also been some concern about the dangers that offshore turbines pose to
leisure and commercial navigation. Ship collisions with turbines are obviously real
possibilities.387 Nevertheless, collisions can be significantly mitigated by the use of radar
equipment and the imposition of shipping traffic controls which prohibit navigation in a
wind farm area. 388 The risk of collision can also be managed by locating wind farms in
areas that do not obstruct recognized sea lanes.

Lastly, offshore wind farms may also

interfere with radio and radar signals which could potentially cause major difficulties for
flight controllers, civil and military activity, and meteorology. 389
Apart from outlining the problems associated with offshore wind development,
this section also served to underscore a more general point made earlier in Chapter 3 of
this study, that is, that renewable sources of energy, are as much associated with negative
383
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environmental impact as they are associated with environmental benefits. Therefore, even
though it is accepted that our energy future needs alternative sources of energy, ―…which
when consumed, are free of environmental impact,‖390 the installation and operation of
these sources of energy are not entirely free from environmental impact. Again, for
governments, it is really a matter of making appropriate choices about what combination
of energy sources brings the lowest harm while providing the greatest benefit. This view
aside, it is generally accepted that in comparison to conventional fossil fuel generation
which contributes to the problem of global warming, renewable energy resources impose
the least regrettable impacts on the environment, human health and the economy. 391 As
will be seen in the next chapter, Chapter 5, the truth of this premise really depends on the
manner in which governments permit renewable energy development.

4.7

Conclusion
This chapter has demonstrated that harvesting the energy potential of the wind is

nothing new. The chapter began by exploring the unmistakable history of experience in
onshore wind energy generation and the prevailing political and environmental impetus to
increase wind energy for climate change mitigation and energy security purposes. It was
noted that these agendas ensured a dramatic improvement in onshore wind energy
technology. Thereafter, the chapter explored problems and barriers associated with
onshore wind development. Chief among these barriers is the issue of shortages of land
area with the right ingredients for a wind project: strong and steady winds, a welcoming
community and easy access to transmission.‘ Initially, it was believed that moving wind
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development offshore provides the opportunity to evade these onshore barriers, and to
continue progress towards a sustainable supply of electricity. 392 Indeed, there is less
―nimbyism,‖ stronger support from environmental NGOs, and the availability of
seemingly unlimited development space. In this respect the chapter outlined reasons for
moving wind development offshore and then focused on the impetus for offshore wind
development in the United Kingdom. Subsequently, the chapter developed the premise
that the process of harnessing the energy potential of offshore winds is generally met with
gauntlet of challenges. Apart financial challenges, several legitimate concerns, constraints
and conflicts from stakeholders in the marine territory were considered. Despite these
challenges, the interest in the potential for offshore wind to assist in the creation of a lowcarbon energy future was explored. The challenge for any regulatory regime is to develop
a governance framework that respects the various stakeholder interests while ensuring
continued progress towards a sustainable supply of electricity from the trade winds.
Chapter 5 assesses the extent to which the United Kingdom has braved the challenge.
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CHAPTER FIVE
The United Kingdom Offshore Wind Consents Regime

5.1

Introduction and Background Information
The preceding chapter noted the massive potential of the United Kingdom to

develop its offshore wind resource to meet its energy objectives, and the strong European
Union support for its advancement in this regard. Like any other new technology and
development, the process of harnessing the energy potential of offshore winds meets with
several pressing concerns and conflicts in the marine territory. 393 There has been much
concern about how the offshore wind industry will be developed; where wind farms will
be located; and the conditions under which they will be permitted to enter the marine
territory. Already, the marine environment serves varied and competing interests, uses
and/or pressures for the sustenance of modern living. These interests include fishing,
dredging, shipping, transport, oil and gas, navigation and leisure for example. The
introduction of a new player into the marine environment is bound to cause some conflict
with these previously established and legitimate uses of the seas. Offshore wind farms
also have great potential to negatively impact marine conservation initiatives, and the use
of cables and pipelines which have their specific roles in economic activities. When the
first offshore wind systems were deployed in the United Kingdom, the regulatory regime
failed to address these concerns and conflicts in a coherent way. This is largely due to the
fact that regulations concerning construction in the marine territory were never
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formulated to facilitate offshore renewable energy generation. 394 As it relates to offshore
wind, the initial consents process is described as ―… a cobbling together of existing
measures originally drawn up for a diverse range of other activities, including on-land
electricity

generation,

offshore

construction

works,

navigation

and

marine

conservation.‖395 Sections 5.3 to 5.3.3.3 below, describe the consent process in more
detail. As will be obvious from these sections, the process for approving offshore wind
farms is referred to as a ―consents process‖ based on the terminology of the various
legislations that require developers to seek ‗consent‘ to carry on activity related to the
development of offshore wind turbines.
Historically, the management, control and regulation of marine activities have
gradually developed in an ad hoc, reactive and fragmented pattern with little integration
between different sectors.396 Piecemeal approaches to regulating activity in the marine
environment are generally considered to be overlapping and confusing. 397 For decisionmakers, piecemeal approaches restrict the ability to properly assess the cumulative
impacts of marine activities.398 The British story399 is no different from that narrated in
Canada,400 the United States401 or the Caribbean region.402 For instance, oil and gas
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exploration, navigation, dredging, fishing and other marine activities in the United
Kingdom were regulated as commercial viability necessitated or in response to the
demands of international standards and obligations. 403 Generally, in the European Union
―[p]olicies on, for instance, maritime transport, fisheries, energy … [and] the marine
environment … have developed on separate tracks, which leads to inefficiencies,
incoherencies and conflicts of use.‖404 It comes as no surprise therefore, that British
initiatives to realize offshore wind potential would begin by joining the tradition of
piecemeal regulation-making, and further obscure an already messy marine management
regime.

5.2

Chapter Overview
This Chapter is a case study of the development of the offshore wind regulatory

regime in the United Kingdom. To date, there have been three identifiable regulatory
attempts to establish the manner in which offshore wind technologies will be allowed to
enter the marine environment. Each regulatory approach coincided with the government‘s
decision to deploy a new round of wind projects, that is, a different consents process was
used to approve Round 1, Round 2, and Round 3 projects. In chronological order, this
Chapter outlines the consents approaches used to approve project applications under each
round of development. Each consent process is then considered in light of Howlett et al.‘s
three-dimensional new governance framework outlined in Chapter 2. Thereafter, Gibson
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et al.‘s core requirements for progress towards sustainability, also outlined in Chapter 2,
will be used to measure the effectiveness of the substantive outcomes of each consent
process.

5.3

Round 1 – The First Consents Process for Offshore Wind
The first wind farms to enter the UK marine environment are collectively known

as ―Round 1‖. ―[Round 1 wind projects were intended] to act as a ‗demonstration‘ round
[to provide] prospective developers with an environment in which they could gain
technological, economic and environmental experience.‖ 405 As a precaution, these
windfarms could only be developed within 10km2 of the seabed, and with no more than
thirty wind turbines to generate a minimum installed capacity of 20 MW. 406 Proposed
developments were given consent under existing marine development regulations and
procedures, which were slightly modified for the purpose.407 In 2000, the Crown Estate
invited bids for the development of the offshore wind industry. Industry proponents were
invited to propose site locations for Round 1 and thereafter seek development consent to
begin construction. Ultimately, seventeen projects received consent.

5.3.1 First Stop: The Crown Estate Lease
Typically, a developer began the consents process by seeking pre-approval from
the Crown Estate to apply for a development site. As noted in Chapter 4, the Crown
405
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Estate is a body corporate charged on behalf of the Crown to manage land and other
property, rights and interests vested in the Crown. 408 The seabed extending to 12 nm from
the baseline (the territorial sea) forms part of Crown ―land‖ and is ―owned‖ and regulated
by the Crown Estate. Proponents who wished to develop the marine territory within the
10km2 restriction were required to seek the permission of the Crown Estate. The Crown
Estate evaluates the financial standing, wind turbine expertise and offshore experience of
the developer and, if satisfactory, enters into an agreement for a lease with the
developer. 409 The agreement materializes into a formal lease to be signed only when the
developer has obtained all necessary statutory consents for the project. 410

5.3.2 Other Statutory Consents Required for Offshore Wind Projects
The consents process allows decision-makers to determine whether a particular
offshore wind proposal should be granted consent for development. The process involves
a consideration of the positive and negative impacts a specific project could likely have
on existing interests and uses of ocean spaces, and where necessary, the protection of
same.411 It also involves a consideration of the potential contribution a specific project, if
developed, could have on the attainment of national targets and policy objectives.412
Given the importance attached to the consents process, Round 1 developers were required
to obtain several statutory consents from different government agencies which
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represented a range of interests and users of the marine territory. Consents could be
obtained either under the Electricity Act 1989413 (Consent Route 1), or the Transport and
Works Act 1992414 (Consent Route 2). Round 1 developers could choose either consents
route. This chapter will deal only with Consents Route 1 as the majority of rounds 1 and
2 consent applications have been made under this route.415

5.3.3 Consents Route 1
Under section 36 of the Electricity Act 1989 (EA), it is an offence to construct,
extend or operate a generating station with a capacity of 50 MWs or more, without the
consent of the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry. 416 This section 36 consent
requirement was initially legislated to enable the Government to regulate the
development of onshore electricity generating facilities. However, a 2001 Order417
extended the ambit of section 36 to include the development of offshore wind and water
generating stations. Thereafter, developers needed to obtain consent from the Department
of Trade and Industry to construct, extend or operate a generating station which is wholly
or partly driven by wind or water, and situated in the territorial waters of England and
Wales, and has a generation capacity of 1MW or more. 418 Note however, that the section
does not apply to those offshore wind and wave stations that come under the purview of
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the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 by virtue of their site location. 419 Developers
also needed to obtain a section 37 consent under the Electricity Act for the installation of
overhead electric lines needed for electricity transmission.
Under consents route 1, a developer was also required to obtain approval for
marine works that are detrimental to navigation. The very nature of offshore wind
development would automatically trigger application of section 34 of the Coast
Protection Act 1949 (CPA).420 Under this section, the developer must seek consent from
the Department for Transportation for the construction, alteration or improvement of any
works on the level of mean high water springs. Consent must also be given for the
deposit or removal of any object or material from the defined area. It is to be noted that a
section 34 consent is only necessary where these works will cause or are likely to result
in obstruction or danger to navigation either when being carried out or subsequently. The
consent therefore does not authorize these works for the protection of the environment
but to ensure safety of navigation.
In addition, under Part II of the Food and Environment Protection Act 1985
(FEPA), the developer must obtain a licence from the Department of Environment Food
and Rural Affairs for any deposit of substances and articles within UK waters either in
the sea or under the seabed.421 In making a decision whether to issue a FEPA licence, the
licensing authority ―… shall have regard to the need to protect the marine environment,
the living resources which it supports and human health; and to prevent interference with
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legitimate uses of the sea…‖ 422 Finally, EA, CPA and FEPA applications must be
supported by an Environmental Statement.

5.3.3.1 Environmental Impact Assessment Requirements
Since 1985, European Union legislation placed an obligation on Member States to
adopt mechanisms to ensure that relevant consenting authorities take into account the
direct and indirect effects of certain public and private projects that are likely to have
significant impact on the environment by virtue of their nature, size, or location, before
granting approval for project development. 423 An Environmental Impact Assessment
(EIA) is therefore necessary for the identification, description and assessment of issues
related to the proposed project for consideration in the decision-making process. Projects
that seek approval to construct, extend, or operate power stations, whether onshore or
offshore, are captured by the Directive. 424 For power station development, the UK has
transposed the obligation on consenting authorities through various rules and regulations.
Generally, where a developer seeks consent under the Electricity Act, the
developer is obligated to ―… have regard to the desirability of preserving natural beauty,
of conserving flora, fauna and geological or physiographical features of special
interests…‖ and must do what is reasonably possible to mitigate any effects on the
same.425 Recently, however, more formal EIA obligations have been fixed to offshore
wind farm applications under the Electricity Act by the Electricity Works Regulations
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2000.426 The Regulations explicitly prohibit the granting of development consent where
the application for offshore wind development is unaccompanied by an Environmental
Statement for consultation by the relevant consenting authority. 427 The Environmental
Statement is a report detailing the findings of the required EIA. It should contain such
information as prescribed by the regulations, including project description, size and
location, the likely environmental impacts and mitigation measures. 428 The Regulations
also enumerate procedures for applicants to engage in public consultation regarding the
environmental implications of the proposed development. 429 The designated local
planning authority must also be given an opportunity to consider the application. 430
Having regard to the Environmental Statement and the results of both consultation
exercises, the Department of Trade and Industry must then publish a reasoned decision on
the application.431
Additionally, under consents route 1, a developer must satisfy EIA obligations
attached to a Section 34 CPA consent application by the Harbour Works Regulations
1999.432
Lastly, although legislation has not been enacted to transpose EIA obligations to
FEPA licence applications, section 8(5) of FEPA gives the licensing authority
discretionary power to demand that an applicant conduct examinations or tests ‗which
may be necessary to enable the authority to decide whether a licence should be issued to
[that] applicant.‘ Under this section, the licensing authority may decide that information
426
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equivalent to an EIA must be supplied by the applicant to enable the licensing authority
to properly consider the application. In practice, Round 1 applications have had to
comply with EIA requirements under FEPA and CPA.433

5.3.3.2 Appropriate Assessment Requirements
In addition to general EIA requirements, offshore wind applications may also be
subject to Appropriate Assessment requirements under European Union and national
legislation. The EU Birds Directive434 and the Habitats Directive435 require Member
States to designate conservation areas within the Community for the protection of listed
wild birds and natural habitats respectively. Under article 6(3) of the Habitats Directive,
any development that is likely to have a significant impact on the above-mentioned
conservation areas must be subjected to an Appropriate Assessment of its implications.
Additionally, the relevant national authority may only permit developments, if, in their
opinion, said developments will not adversely affect the integrity of any conservation
area.436 The relevant authority may also have regard to public opinion in deciding
whether to permit developments which adversely impact conservation areas. 437 These
directives are given legislative force in territorial waters through several regulations: the
Birds Directive is implemented through the Wild Life and Countryside Act 1981438 and
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the Conservation Regulations 1994439 while the Habitats Directive is transposed through
the Conservation Regulations 1994.

5.3.3.3 Consent for Onshore Components of Offshore Wind Farms
In addition to the statutory consents and EIA requirements detailed above, the
construction of offshore wind farms are likely to require construction, extension or
operation of onshore works, for example, the onshore stations. Generally, planning
permission is required from the relevant local planning authority for the carrying out of
any development on land. 440 However, section 90(2) of the Town and Country Planning
Act 1990 allows an applicant for development consent under section 36 of the Electricity
Act to simultaneously apply for ‗deemed planning permission.‘

5.3.4 Application of the Howlett et al. Three-dimensional New Governance
Assessment to the Round 1 Consents Process
The preceding sections have outlined the range of possible consents and licences
required for Round 1 offshore wind development in the UK. The following sub-sections
apply the three-dimensional analytical framework of Howlett et al. to the Round 1
decision-making process. To recap, the first dimension created by the Howlett et al. is the
political dimension. In this mode of governance, the authors were mainly concerned with
one question: ―whether political power – that is, the ability to make legitimate,
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authoritative decisions allocating societal resources – favours state or non-state actors.‖441
It can be argued on end about what it means for political power to be vested in the state
and what it means for that power to be vested in society-driven actors.442 Earlier, in
Chapter 2, it was noted that ―…many people have been disappointed with the ability of
government to tackle social problems.‖ 443 At the same time, New Governance scholars
argue that the social trait of non-state actors would influence more effective rules and
solutions to social problems. 444 These are issues that the framework forces one to
consider after having identified whether the political power in the regime favours state or
non-state actors.
The other two dimensions recognize that there is more to a governance
arrangement than political power. The second dimension for instance, is symbolic of the
fact that ―[i]nstitutions set the framework for the exercise of power.‖445 In this dimension,
Howlett et al. were concerned with the constitution and composition of institutional
structures, i.e., are the institutions formally or informally constituted? Are the institutions
composed of state or non-state actors? Essentially, in their view, these characteristics
determine ―…the abilities of various state and non-state actors to prevail in policy
disputes and decisions, as well as the possibilities for the choice of the policy instruments
used to implement the mode of governance.‖ 446
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The third dimension focuses attention on the nature of the legal instruments used
in the governance arrangement under study. The authors were concerned about whether
the legal regime is characterized by traditional top-down hierarchical government control
through laws and regulations or market-oriented regulation which are generally flexible
and voluntary. In other words, the focus is on whether the regulatory practice is reflective
of the hard or soft law approach to governance.
Overall, in each of the dimensions, the focus is on locating the governance
arrangement, (is it State (hierarchical)? or Non-State (plurilateral)?), of each mode of
governance (political, institutional, regulatory). Howlett et al. describe the key to using
the framework in the following terms: ―…movement along the horizontal ‗hierarchical‘
to ‗plurilateral‘ axis is seen as being associated with changes along three distinct but
overlapping vertical dimensions: namely institutional structures, political practices and
regulatory techniques… .” 447 In other words, in moving across the horizontal axis, the
fundamental question is whether there is one actor or many actors in each mode of
governance, and who those actors are.

5.3.4.1 The Political Dimension
The range of consents and licences required demonstrate the involvement of
several actors in the decision-making process. These actors play various roles and
perform various responsibilities and, thus, can be grouped by their affiliate state or nonstate orientations.
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On the state side, the central bodies involved in the development and regulation of
the offshore wind industry are the Crown Estate (sea bed lease), the Department of Trade
and Industry (energy policy and section 36 EA consent), the Department for
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (FEPA licence and EIA) and the Department for
Transport (section 34 CPA consent).448
Although it may not be expressly reflected by the consents process, many nonstate actors also hold an interest in the development and regulation of offshore wind. The
main non-state actors include the public, industry developers, environmental pressure
groups, statutory environmental consultees and trade organizations representing shipping
and fishing interests. The consensus is that many State and Non-State actors hold an
interest in offshore wind development and regulation. The question remains, which
among these State and Non-State actors is actually charged with power to determine
whether a particular offshore wind project will be given approval for development.
A quick review of the consents process would confirm that power to produce
legally binding outcomes on consents applications is concentrated in the hands of State
actors. However, while power to make decisions is legally vested in the State, legitimate
questions can be raised as to whether Non-State actors influence the exercise of State
power over consents applications. This question turns on two variables. The first variable
concerns the identity of the Non-State actor in question. This is of particular importance
because it characterizes the interest of the non-state actor in the regime, and hints to its
preference of outcome on consents applications. The second variable speaks to whether
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the non-state actor has the capacity to influence State power in the direction of their
preferred outcome.
In Chapter 4, the point was made that the public has had an indisputably dominant
and influential role in the decision-making process for onshore wind farms in the United
Kingdom.449 Over 150 groups have fought tirelessly against the construction of wind
farms in their backyard.450 These NIMBY protesters are consistently described as ―wellorganized opponents to wind farm development.‖451 Essentially, they have become
significant barriers to renewable energy development in local communities 452 by
continually stymieing a reliable flow of projects.453 For quite some time, the prospect of
offshore wind development has won over the support of NIMBY protesters for the mere
fact that locating wind projects offshore align with Not-In-My-Back-Yard initiatives.454
Their large numbers and interests in offshore development have given them sufficient
capacity to influence State action in the consents process. The same can be said for
environmental pressure groups such as Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace who have
welcomed British offshore wind development from its inception as a demonstration by
the Government of their ambition to defeat global warming. 455 Therefore, in granting
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project approvals, state actors are given the confidence that development is in the best
interest of the community and environmental pressure groups that strongly support the
industry.
Industry developers also exercise a strong influence on the outcome of consents
applications and the development of the offshore wind regime in general. The British
Wind Energy Association (BWEA) is a formally established trade body that represents
industry developers who want to see offshore wind energy generation realized. 456
Politically, offshore wind energy generation must happen if the UK is meet their
renewable energy targets. The nexus between BWEA and the State is the undeniable fact
that their interests also align. BWEA‘s advocacy goes far beyond ‗offshore wind energy
is essential to sustain modern living,‘ to include advocacy for change in energy policy
and legislation to facilitate development of offshore wind. For instance, in 2002, BWEA
submitted an Energy Policy Review457 to the DTI stressing the massive contribution
offshore wind could make to the attainment of national energy goals. In the review,
BWEA warned DTI that ―…the prospects for offshore are zero without a swiftly
implemented 'future offshore' process and consenting regime. [And that] until such time
as these are in place, there will be no further offshore development [my emphasis].‖458
The BWEA was adamant that there needed to be a ―satisfactory conclusion of
negotiations‖ between BWEA and the Government on swifter consents processes. 459
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Obviously, therefore, BWEA has been working closely with the relevant government
institutions, and pressuring the development of policy and legislation on the offshore
process and consents regime. 460 A quick review of Hansard would confirm Parliament‘s
reliance on BWEA‘s organized advocacy and research. ―The superior strength of the
offshore wind industry…‖ enabled them to exercise a greater influence over the decisionmaking process and the outcome, in comparison to fishermen who stood to be most
adversely affected by offshore wind development. 461
There is great complexity in considering whether fishers have the capacity to
influence State action. This complexity is linked to the overall ‗chronic fragmentation‘ of
the fishing industry. In Offshore Wind Farms and Commercial Fishing: A Study in
Stakeholder Consultation, it was found that consultation views of fishers in relation to
offshore wind farms were not representative of the entire fishing industry. 462 In assessing
fishermen views and interests, ‗consultations‘ were held with national fishermen‘s
associations. These national associations represented the larger fishing vessels in the
commercial industry. However, it was found that less than 20% of English and Welch
fishers were members of a national fishermen‘s association. 463 Most fishermen belonged
to local associations, which were ―loose, fissiparous… and rival‖ - characteristics that
invited easy exploitation by developers and weakened bargaining power.464
Unfortunately, these were the category of fishermen against offshore wind development
and unable to prove entitlement to compensation. The overall ‗chronic fragmentation‘ of
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the fishing industry was found to affect the ability of fishers‘ opinion to prevail in the
decision-making process.465
Another factor that characterizes the fishing industry‘s weak influence in the
decision-making regime is the ―…government‘s enthusiastic support for offshore wind
farms.‖466 It is no secret that the UK government is in full support of offshore wind
development. The mandates of climate change and energy security have garnered enough
political momentum to ensure that there is no turning back. Fishers‘ representatives argue
that a fisherman‘s story about the loss of livelihood, and the need for compensation,
would fail to measure up to a story about global climate change and needed mitigation.467
It is clear from the above assessment that there are many stakeholders in the
offshore wind farm consents process representing many interests. It is also clear, that
amongst those stakeholders power to produce legally binding outcomes on consent
applications is concentrated in the State. Therefore, in the context of the Howlett
framework, it would appear that the political dimension is characterized by traditional
hierarchical governance. However, it was also found that in practice, this state-directed
governance arrangement is vulnerable to pressures exerted by formally instituted nonState actors. Therefore, in the context of the Howlett framework, this dynamic has
created movement along the horizontal axis of the political dimension, ultimately creating
a de facto plurilateral governance arrangement.

465

Ibid.
Ibid. at 137.
467
Gray et al., ―Stakeholder Consultation‖, supra note 323 at 137.
466

109

Fig. 4
Placement of the Round 1 Political Power on Michael Howlett et al.‘s Political
Dimension

5.3.4.2 The Institutional Dimension
The founding concept under this dimension is that ―[i]nstitutions set the framework
for the exercise of power.‖468 Here, Howlett et al. were concerned with the constitution
and composition of institutional structures used to exercise power. Institutions may be
formally or informally constituted and composed of state actors, non-state actors or both.
Essentially, in their view, these characteristics determine ―…the abilities of various state
and non-state actors to prevail in policy disputes and decisions, as well as the possibilities
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for the choice of the policy instruments used to implement the mode of governance.‖469
Institutions, therefore, are linked to decision making. Based on the assessment of the
political dimension in the previous subsection, the prima facie assumption can be made
that the institutional arrangements that had the capacity to make legally binding decisions
and influence the outcome of Round 1 consent applications are typically characterized by
formal establishment.
As it relates to State actors, their power to produce binding decisions on consents
applications was exercised through four main governmental departments: the Crown
Estate, the Department of Trade and Industry, the Department for Environment, Food and
Rural Affairs and the Department for Transport. These governmental bodies determine
whether a particular offshore wind project will be given consent for development.
Another characteristic of these governmental departments is that they were all established
by acts of parliament. Therefore, the common trait among state actors is that their power
is exercised through governmental departments that are formally established by acts of
parliament, and are therefore empowered to produce legally binding outcomes on
consents applications.
As noted in the assessment of the political dimension above, there is a wide range
of stakeholders that hold an interest in the offshore wind consents process other than the
state. In fact, diversity in institutional arrangements is borne out in how these non-state
actors are organized.
Since 1978, the BWEA, a trade body, has represented industry developers.
BWEA‘s formal establishment has afforded it the opportunity to conduct focused
research, reviews and consultations which arm it with the necessary tools to convince
469
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Government that offshore wind development is in the best interests of the community at
large. As noted in section 5.3.4.1 above, this formal arrangement has allowed industry
developers to influence policy, legislation and consents outcomes.
By definition, the public is not, per se, formally instituted. However, its strong
support for offshore wind is channeled through NIMBY organizations that have
developed into formal institutions. However, outside of the public‘s affiliate status within
NIMBY organizations, those who objected to offshore wind development retained some
formal structure as ―statutory consultees‖ where regulatory instruments require decisionmakers and industry developers to consult with them. So for instance, where an
application is made for consent under the Electricity Act, the Secretary of State for the
Department of Trade and Industry must serve notice on the relevant local planning
authority, which is also a governmental institution. 470 The planning process allows the
general public to register their views on the application. If the local planning authority
decides to lodge objections, the Secretary of State is obligated to cause a public enquiry
to be held.471 In determining whether to give consent, the Secretary of State is obligated
to consider the objection and the results of the public inquiry. 472 However, where
objections are received from persons other than the relevant planning authority, the
Secretary of State holds a discretionary power to decide whether a public inquiry is
necessary. 473 Furthermore, unlike objections received from planning authorities, there is
no provision in the Act obligating the Secretary of State to consider objections from other
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persons when deciding whether to grant development consent. This seems purposeful.
Surely, to give such standing to stakeholders would open the floodgates. Nonetheless,
where the general public registers their views with the local planning authority, the
―…planning authorit[y] may convey local feeling as part of their consultation
response.‖474 Therefore, ―…the involvement of local authorities [in the decision-making
process], albeit limited, does provide some opportunity for public comment and
representation on individual projects.‖475 However, as can be seen from the above,
planning authorities take a relatively peripheral role in the consents process. As to the
‗peripheral role‘ of planning authorities, it is argued that because offshore wind farms lie
wholly outside the jurisdiction of any planning authority ―… there is no relevant planning
authority under the terms of the Electricity Act (schedule 8) and therefore the power of
planning authorities to object and bring about a public inquiry does not apply.‖ 476
Causatively, this ‗peripheral role‘ restricts the opportunity for wider public involvement
in the development of offshore wind farms. 477 Alternatively, however, the public may
intervene in the consents process through consultation procedures under EIAs.
Lastly, although fishers have organized themselves into formal structures, these
structures are more typical of ‗non-cohesive networks,‘478 whose members have failed to
develop a consensus on offshore wind development. The chronic fragmentation of
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fishers‘ structural arrangements has critically constrained their capacity to prevail in
decisions that affect their livelihood. 479
This section reviewed and characterized governmental institutional structures,
non-governmental environmental agencies, the public, industry institutional structures,
and the intuitional arrangement of the most affected stakeholders – fishermen. The
conclusion that can be drawn from this assessment is that the institutional arrangements
that had the capacity to influence the outcome of Round 1 consents applications were
characterized by formal establishment. The governmental bodies and the BWEA were all
characterized by formal establishment, and therefore, best placed to influence consents
decisions. Most notably however, on the institutional dimension, the government retained
an important structural advantage in the consents process largely due to its ownership of
the sea bed and formal legislative control over activities in the marine area. On the other
hand, weaker parties such as fishers suffer from such a description because of their
inability to organize themselves into a cohesive network for representation. In this regard,
the institutional arrangements under Round 1 retained some plurilateral features.
However, the government was able to dominate the consents process by moving upwards
along the vertical axis of the institutional dimension away from informality towards more
formal structures. Additionally, there has been very little movement along the horizontal
axis of the institutional dimension. In sum, the institutional dimension is mainly
representative of hierarchical governance.
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Fig. 5
Placement of the Round 1 Institutional Structures on Michael Howlett et al.‘s
Institutional Dimension

5.3.4.3 The Regulatory Dimension
Power to make decisions on consents applications is legally concentrated in the
hands of the state and exercised through formally established institutions. This dynamic
has influenced the creation of an offshore wind consents regime that respects traditional
top-down hierarchical government control through laws and regulations. In relation to
Welch waters it was found that ―[t]he law governing the protection and management of
the marine environment is found in a large number of statutes, regulations and orders.‖480
The preceding sections, which outline the range of possible consents required for offshore
480

Linley-Adams ―Case Study on Marine Renewable Energy‖, supra note 396.

115

wind development, confirm this finding. Essentially, therefore, the nature of the Round 1
consents process is consistent with the notion of hard law – the upper end of the vertical
axis on the regulatory dimension. Howlett et al. describe the notion of hard law as ―…
synonymous with a state-centric, command and control mode of regulation that imposes
generally applicable obligations, articulated with a relatively high degree of precision,
that are directly enforceable through the courts.‖481 Again, a quick review of the consents
process would confirm this finding. Generally, therefore, the hard law governance
arrangement constrained the ability of non-state actors to alter the policy-making process
and the eventual binding outcome. As a result, the regime is representative of hierarchical
governance on the horizontal axis of Howlette et al.‘s regulatory dimension.
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Fig. 6
Placement of the Round 1 Regulatory Approach on Michael Howlett et al.‘s Regulatory
Dimension

5.3.5 Application of Gibson et al.’s Core Requirements for Progress Towards
Sustainability to the Round 1 Consents Process
As the heading suggests, this section seeks to apply Gibson et al.‘s core
requirements for progress towards sustainability to the Round 1 Consents Process.
However, before proceeding to the same it is necessary to outline a few points that offer
appropriate context to the task at hand. Firstly, when Round 1 wind farms were deployed
in April 2001, the sustainable development agenda had not yet formed part of energy
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policy in the United Kingdom. 482 It was only in the 2003 Energy White Paper that energy
generation and supply were given a sustainable mandate. 483 Prima facie, therefore, the
assumption can be made that Round 1 demonstration projects were not necessarily
characterized by sustainability objectives. The consents regime supports this assumption.
In granting approvals under the EA, CPA, or FEPA, decision makers were not required to
consider whether or not a proposed undertaking (offshore wind) is the best option
available to contribute to sustainable development, or progress towards sustainability.
The laws on this point are clear. There is no mention of sustainability in any of the abovementioned regulatory instruments. The legislative purposes of the Acts do not demand or
even suggest that decision-makers consider the implications of offshore wind
development on progress towards sustainability. Again, this is largely due to the later
coming of sustainability as an energy development objective.
Secondly, because sustainability is a challenge to business as usual practices, 484
the very use of existing mechanisms to regulate Round 1 development goes against the
core concept of sustainable development as defined by Gibson et al. As previously noted,
the existing framework was developed in a fragmented pattern.485 Curtailing the regime
to accommodate offshore works adds to this culture of fragmentation, resulting in a
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governance system that impedes an integrated decision-making process – ―a necessary
element of sustainable development.‖486 In this regard, Gibson et al. note that: 487
―…sustainability assessment processes are entering a world already
heavily populated by legislated planning, review and approval
requirements. These requirements are evidently insufficient for essential
sustainability purposes – they are generally too narrowly focused, too
short term in vision and too fragmented in application to serve sustainable
purposes effectively.‖
So by way of example, while a developer was required to obtain an EA consent as
well as a FEPA licence, each consent and licence had a different purpose, that is, they
seek to regulate a specific activity. Consequently, the factors that decision-makers can
consider when deciding whether to grant approval for an EA consent and a FEPA licence
are limited by their respective purposes. For EA consents, decisions are generally
confined to a consideration of factors that relate to the electricity infrastructure and
supply. 488 Decisions under FEPA are generally confined to a consideration of factors
relating to the protection of the marine environment, the living resources which it
supports and human health489 but not the wider benefits that offshore wind may bring.490
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As a result, the decisions taken did not holistically consider the benefits of a project with
its drawbacks. The same assessment can be levied against CPA consents which were
specifically formulated to ensure a safe environment for navigation. A consideration of
the potential benefit of offshore wind development to emission reduction, or the impacts
on the interests of other users of the sea, are beyond its scope.491
All the same, taken by itself, there can be no question that the concept of
renewable energy generation from offshore winds is, per se, a sustainable initiative.492
However, the question whether it is able to maintain this cloak of sustainability in
practice arises for consideration. The answer to the question depends on the manner in
which it is allowed to enter the marine environment. In other words, the big question is
whether the Round 1 decision-making process led to sustainable outcomes. The answer
depends on whether the outcome has satisfied the eight generic requirements for progress
towards sustainability identified by Gibson et al. and outlined in Chapter 2 of this
study. 493 In essence, therefore, Gibson et al.‘s criteria is the analytical tool chosen to
evaluate the effectiveness of the Round 1 decision-making process.
The first requirement for progress towards sustainability is that decisions should
be made which seek to advance the principle of socio-ecological system integrity. The
principle recognizes firstly that humans are dependent on biophysical systems for the
continuance of life on Earth and for the provision of a range of sufficiency demands. This
dependency forms the crux of the requirement, i.e., decisions should be made which seek
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to build human-ecological relationships that favour the protection of irreplaceable life
support systems. Therefore, in the first instance, the relationships should seek to reduce
direct and indirect human-induced stresses on the environment and associated life support
functions. Secondly, and more importantly, the objective of this requirement is ―…not to
prevent system change but to organize and manage [human] activities so that the changes
[influenced] still preserve the system conditions and services upon which [humans]
rely.‖494 The focus therefore is on adjusting and reconstructing governance systems in
order ―… to establish a more modest, sensitive and flexible relationship with the
biophysical system upon which we rely.‖ 495 As to the substantive focus under this
requirement, the fact that Round 1 projects were permitted to enter the marine
environment via existing legislations is illustrative of the failure to meet this
sustainability requirement. Implicitly, by curtailing existing legislations to accommodate
offshore works, traditional approaches to the control, management and regulation of
human activities in the marine environment were applied. Therefore, by using existing
approaches to manage human activities, there was no attempt to adjust or reconstruct the
manner in which humans interact with the environment in order to build ‗sustainable‘
human-ecological relationships. The fundamental point is that curtailing existing regimes
to accommodate offshore wind development applies traditional methods of control which
are primarily reactive, fragmented and ad hoc. As noted at the outset of this Chapter,
these characteristics restrict the ability to properly assess the cumulative impact of marine
activities and therefore, they continue business as usual practices which make very little
contribution to progress towards sustainability.
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In addition to socio-ecological integrity, human well-being is also dependant on
material goods and services for the attainment of livelihood sufficiency and the creation
of opportunities for continued development. Here, in making a determination on offshore
wind consent applications decision-makers must consider the contribution the project
may make to ensuring that everyone has sufficient material goods and services for a
decent life and opportunities for improvements. At the outset of Chapter 3, it was noted
that energy is essential for the continued development of modern economies and for the
sustenance of modern standards of living. In the contemporary world, there is a high
demand for energy for the execution of daily activities. The intrinsic value of energy to
all human activity is borne by the International Renewable Energy Agency‘s
proclamation of energy as a ―…basic human need.‖496 Broadly speaking, energy is
needed to deliver adequate food, water, shelter, education, health care and employment.
Indeed, without it, all human activity and development would come to a complete and
instantaneous standstill. 497 By necessary interpretation, it seems that consent applications
for offshore wind were not considered for their ability to increase energy affordability for
the poor. This assessment is based on the fact that energy affordability only became an
energy policy objective in the 2003 Energy White Paper. Additionally, even if energy
affordability had formed part of energy policy at the time, as noted above, several
licences and consents were required under various Acts which confined decisions to a
consideration of factors related to the purposes of those individual Acts. Possibly then,
Round 1 EA consents might have been granted on a consideration of energy affordability
had that been the policy of the day. The same theory cannot be applied to FEPA licences
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and CPA consents given their specific purposes.498 Therefore, it is doubtful that this
sustainability requirement would have been otherwise adequately fulfilled given the
presence of a general energy affordability policy. In any event, a quick review of licences
and consents issued to Round 1 offshore wind farms would confirm that the decisionmakers did not consider the potential contribution offshore wind projects could make
towards livelihood sufficiency and opportunity. In this regard, Gibson et al. note that to
ignore issues of destitution, oppression and desperation is as unsustainable as it is morally
unacceptable.499
Incorporating the principle of intragenerational equity is the third requirement for
progress towards sustainability. In very basic terms, the principle requires that decision
makers ensure that proposed undertakings are pursued in ways that reduce dangerous
gaps in sufficiency and opportunity between the rich and poor.500 In other words, the
criterion advocates that decisions should make positive contributions towards the concept
of ‗livelihood equality,‘ i.e. ―…the right of all peoples within the current generation to
fair access to the Earth‘s natural resources.‖501 Therefore, when approving marine
renewables, decision makers must consider whether the costs and benefits are shared
equally among all users of the sea. Is the effective decision fair to all users of the sea?
The answer to this question depends on the attention paid to trade-off and compensation
498
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issues. Generally, substantive trade-offs are involved whenever there are positives and
negatives that must be weighed against each other. 502 Decision makers, therefore, are
always in the business of deciding which objectives to emphasize and, at least implicitly,
which ones to neglect.503 There are a plethora of decision-making tools designed to assist
them with these difficult trade off decisions. 504 One common approach is to apply a costbenefit analysis to the evaluation of competing interests. While it is accepted that ―[i]t
may not be possible to convert from climate threatening coal thermal power plants to
renewable resources without adding new ecological burdens,‖ 505 the question is whether
the costs and benefits of offshore wind are being distributed fairly among all
stakeholders.
There are several users and uses of the offshore environment. These include for
instance, recreation, shipping and fishing. However, the group of users most affected by
the construction and operation of offshore wind farms are fishermen, whose very
livelihood is at risk. 506 Therefore, an evaluation of the experiences of the most affected
group of users is a suitable means for assessing whether the costs and benefits of offshore
wind are being distributed fairly. In this regard, the following series of events respecting
the Kentish Flats Offshore Wind Farm is of importance in the discussion on the
intragenerational requirement. In 2002, Global Renewable Energy Partners UK Marine
Limited, the developers of Kentish Flats, published their Non-technical Summary of the
required environmental statement in which it was noted:507
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Impacts on fish and shellfish species are also not expected to be
significant. The loss of seabed habitat is not considered significant and
does not generally affect spawning or juvenile nursery areas. Instead, fish
would be expected to show some avoidance to areas of disturbance during
the construction phase, particularly in response to noise generated by
piling operations.
[…]
“The new structures could act to attract fish into the area and could
even increase fish diversity and productivity in the longer-term.‖
On 7th March 2003, after considering the findings of the environmental statement,
the Secretary of State for Environment Food and Rural Affairs decided to grant Global
Renewable Energy Partners UK Marine Limited consent under Part II of the FEPA Act
1985 to undertake the construction of up to 30 wind turbines at Kentish Flats, off the
North Kent coast.508 In the Cover Letter to the licence the following was stated:509
There are generic environmental issues associated with the construction
and operation of offshore wind farms in the UK water for which there is at
present a lack of knowledge [my emphasis] and opportunity for possible
answers/solutions to be investigated.
The actual licence was granted with fish monitoring conditions in the following
terms:510
Since very little is known about the potential effect of wind farms in terms
of enhancing or aggregating fish populations [my emphasis], the Licence
Holder must produce proposals for adequate preconstruction baseline data
and post-construction surveys of fish populations in the area of the wind
farm. These surveys should, as a minimum comprise some seasonal
surveys of fish populations in the region before construction and during
the first year of the operational phase and should consider both demersal
508
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and pelagic species. The Licence Holder shall, in drawing up such
proposals, canvas the views of the local fishermen. The proposals must be
submitted to the Licensing Authority at least one month prior to the
proposed commencement of the monitoring work.
Later, on 12th March 2003, on consideration of the findings of the environmental
statement, the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry granted consent to Global
Renewable Energy Partners UK Marine Limited for the construction and operation of an
offshore wind farm under section 36 of the Electricity Act.511 The Cover Letter to the
consent listed the objections to the project and how the Secretary of State considered their
merits. One objection listed concerned the impact of the Kentish Flats farm on fishing. In
response, it was noted that:512
The Secretary of State has been informed by the Department of the
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA), which has Government
responsibility for the fishing industry, that the Development would be
unlikely to have a significant impact on fishing grounds [my emphasis]
The preceding extracts form an account of the battle for primacy between two
competing interests in the trade-off/decision-making process: the maintenance of the
natural capital of fisheries versus the installation of the Kentish Flats Wind Farm.
Specifically, the extracts evidence the manner in which decision makers have favoured
the establishment of the Kentish Flats Wind Farm over the maintenance of the natural
capital of fisheries. Were the costs and benefits of the trade-off distributed fairly?
It may be helpful to note that generally, trade-offs allow some adverse effects in
the interests of securing important gains, 513 such as the generation of renewable
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electricity from offshore winds to meet emission reduction commitments. Certainly, on
this basis, it can be argued as it has by Theodoros Kolonas 514 that ―[t[he development of
wind power, following the provisions of the Kyoto protocol can be interpreted as an
effort to establish both intra and intergenerational equity within our societies.‖ 515 The
general principle that may be extrapolated from this proposition is that any undertaking
that makes an effective contribution towards reducing greenhouse gases has an intra and
intergenerational benefit. Therefore, though Kolonas articulated this view in reference to
onshore wind, the viewpoint is equally applicable to offshore wind development. Kolonas
caveats however, that ―…there are studies that advocate that the implementation of wind
power on the local level might be an action against the principles of equity, referring to
its intragenerational part.‖516 In this regard, he cites studies which have concluded that
NIMBY concerns in relation to onshore wind, ―…is a result of the citizens feeling that
they have been treated in an unfair way.‖ 517 Comparatively, the offshore ‗NIMBY‘
protestors would be the fishermen who feel that they have been similarly treated in an
unfair way, i.e., fishermen have been the recipients of the negatives of offshore wind
development rather than the benefit. It seems therefore, that while offshore wind is able
to contribute to global intra and intergenerational equity, it conflicts with domestic gains
on progress towards intragenerational equity. Again, in the midst of this conflict it would
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be helpful to restate the fact that generally, trade-offs allow some adverse effects in the
interests of securing important gains. 518
However, while some sacrifices may be necessary to permit gains elsewhere, no
sacrifice should be made lightly.‖ 519 It would appear from a reading of the excerpts that
the decision to sacrifice the maintenance of fisheries capital was made lightly. On the one
hand, the environmental statement made it clear that given the small area affected by both
turbine installation and cabling, ‗the impacts on fish and shellfish species and the loss of
seabed habit is not considered significant.‘520 Subsequently, the Cover Letter to the
FEPA licence noted that ‗there was a lack of knowledge on a range of environmental
issues associated with the construction and operation of offshore wind farms.‘
Specifically, the FEPA licence admittedly noted, albeit contrary to that which was
expressed in the Environmental Statement, ‗that very little was known about the
potential effect of wind farms in terms of enhancing or aggregating fish populations.‘
Lastly, in granting the EA consent, the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry relied on
the opinion of DEFRA to the effect that the ‗…Kentish Flats Wind Farm would be
518
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unlikely to have a significant impact on fishing grounds.‘ The opinion of DEFRA that
the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry relied on in granting the EA consent is
dramatically different in wording, meaning and degree to the opinion expressed by
DEFRA in the FEPA Licence. There is a huge conceptual difference between a statement
expressing the fact that ‗very little is known about the potential impacts…,‘ and a
statement advocating that „Kentish Flats Wind Farm would be unlikely to have a
significant impact on fishing grounds.‟ In sum, it is clear that, the opinions expressed as
justification for favouring the Kentish Flats Windfarm over the maintenance of fishing
capital in the trade-off process, were inconsistent. This finding is unsurprising. It is a
direct result of the United Kingdom‘s attempt to regulate offshore wind through existing
and fragmented regimes that were created for other purposes. In this regard, Gibson et al.
note that in fragmented regimes ―…trade-off judgments are made with minimal guidance,
transparency or explicit rationale.‖521
Given the foregoing, it is difficult to determine whether the costs and benefits
were distributed fairly in the absence of a clear, consistent and affirmative position
regarding the potential positive and negative impacts the Kentish Flats Wind Farm
project posed to fisheries. However, the very absence of a clear, consistent and
affirmative position could necessarily lead to the conclusion that, at the outset, explicit
attention was not paid to trade-off issues and implicitly, no attention was paid to the
distribution of the costs and benefits of the project or more specifically, the fair
distribution of the same.
Furthermore, where gains could not be made on the requirement for
intragenerational equity by reducing the negative impact to a local fisherman‘s
521
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livelihood, one alternative way in which decision-makers could have sought to make
some gains on the principle was to grant consents on an active consideration of
compensation for loss of livelihood. Indeed, many fishermen argued that they had ―… a
moral right to compensation because the siting of wind farms on fishing grounds eroded
their (legitimate) opportunities to earn their livelihood.‖522 Unfortunately, none of the
licences reviewed explicitly focused on matters of compensation issues. In relation to the
Kentish Flats WindFarm, this is particularly unfortunate given the fact that compensation
issues were raised for consideration when the developers published their non-technical
summary of the environmental statement. To recap, it was noted that ―[t]he new
structures could act to attract fish into the area and could even increase fish diversity
and productivity in the longer-term.”523 According to a study by Jennifer C. Wilson and
Michael Elliott, ―…the placement of offshore wind turbines gives the potential for habitat
creation, which may thus be regarded as compensation for habitat loss.‖ 524 The decisionmakers on Round 1 consent applications did not explore the potential for habitat creation
outlined in the Kentish Flats non-technical summary. Instead, it was noted in the FEPA
licence that ―…very little [was] known about the potential effect of wind farms in terms
of enhancing or aggregating fish populations… .‖525 Upon acknowledgement of the same,
Licence Holders were required to…
…produce proposals for adequate preconstruction baseline data and postconstruction surveys of fish populations in the area of the wind farm.
These surveys should, as a minimum comprise some seasonal surveys of
fish populations in the region before construction and during the first year
of the operational phase and should consider both demersal and pelagic
522
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species. The Licence Holder shall, in drawing up such proposals, canvas
the views of the local fishermen. The proposals must be submitted to the
Licensing Authority at least one month prior to the proposed
commencement of the monitoring work.
While fish monitoring obligations may be pressed to represent agreed means of
compensation, the unadorned fact is that consent for the Kentish Flats development had
been provided prior to a determination of the potential effect of wind farms in terms of
enhancing or aggregating fish populations. What is in critique here is the fact that the
FEPA Licence should have been granted on consideration of baseline data on the
potential effect of wind farms on fishing populations, rather than requiring baseline data
after the licence had already been granted. However, the Joint Nature and Conservation
Committee and English Nature argued that ―… while there are gaps, sufficient data
existed for dealing with offshore proposals.‖526 All the same, the conclusion is that Round
1 decisions failed to make gains on the requirement for intragenerational equity.
The requirement of intergenerational equity was briefly considered in the
assessment of intragenerational equity above. It was noted that conceptually, offshore
wind contributes to intergenerational equity because of its emission reduction benefit.
Under this requirement, Gibson et al., advocate that decision-makers ―[f]avour present
options and actions that are likely to preserve or enhance the opportunities and
capabilities of future generations to live sustainably. ‖527 The requirement forces decisionmakers to make a choice between preserving or exploiting ecological systems and
associated resources for the benefit of future generations. Implicitly, in making a
decision, decision-makers must grapple with the principle of substitution, i.e.,
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Do we [decide that we should] retain and protect current ecological
systems and resources for the continued benefit of future generations? Or
do we [decide that we should] use (and in some ways degrade) these
systems and resources now in the expectation that the returns will build
economic, technical and/or intellectual capacity for replacing exhausted
resources or improving the environment for the future?528
At the outset of this Chapter, it was noted that ―[Round 1 wind projects were
intended] to act as a ‗demonstration‘ round [to provide] prospective developers with an
environment in which they could gain technological, economic and environmental
experience.‖529 Also, in granting the section 36 Consent under the Electricity Act, the
Secretary of State considered the important role offshore wind power could play ―… in
providing clean forms of energy to help provide additional security in our supplies and
also help reduce emissions from the production of electricity.‖ 530 Therefore, on the one
hand, as ‗demonstration projects‘ that carry an emission reduction benefit, Round 1
windfarms can be deemed significant investments for improving the environment in the
future. On the other hand, it must also be recognized that while substitutions have been
made which provided valued and lasting improvements in human well-being, ―[t]he catch
is that they have not had consistently positive of fairly distributed effects.‖531 The failure
of Round 1 decisions to prevent greater gaps in sufficiency and opportunity between the
rich (the offshore wind industry) and the poor (the affected fishermen) demonstrate the
truth of this. Nonetheless, this dynamic does not wholly discount the contribution Round
1 demonstration projects made towards intergenerational equity.
Moreover, according to Jeremy Firestone et al., ―…the principle of
intergenerational equity suggests that a future generation should not be saddled with the
528
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costs of decommissioning a facility that benefited the present generation.‖532 In relation
to Kentish Flats, for instance, the FEPA licence requires that the licence holder ensures
that any debris or temporary works placed below mean high water springs are removed
on completion of the works authorized by the licence. 533 Additionally, developers are
required to undertake a pre-construction survey in which all obstructions on the seabed
must be plotted. Afterward, a post construction survey must be undertaken wherein any
new obstructions must be removed at the developer‘s expense. 534 These two provisions
are common among Round 1 FEPA licences and, interpretively, they incorporate not only
the requirement for intergenerational equity but also the polluter pays principle.
Additionally, the pro-forma leases that are granted by the Crown Estate to bestow
tenancy rights to developers contain reinstatement covenants that also incorporate the
polluter pays principle and the intergenerational equity requirement. Generally, a
developer/tenant covenants with the Crown Estate Commissioners/landlord that:535
… prior to the expiration or sooner determination of the Term (unless the
Landlord otherwise requires in writing) to remove the Works and Supply
Cables […] and to restore the Premises and Designated Areas to a safe and
proper condition and in accordance with all Legal Obligations.
As well, EA consents also incorporate the requirement for intergenerational equity
and the polluter pays principle by binding developers to decommissioning and restoration
obligations very similar to those contained in Crown Estate leases. 536 It would appear
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therefore that Round 1 consent decisions made some progress towards sustainability to
the extent that they incorporated the requirement for intergenerational equity.
Additionally, for progress towards sustainability, decisions should incorporate the
principle of resource maintenance. Here, decision makers must ensure that approval
decisions on offshore wind projects seek to reduce threats to the long-term integrity of
socio-ecological systems by reducing extractive damage. 537 In other words, decisionmakers must take into consideration the existing stresses on ecosystems and associated
resources, and permit development initiatives under conditions that ensure careful
extraction of resources. As a starting point, it was noted in the beginning of this Chapter
that European Union and National law placed obligations on offshore wind developers to
carry out Environmental Impact Assessments.538 So for instance, the Electricity Works
Regulations 2000 explicitly prohibit the granting of development consent where the
application for offshore wind development is unaccompanied by an Environmental
Statement for consultation by the relevant consenting authority. 539 The EIA process
involves a number of steps which include project screening, scoping, description of the
environmental baseline, identification of key impacts, public consultation, decisionmaking, post-decision monitoring, etc.540 For present purposes the ‗description of the
environmental baseline‘ step deserves some attention. This step involves ―…the
establishment of both the present and future state of the environment, in the absence of
the project, taking into account changes resulting from natural events and from other
537
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human activities.‖541 Thereafter, this information is reported in the resulting document the Environmental Statement. The Environmental Statement is then taken into account by
the relevant decision-makers who must decide whether the proposed offshore wind
project should proceed to the development stage. Therefore, the ‗description of the
environmental baseline‘ aspect of the Environmental Statement forces decision-makers to
consider the existing stresses on ecosystems and associated resources. Without due regard
to information contained in the description of the environmental baseline, it would be
difficult for decision makers permit offshore wind development under conditions that
ensure careful extraction of offshore wind energy. In sum, EIA requirements ensured that
Round 1 decisions made positive gains on the requirement of resource maintenance.
As another core requirement for progress towards sustainability, Gibson et al.
propose that decisions incorporate the principle of socio-ecological civility and
democratic governance, i.e., there should be a greater focus on better governance and
developing better governance arrangements. This criterion is reflective of the notion that
sustainability is a challenge to conventional thinking and practice. And so, Gibson et al.
argue that if the other core requirements are to be met, decision-makers must begin by
recognizing that current decision-making structures and processes are ineffective.542
Essentially, what is needed to secure progress towards sustainability on this requirement
is governance thinking and arrangements that ―… move away from development for the
people to development with and by the people.‖543 Therefore, central to this criterion is
the application of sustainability principles through more transparent and better publicly
informed deliberations. There can be no mistake in concluding that Round 1 decisions
541
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failed to meet this requirement. First, as noted at the outset of this section the very use of
existing regulatory mechanisms to pursue Round 1 development is against the core
concept of sustainability, i.e., that sustainability is a challenge to business as usual
practices. Curtailing existing legislations to accommodate new uses such as offshore
wind is characteristic of the conventional practice of managing and regulating marine
activities through ad hoc, responsive and fragmented ways. This culture of fragmentation
impedes an integrated decision-making process; a process that is considered a mode of
better governance. Secondly, the use of traditional governance arrangements to regulate
offshore wind means that the decision-making process was reminiscent of traditional,
top-down control through laws and regulations that concentrate political power in the
hands of the State. Evidence of the same is noted in the new governance assessment
above. The new governance assessment shows that governmental departments built up
relations with industry (BWEA) but failed to build up strong relations with the full range
of potentially interested groups like fishermen, especially at the local level. Additionally,
the regulatory mechanisms for marine activities, which were adopted for the purposes of
offshore wind development, offered relatively few opportunities for public representation
and consultation.544 These instances are inconsistent with a governance arrangement that
moves away from development for the people to development with and by the people.
Gibson et al.‘s seventh requirement for progress towards sustainability is that
decisions should seek to adopt the principles of precaution and adoption. Specifically, the
guidance given to decision-makers is to ―[r]espect uncertainty, avoid even poorly
understood risks of serious or irreversible damage to the foundations for sustainability,
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plan to learn, design for surprise and manage for adaptation.‖ 545 Generally, the conditions
attached to the FEPA licences granted to Round 1 projects such as North Hoyle,546
Kentish Flats, 547 Rhyl Flats548 and Scroby Sand549, demonstrate that decision-makers
were concerned with minimizing the impact of the development on the surrounding
environment. In doing so, the licences sought to regulate the type of chemicals that may
be used during construction;550 ensure efficient storage, handling and transportation of
fuels and other chemicals to prevent releases into the marine environment; 551 and prevent
accidental release of wet cement into the marine environment. 552 FEPA licences also
imposed strict obligations on developers to monitor impacts of project development over
the course of construction and, thereafter, during operation. 553 Generally therefore,
precautionary and anticipate-and-prevent approaches were adopted by decision-makers.
Interpretively, because precautionary and anticipatory approaches aid in ensuring the
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careful extraction of resources, progress on this requirement ensured conformity with the
core requirement of resource maintenance outlined above.
Lastly, for progress towards sustainability, Gibson et al. note that decisions should
seek to incorporate the principle of immediate and long-term integration. Essentially, this
requirement sets the policy objective for meeting all the other core requirements. The
policy objective is that decisions should ―[a]ttempt to meet all requirements for
sustainability together as a set of interdependent parts, seeking mutually supportive
benefits.‖554 In other words, the goal of sustainable decision-making is to effect decisions
that seek to pursue all of the requirements at once in order to make gains in each area.
This requirement recognizes the fact that because requirements overlap and are
interdependent, failure or gains on one requirement will affect progress on others. 555 So
for instance, Gibson et al. note that ―[g]ains in livelihood sufficiency and opportunity will
collapse if the integrity of supporting socio-ecological systems is compromised and key
ecological functions are not maintained.‖ 556 The application of the core requirements to
the decision making process demonstrate the truth of this proposition. Of the seven (7)
core requirements outlined above, the Round 1 consents process failed four (4) of those
requirements. Inescapably, this means that the Round 1 consents process also failed this
requirement. Overall, therefore, the consents decisions failed five (5) core requirements
for progress towards sustainability. This supports the assumption at the outset of this
section that Round 1 offshore wind projects were developed without due regard to the
principle of sustainable development.
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In sum, according to Gibson et al.‘s generic requirements for sustainability, the
decisions made to deploy Round 1 offshore wind turbines did not produce sustainable
outcomes or, rather and more importantly, maximum gains on all requirements.
Generally, the substantive outcomes were strong on the requirements for precaution and
adaptation, intergenerational equity and resource maintenance. In other words, Round 1
consent decisions satisfied only three of eight requirements for progress towards
sustainability. The few gains made on the requirements can hardly be considered
dedicated efforts towards sustainable development. In fact, the few gains were effected
haphazardly through the use of existing regulatory instruments. Again, this demonstrates
the unsuitability of existing regimes for sustainability purposes.
Several reasons explain the unsustainable outcome. For the most part, the reasons
are inextricably linked to the decision-making arrangements outlined in the previous
sections. In relation to the political dimension, the first conclusion drawn was that power
to make legally binding decisions that determine whether a particular offshore wind
project will be given approval for development was legally vested in the State. On a
proper examination of the regime, it was found that in practice, the State-directed
governance arrangement was especially vulnerable to pressures from one particular nonstate actor, the BWEA (industry). Meanwhile in relation to the institutional dimension, it
was found that the institutions that had the capacity to influence the outcome of Round 1
consents applications were typically characterized by formal establishment (State actors
and industry). Irrespective of whether it is decided to acknowledge the de jure or de facto
placement of power in the political dimension, the difficulty to be considered is that,
given the unsustainable outcome, what motivated the exercise of power in favour of
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approval? One immediate but myopic answer is that ―[Round 1 wind projects were
intended] to act as a ‗demonstration‘ round [to provide] prospective developers with an
environment in which they could gain technological, economic and environmental
experience.‖557 A more prudent response would reference the environmental benefit to be
had from harnessing clean, renewable energy from offshore winds. By all accounts, it can
be conclusively stated that in the exercise of their power to determine whether offshore
wind farms would be allowed to enter the marine environment, the State treated Round 1
consent applications differently because of the perceived benefit. 558 So for instance, when
the Government asked the Canterbury City Council Planning Authority to consider the
merits of the Kentish Flats Wind Farm application, ―…Canterbury‘s response was to
support the wind farm in principle, on the basis that it ‗represents the development of a
clean, sustainable and renewable energy source.‘‖ 559 Stephen A. Jay describes the
underlying political issues behind planning authorities‘ preference and support for
offshore wind in the following words:
… planning authorities may themselves look favourably on offshore wind
as a preferred alternative to on-land schemes in their areas. By supporting
offshore schemes, they can demonstrate their backing for renewables
whilst protecting their territories from intrusion of on-land wind farms and
avoiding conflicts that might arise onshore. In other words, planning
authorities themselves can benefit from the advantages of offshore
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locations as perceived by the industry. This may be an explanatory factor
in the interest they have shown in offshore wind farms. 560
In the context of this assessment, it appears as though planning authorities did in
fact demonstrate their preference for offshore wind development in the consenting
process. In similar fashion, the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry also weighed in
on the ―…potential of offshore wind farms for delivering a significant contribution to
meeting its renewable targets,‖561 during the decision-making process.
Though it is argued here that decision makers may not be inclined to reject
offshore wind projects, they are, nevertheless, seized with ability to determine the manner
in which they are to be deployed. This is particularly important because, prima facie,
there can be a range of impacts on coastal and marine areas, depending on how wind
farms are being deployed, and the number of wind farms being deployed under these
conditions. At some point the impact of deploying more wind farms and/or deploying
more wind farms with less focus on progress towards sustainability, is going to push
offshore wind energy to become more intrusive, inequitable and harmful than
conventional methods of energy generation. The concentration of power in the hands of
state and industry whose primary focus in the trade-off process has been on the benefit to
be had from offshore wind, is restricting the issuance of decisions that may ensure that
offshore wind does not cause any more harm than good.
Given the foregoing, how then could decision-makers ensure that offshore wind
does not cause any more harm than good? The simple answer would be to effect more
gains on Gibson et al.‘s core requirements. More specifically, however, the new
governance assessment above has shown that the main feature of the Round 1 consents
560
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process is that it was a state-centered, top-down governance arrangement. In particular,
this hierarchical governance arrangement prevented any gains on the requirement for
socio-ecological civility and democratic governance. It means then that the consent
decisions mainly reflected the interests of the Government, but also the BWEA. The
interest of both actors in the consents process is the rapid development of the offshore
wind industry and the potential benefit to be had. Perhaps therefore, this dynamic is one
of the main causes of the unsustainable outcomes on consent applications. In Chapter 2, it
was noted that ―…many people have been disappointed with the ability of government to
tackle social problems.‖ 562 The unsustainable outcomes are one example of the inability
of State-centered governance arrangements to effectively tackle social problems. It was
also noted in Chapter 2, that the cause of New Governance scholars has been motivated
by these inabilities.563 In the main, these scholars seek to destabalize the priority of
traditional modes of governance. Their proposition is that the social trait of non-state
actors would influence more effective rules and solutions to social problems. 564 So for
example, Gibson et al. suggest that ―…greater [intergenerational] equality is unlikely to
be achieved or to be lasting unless it is accompanied by greater political equality, in the
broad sense of power to participate effectively in decision-making in a context of real
choices‖565 Essentially therefore, progress towards sustainability will remain vulnerable if
democratic governance and customary civility are underdeveloped. At its base, this
discussion is an apt exemplar of the significance of the requirement for integrating the
principle of immediate and long-term integration.
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Compounding the problem of concentrating political power in the hands of the
State is the regulatory mode of governance. The new governance assessment concluded
that the regulatory regime was consistent with traditional top-down hierarchical
government control through existing laws and regulations. Earlier, it was noted that the
use of existing regimes with sectoral focus, is fundamentally at odds with the principle of
sustainability, which, in theory and in practice, challenges business as usual. It is beyond
challenge that ―[s]ometimes, existing mechanisms have simply been adapted for new
purposes even though they may not be ideally suited to the matter in hand. [As a result,
the] only step towards the integration of different interests has been through consultation
procedures.‖566 This is precisely the case with the Round 1 regulatory regime, the only
difference being, that the consultation procedures were inadequate for integrating
different interests. Additionally, given the primacy placed on the need to rapidly develop
the offshore wind industry, the consents regime was really a quick response to effect
government policy. 567 Above all, and if anything, the regulatory governance arrangement
is an explicit demonstration of the notion that ―[t]he law of the land cannot swim,‖568 that
is, regulations passed to govern activity onshore are ill-suited for regulating activity in the
marine environment.
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5.4 Round 2 – The Reformed Consents Process and Strategic
Environmental Assessment
Despite the foregoing assessment, the UK Government considered the Round 1
consents process to be ‗adequate‘ for offshore wind purposes. 569 Consequently, the
consents process for Round 2 wind farms marginally differed from the Round 1
process.570 One major critique of the Round 1 consenting process was that it was
duplicating and complex. 571 A slight reform was effected through the enactment of the
Energy Act 2004.572 Section 99 of the Energy Act attempts to streamline the consenting
process by trumping the need for a separate permit under the Coast Protection Act 1949
to extinguish rights of navigation. Section 99 also inserted two new provisions (Section
36A and 36B) into the Electricity Act 1989. By section 36A, where the Secretary of State
for Trade and Industry receives an application under section 36 of the Electricity Act
1989 for the construction, etc. of an offshore renewable energy station, he may
simultaneously, make a declaration extinguishing rights of navigation.
Another change in the regime was the extension of the ability to exploit the sea
for energy production to areas outside the territorial sea. At some point in time, if
development continues to be limited to territorial waters, the lack of available seabed will
become a real issue for continued development573 and as a result, will impede the ability
of offshore wind to deliver its emissions reduction promise. As well, the cumulative
impacts of developments in territorial waters may reach levels where no further

569

DTI, ―Future Offshore‖, supra note 408 at 66 ¶ 7.4.1.
Jay, ―At the Margins of Planning‖, supra note 327 at 110.
571
DTI, ―Future Offshore‖, supra note 408 at 66 ¶ 7.4.1.
572
Energy Act 2004 (U.K.), 2004, c. 20.
573
DTI, ―Future Offshore‖, supra note 408 at 34 ¶ 3.4.1.
570

144

development is possible. 574 These difficulties, along with industry interests for larger
projects, encouraged the Government to develop a legislative basis for offshore wind
development beyond territorial waters. 575 For this purpose, section 84 of the Energy Act
was drafted to establish a 200 nautical mile Renewable Energy Zone (REZ) around the
United Kingdom territory, within which it can exercise sovereign rights in relation to the
production of energy from the water, currents and waves. 576 Having established the REZ,
section 93 of the Energy Act goes on to extend the section 36 consent requirement for
construction etc. of generating stations to the territorial sea and the REZ.
Furthermore, the Energy Act also introduced two new schemes to the consenting
regime. Firstly, sections 95 – 98 established safety zones around offshore renewable
energy installations. Secondly, Chapter 3 Part II of the Energy Act established a
comprehensive statutory scheme for decommissioning offshore renewable energy
installations.
The final modification to the Round 1 consents regime was the passage of the
Electricity (Offshore Generating Stations) (Applications for Consent) Regulations
2006.577 Pertinent to this assessment, Regulation 5 now makes it mandatory for applicants
to serve notice of offshore proposals on a list of state and non-state agencies representing
varied interests. Missing from that list however, is the agency that represents the interests
of the most affected users in the marine environment – the fishers. Possibly still, fishing
interest may be captured under regulation 5(k) where the Secretary of State for DTI holds
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a discretion to decide such other persons that notice of application is to be served upon.
Additionally, Regulation 6 requires offshore wind developers to serve notice of their
application on any planning authority that ―…is likely to have an interest in the
development… .‖ By necessary interpretation, what this section does is to elevate
planning authorities to the role of ‗statutory consultees‘. On the other hand, the
Regulations also preserved the power of planning authorities to object, but on the other
hand, the Regulations removed the power to force a public inquiry. Causatively,
therefore, this fetter on planning authorities‘ power only serves to further restrict the
opportunity for wider public involvement in the consents process.
As with Consents Route 1, the Round 2 application process began by seeking
tenancy rights from the Crown Estate. While the Crown Estate was able to offer leases to
Round 1 projects because they were constructed within territorial waters, Round 2
projects developed beyond the territorial limit could only be awarded licences as the UK
does not retain ownership of the seabed beyond the territorial limit.
One striking feature of Round 1 was that the State and proponents greatly
influenced the development of offshore wind energy, particularly the decision-making
process. Therefore, before awarding sites for Round 2, the Government published Future
Offshore in which it was proposed that a strategic planning framework be adopted as a
basis for the expansion of the offshore wind industry. 578 For this purpose, in 2002, the
Department commissioned a Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) designed to
empower actors other than the State and the proponent. The SEA focused on three
strategic regions – the Thames Estuary, the Greater Wash and the North West. These
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regions were pre-selected by the Crown Estate and the DTI as areas appropriate for
development. The SEA was completed on 29th April 2003.
In Future Offshore, the Government adopted Threrivel et al.‘s 579 1996 definition
of strategic environmental assessment which reads: 580
The formal, systematic and comprehensive process of evaluating the
effects [my emphasis] of a proposed policy, plan or programme or its
alternative, including the written report on the findings of that evaluation,
and using the findings in publicly accountable decision making.
Despite the Government‘s good intention to develop a strategic framework for the
offshore wind industry, many believed that the SEA process was far from
‗comprehensive‘. Consequently, it has often been considered a failure. 581 Many of the
reasons that ground this assessment stem from the fact that the SEA process was
rushed582 and ―…that the issue of cumulative impact had not been addressed in enough
depth and detail.‖583 The entire SEA process was completed in five (5) months. At first
glance, the rushed outcome could be considered surprising for the very reason that the
general impression given by the Government in Future Offshore was that due care would
be taken during the commissioning stage of the SEA because of the newness of applying
SEAs to marine renewables. So, for instance, when introducing the practice of conducting
SEAs in Future Offshore, the Government noted that SEAs were not new practices to its
579
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management regimes, but had been previously been applied by the Department of Trade
and Industry to the oil and gas sector.584 Since the same department would have been
charged with the responsibility of conducting the SEA for marine renewable energy
purposes, this was a clear statement by the Government that they had the capacity and the
know-how to properly commission a SEA. In this respect, it was noted that ―[t]here is
relevant experience to be gained from the application of the SEA to the UK Oil and Gas
sector… .‖585 Specifically, however, it was singled out for mention that:586
…there are some fundamental differences to be appreciated when
comparing the application of the SEA to the oil and gas sector. The oil and
gas sector is a mature industry in contrast to the offshore wind industry
which has different impacts and issues, many of which are relatively
unknown and cannot currently be predicted with any certainty as there is
no monitoring information available [my emphasis].
The above extract clearly indicates that the Government was well aware of the need
to apply extra care when seeking to strategically assess the three development areas.
According to Tim Gray et al., ―[t]he SEA has a number of critical requirements including
the consultation of stakeholders. It is therefore clear that the permitting process is a long
and complicated one, and that a key part of it is stakeholder consultation.‖ 587 Among
those stakeholders, is ―the public, including the public affected or likely to be affected by,
or having an interest in the decision-making of the plan or programme, comprising
several non-governmental organizations.‖ 588 Essentially, therefore, one of the main
purposes of SEAs is to empower non-state actors.589 By completing the SEA process in
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five months, many respondents, such as the Council for National Parks, the Countryside
Council for Wales, several Sea Fisheries Committees, the Joint Nature Conservation
Committee, the Marine Conservation Society, and the Royal Society for the Protection of
Birds, expressed concern that as a direct consequence, the consultation period was
rushed. 590 In relation to fisheries, a study in stakeholder consultation found that ―[t]he
undue speed of some of the consultation processes with fishers was also criticised;
indeed, the [Joint Nature Conservation Committee] member highlighted that the four
weeks for the SEA consultation compared unfavourably with the 12 months allowed for
oil and gas project consultations.‖ 591 It appeared surprising, therefore, that given the
above-quote highlighting the immaturity of the offshore wind industry, that the
Government would fail to proceed on standards akin, or even higher than those afforded
to the oil and gas sector. Even worse, according to Threrivel‘s definition of a SEA, the
findings of the SEA were to be ‗used in publicly accountable decision making.‘ It seems,
however, that business efficacy was more important to the Government than a
‗comprehensive process of evaluating the effects‟ of offshore wind farms in the identified
strategic regions. While noting that ‗[t]here is relevant experience to be gained from the
application of the SEA to the UK Oil and Gas sector…‘592 it seemed as though the
experience only inspired short-cuts in the interests of business efficacy:
Although the two sectors will have a different approach to SEA, the oil
and gas SEA work does provide the offshore wind energy sector with a
number of potential opportunities and cost and time savings. In particular
considerable data and information collection has been undertaken for the
oil and gas SEA areas and, where appropriate, these data will be used to
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support offshore wind SEA work.593
It is necessary to make the distinction that the need to rapidly develop the offshore
regime to meet climate change agendas is not in question. What is in critique, however, is
the manner in which the Government has sought to meet that end. In Future Offshore, the
Government was sure to mention ―…that the rapid development of the offshore wind
farm industry must not be at the expense of unacceptable risks to the environment or to
other users of the sea. It should not be undertaken in a manner which is inefficient...‖ 594 It
was also noted in Future Offshore that ―[a]part from economic considerations, the extent
to which this resource can be exploited needs to be determined through a comprehensive
planning framework which properly weighs the benefit of the development against the
potential adverse impacts.‖595 Notwithstanding recognition of the same, the
Government‘s insistence on rapid development launched and concluded a SEA in a
manner void of efficiency and comprehensiveness. It was also explicitly noted in Future
Offshore that:596
The planning framework […] needs to allow potential impacts and
considerations to be fully assessed, at a strategic level, through a strategic
environmental assessment, as well as locally, to ensure full confidence in
the reliability of the planning process.
Again, despite the statement and recognition of the need to ensure and/or restore
transparency and confidence in the reliability of the planning process, the SEA process
failed miserably to effect positive gains on either end.
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Notably, some developers were also critical of the short time-scale allotted for
consultation and argued that the SEA process should have taken twelve (12) months and
not five.597 BWEA‘s position on the SEA process and outcome is inconsistent. At one
point, they state that there were ―…a number of instances within the Report in which
assertions were made and implications drawn, on the basis of limited information and
minimal consultation.‖598 They further state that the analysis of the cumulative impacts
was not comprehensive. 599 On the other hand, BWEA also viewed the rapid completion
of the SEA process as ―…vital to retain the momentum established on Round 1 by
moving quickly to begin Round 2.‖600 Indeed, it has already been noted that BWEA‘s
main interest in the development of the licensing regime has been to accelerate the speed
at which licences can be procured.601 The Government was equally ―…keen to maintain
the pace of development in the offshore wind industry… .‖ 602 In this regard, it was found
that ―…the government‘s rush to implement wind farms meant it sometimes rode
roughshod over environmental considerations.‖603 The procedural inefficiency of the
SEA process is rather unfortunate. This assessment can be considered flagrantly
euphemistic given the fact that the Government passed the Electricity Regulations
2006,604 the effect of which was to remove the power of planning authorities to force a
public inquiry. Cumulatively, the procedural inefficiency of the SEA process and the
597
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Regulations only ensured that wider public involvement in the consents process was kept
at a minimum.
Apart from the procedural inefficiency of the SEA process, many also felt that the
SEA process had been seriously flawed from start.605 First, it was argued that the SEA
process was ―…flawed for not looking at the UK as a whole, but choosing three areas and
doing a SEA on them.‖ 606 This was considered to have foreclosed many options for the
development having little user conflict. 607 As well, that the process for identifying the
strategic areas in which Round 2 development would be permitted was flawed because
the areas were selected based on favourable wind conditions and provisional indications
from BWEA. 608 Some authors have expressed the view that ―environmental constraints
[did] not appear to have influenced the choice of strategic areas.‖ 609 In fact, the key
features which ultimately influenced area selection included ―…proximity to grid
connections serving important markets and offshore siting criteria conducive to costeffective construction, operation and maintenance of wind farms.‖610 That aside, marine
industries raised concern over the fact that it appeared that the selection process was
―…limited to the DTI, the Crown Estates and the wind farm developers – or their
consultants.‖611 Others have also noted that it appeared as though DEFRA had not been
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consulted in the process of selecting the development sites. 612 The unsurpassed irony of
the strategic assessment process is that it began its attempt to form an integrated approach
to offshore wind development by using sectoral decision-making practices. The potential
for current sectoral marine management approaches to act as hindrances to effective
delivery of sustainability has already been noted.613
Future Offshore acknowledges that ―[t]here is no single process for conducting
SEA, but there is a broad agreement as to the overall approach and the methodological
principles to be used.‖614 For the United Kingdom, information regarding the same can be
located in the SEA Directive.615 When the Government decided to ―…carry out a formal
SEA … [to] provide helpful support to the development and refinement of plans and
programmes for expansion of the offshore wind industry,‖ 616 the Directive had not been
transposed into UK law. All the same, the Government decided to be proactive and apply
the SEA. Indeed, there can be no question about the nobility of this initiative. However
noble, the preceding paragraphs have shown that in the rush to deliver offshore wind
energy the Government failed to follow specified SEA procedures during its
preparation.617 The Directive makes it unmistakably clear that one of its purposes is to be
integrative and to empower non-state actors. The preamble provides: 618
In order to contribute to more transparent decision-making and with the
aim of ensuring that the information supplied for the assessment is
comprehensive and reliable, it is necessary to provide that authorities with
612
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relevant environmental responsibilities and the public are to be consulted
during the assessment of plans and programmes, and that appropriate
time frames are set, allowing sufficient time for consultations, including
the expression of opinion [my emphasis].
Article 6 of the Directive provides further detail to the obligation to consult.
Specifically, Article 6(2) provides that the public…
…shall be given an early and effective opportunity within appropriate
time frames [my emphasis] to express their opinion on the draft plan or
programme and the accompanying environmental report before the
adoption of the plan or programme or its submission to the legislative
procedure.
The standard set for consultations with the public is clear. Such consultations must
provide early and effective opportunities within appropriate time frames for the public to
express its opinion. It is an unchallengeable assumption to suppose that the UK intended
to follow some standard for consultations as they sought to ―…carry out a formal SEA.‖
Though the Directive had not been transposed, given the fact that ―[t]he government
[decided] to act within the spirit of the Directive,‖619 it is also an unchallengeable
assumption to suppose that in carrying out a ―formal SEA‖ the standard for consultations
can be located within the text of the Directive. The foregoing paragraphs demonstrate a
failure to meet these standards in the commissioning stage of the SEA. It is extremely
doubtful that these assumptions can be challenged, but even if they can be challenged
there are no other processes for conducting SEAs that would support the
incomprehensive manner in which the Round 2 SEA was conducted. The consensus is
that ―[p]lanning authorities [must provide] reasonable time frames for the invitation and
the handing in of statements and for dealing with the statements in a traceable way.‖ 620
Apart from ‗the formal, systematic and comprehensive process for evaluating the
619
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effects of a proposed policy, etc.,‘ Threrivel‘s definition indicated that the findings of the
SEA be used ―… in publicly accountable decision making.‖ Several respondents to the
consultation report for the round two SEA stated that they were unclear as to how the
Environmental Report would influence the consents process for Round 2. 621 Specifically,
the Countryside Council for Wales noted that ―… the assessment was currently too
general. It gave no indication of the ‗carrying capacity‘ of each of the strategic areas
other than the physical seabed space available.‖622 In similar fashion, Le Secretariat
General de la Mer (France) noted that ―…the Report did not present firm pointers to areas
where wind farms might/might not be permitted. Instead it just gave general observations
on additional studies needed.‖ 623
In sum, although the Energy Act 2004 made a few changes to the consenting
process by attempting to streamline the process, the changes did not displace the political,
institutional and regulatory dimensions of the Round 1 governance arrangement.
Therefore, a thorough new governance assessment would be redundant. As well, the
concept of the SEA was a well-welcomed move on progress towards sustainable
development of the marine environment, and would have gained favour with Gibson et
al.‘s criteria but for the negligent, inefficient and incomprehensive manner in which it
was conducted. In this regard, the Royal Yachting Association noted in their response to
the SEA that ―…the Report should admit that it was ―a start‖ and by no means
complete.‖624 Additionally, the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds noted that ―[t]he
absence of recommendations to DTI on the most appropriate strategic plan for Round 2
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was a major weakness in the SEA.‖625
Finally, the adoption of the SEA process ―…was intended to influence decisions on
which areas of the sea should be offered to developers (and which should be excluded) as
well as to guide decisions on bids submitted by individual developers.‖ 626 This is
consistent with Threrivel‘s SEA definition which advocates that the findings of the SEA
process are to be used in publicly accountable decision making. However, the
Government proceeded to invite and accept bids for offshore wind developments prior to
the completion of the SEA Environmental Report and the receipt of the consultation
responses to the same. 627 In essence, it appeared as though the Government started their
decision making process prior to a consideration of any guidance or benefit to be had
from the SEA process. This raised legitimate concerns among stakeholders in the SEA
Consultation Report Responses about how the Environmental Report would influence
Round 2.628 In response to these concerns the Government stated: ―…developers have
been advised to consider other impacts discussed in the Environmental Report in
selecting the sites for which they will bid.”629 The Government‘s response is
unmistakable odd given the fact that the Government set a deadline for developers to
submit bids by March 2003 when the Environmental Report was completed two months
later. Most of all, the situation gives credence to those who view the entire process as a
cosmetic exercise.
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5.5

Round 3 – The New Model of Governance for Regulating Offshore
Wind and Other Marine Activities
At the beginning of this Chapter, it was noted that the management, control and

regulation of the uses of ocean spaces gradually developed in a reactive and fragmented
pattern. As Round 1 demonstrates, British initiatives to realize offshore wind potential
began by joining in this tradition of piecemeal regulation-making. The observations were
predictable: over-regulated consenting regimes with obscure consenting processes that
led to unsustainable outcomes. Round 2 proved that the ocean governance arrangements,
though slightly reformed with integrative decision-making objectives, have still failed to
break away from the culture of sectoral decision-making. For the third round of
deployments, the Government made another attempt at trying to impose a betterintegrated system for regulating the marine environment. At present, the Planning Act
2008630 and the Marine and Coastal Access Act 2009631 represent the new legal
frameworks within which decisions will be made. Both pieces of legislation symbolize an
innovative model of integrated and sustainable ocean governance in the United Kingdom.

5.5.1 The Planning Act 2008
The Planning Act received Royal Assent on 26th November 2008. Parts 1 to 8 of
the Act create a new system of development consent for Nationally Significant
Infrastructure Projects (NSIPs) in England and Wales that is ‗fairer, faster and more
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transparent.‘632 Under the Act, consent is required for development to the extent that it is,
or forms, part of a NSIP.633 NSIPs cover a wide range of infrastructural developments,
chief among them being, projects that seek to construct or extend generating stations.634
Offshore generating stations are only considered NSIPs if their generating capacity is
more than 100 megawatts,635 and are located in territorial waters 636 or in a REZ, except
any part of a REZ in relation to which the Scottish Ministers have functions637. A quick
review of the Round 3 Map638 and Round 3 Developers639 will confirm that the bulk of
the proposed Round 3 wind projects will meet these criteria. 640 Generally, it is an offence
for a person to carry out, or cause to be carried out, any development for which
development consent is required.641 Therefore, developers desirous of constructing or
expanding offshore generating stations are now required to apply for development
consent under this Act. For this purpose, the Act creates a body corporate, the
Infrastructure Planning Commission (IPC), 642 and vests it with power to examine and
determine applications for development consent for NSIPs. Though the IPC must
discharge these responsibilities on behalf of the Crown, it is not to be regarded as a
servant or agent of the same, nor does it enjoy any status, immunity or privilege of the
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same.643 Consent for development will be given in the form of an order 644 which
generally imposes requirements in connection with the development for which the
consent is granted.645 As well, once obtained, development consent under the Act
replaces the requirement for development consent under other regimes. Thus, in relation
to offshore wind projects, development consent under section 36 and 37 of the Electricity
Act 1989 is no longer required, 646 nor is planning permission under the Town and
Country Planning Act 1990 required.647 Additionally, an order granting development may
include provision deeming consent to have been given under section 34 of the CPA.648
The order may also include provision deeming a licence to have been given under Part 2
of the FEPA to have been given.649 Consequently, by reducing the number of applications
and permits that were once required for offshore wind projects under the Round 1 and 2
regimes and shifting the decision-making power from a variety of local authorities to a
central national authority, the Act has successfully created a new system of development
consent which is consistent, simple, streamlined and integrated.
In making a determination on the applications received, the IPC will have due
regard to National Policy Statements (NPSs) where these are in force. In relation to
energy, the Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change is given authority to
designate a statement as a National Policy Statement.650 This new feature, ―…forces
governments to think ahead [and set] out clearly, in black and white, what the national
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priorities are.‖651 Notably, NPSs can only be designated where the Secretary of State has
carried out an appraisal of the sustainability of the policy set out in the statement;652
where there has been a public consultation;653 and parliamentary requirements have been
met654. These requirements advance the theme of integration and transparency which
permeates the Act. The Secretary of State has a very wide discretion to determine the
content of the policy. Specifically, he or she may decide to:655
(a) set out, in relation to a specified description of development, the
amount, type or size of development of that description which is
appropriate nationally or for a specified area;
(b) set out criteria to be applied in deciding whether a location is suitable
(or potentially suitable) for a specified description of development;
(c) set out the relative weight to be given to specified criteria;
(d) identify one or more locations as suitable (or potentially suitable) or
unsuitable for a specified description of development;
(e) identify one or more statutory undertakers as appropriate persons to
carry out a specified description of development;
(f) set out circumstances in which it is appropriate for a specified type of
action to be taken to mitigate the impact of a specified description of
development.
It is noteworthy that where a NPS is designated, it must detail the reasons for the
policy contained in it.656 In particular, the reasons must include an explanation of how the
policy set out in the statement takes account of Government policy relating to the
mitigation of, and adaptation to, climate change. 657 If that were not clear enough, section
10 of the Act makes it mandatory for the Secretary of State to designate NPSs with the
objective of achieving sustainable development and having regard to the desirability of
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mitigating and adapting to climate change and achieving good design. 658 Essentially, once
formulated, NPSs set the framework for decision-making by the IPC.659 This means,
therefore, that the objective of focusing development on progress towards sustainability
and mitigation of climate change is indirectly transferred to the decision-makers. While
the focus on sustainability would generally find favour with Gibson et al.‘s assessment
criteria, it has been argued that ―… the need to mitigate climate change implies a
predisposition to decisions in favour of offshore wind.‖ 660 While this possibility is not
disputed, it should be noted that the Act establishes a right to judicially review a national
policy statement or anything done, or omitted to be done, by the Secretary of State in the
course of preparing the statement.661
Another novel improvement in the Round 3 consents regime is that it places
structured consultation duties on applicants that must be performed before submitting
applications to the IPC. These are, indeed, novel improvements, as Round 1 and Round 2
developers were only encouraged to consult with local authorities and communities in
their own interests. Under section 42 of the Planning Act, there is a duty to consult
specified local authorities about the proposed application. 662 Additionally, there is a wider
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and more onerous duty placed on applicants to consult local communities. 663 Specifically,
before consulting local communities on the proposed application, the applicant is
required to prepare a statement setting our how the applicant proposes to conduct the
consultation. 664 Thereafter, the applicant is required to publish the statement in a
newspaper circulating in the vicinity and in such other manner as may be prescribed. 665
At this point, the applicant is bound to carry out the consultation in accordance with the
proposals set out in the statement.666 While these duties frontload the planning process
onto the applicants, they are considered ―… crucial to the success of the planning
process.‖667 However, concerns have been raised about the effectiveness of the
consultation process. For one, nowhere in the Act is the word ―consultation‖ defined.
Therefore, the consultation process may be subject to an applicant‘s interpretation which
could lead to different approaches by different developers and, subsequently challenges
to the process.668 Also, regarding the duty to consult local communities, no where in the
section is there a stated minimum time frame for consultation. Again, this could pose
similar difficulties to the consenting process as experienced in Round 1 and Round 2.
Possibly, however, the run-up to the Act provides conceptual answers to these potential
difficulties. In 2007, the Government published Planning for a Sustainable Future: White
Paper669 in which it set out a wide-ranging package of reforms for the planning system. It
was advocated that there be ―full and fair opportunities for public consultation and
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engagement.‖670 Apart from recommending that the principles of ‗early engagement and
effective‘ consultation be preserved,671 the recommendations never specifically defined
what was meant by ‗full and fair opportunities for public consultation and engagement‘.
For what it is worth however, it was envisioned that the duty to consult would be ―… the
means of ensuring high standards of engagement.‖672 According to one author, ―[a]
fundamental aspect of the new regime is the over-arching role of the IPC both in
providing guidance on consultation and in vetting each applicant's approach to it.‖ 673 In
other words, the commission would need to satisfy itself that such consultation had been
properly carried out. Baroness Andrews seems to have cleared the uncertainty best: ―[the
IPC] must be satisfied that this consultation has been conducted properly, impartially,
fully and inclusively…‖674 In any event, when the consultations are completed, there is an
added duty placed on applicants to take account of the responses to the consultation and
the publicity. 675
By purposeful design, the IPC was created as a body corporate, independent of the
Government of the day. Rounds 1 and 2 demonstrate that a decision-makers‘
independence from governmental influence is crucial to an impartial decision-making
process. By way of example, it was regarded as unusual for the Secretary of State for
Transport to set the policy for highways, make the applications for road improvements
and, thereafter, decide whether or not the highway would be approved and consented
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to.676 Such processes inevitably confuse objectors as there is no identifiable separation of
powers.677 The situation was slightly different in relation to offshore wind farms. The
Secretary of State for Trade and Industry performed all the afore-mentioned functions
except regarding the application process. As has been demonstrated by Rounds 1 and 2,
the State has increasingly exerted its commitment to offshore wind energy development
in the consenting process by trumping objectors.

In essence, the system was not

transparent. What the Planning Act sought to do was to introduce the IPC as an
independent body so as to restore transparency and accountability. 678 As well, the
purpose of the IPC was to ―… champion the rights of objectors and local authorities and
other organizations.‖679 Unfortunately, these welcome contributions to the consenting
process are fast approaching abolishment. One of the major criticisms of the IPC was that
it failed to make any decisions on NSIPs over its two years of operation and exhausted a
budget of £16 million. 680 Having failed to approve any projects, the IPC in turn failed to
deliver on its promise of a fast-track consenting system for major infrastructure
developments. Consequently, the IPC is set to be abolished, and its decision-making
powers would revert to the Secretary of State. The IPC‘s successor is described as ―…a
new rapid and accountable system where Ministers, not unelected commissioners, will
take decisions on new infrastructure projects critical to the country‘s future economic
growth.‖681
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5.5.2 The Marine and Coastal Access Act 2009
The Marine and Coastal Access Act 2009 received Royal Assent on 12th January
2009. Similar to the Planning Act, it also created a new system of decision-making for
Round 3 consent applications. However, the jurisdiction of the MCAA is not as wide as
the Planning Act which permits a range of NSIPs both onshore and offshore. As the title
suggests, the MCAA‘s jurisdiction is limited to the management, control and regulation
of the uses in the UK marine area. The ―UK marine area‖ encompasses the area of sea
within the seaward limits of the territorial sea, any area of sea within the limits of the
EEZ, the area of sea within the limits of the UK sector of the continental shelf, and
includes the bed and subsoil of the sea within those areas. 682 For the purposes of the Act
―sea‖ includes any area submerged at the mean high water spring tide, and the waters of
every estuary, river or channel, so far as the tide flows at the mean high water spring
tide.683
Part 1, Chapter 1 of the Act establishes a body corporate 684 known as the Marine
Management Organization (MMO). The MMO is charged to manage the UK marine area
on behalf of the Crown, but is not to be regarded as a servant or agent of the same nor
does it enjoy any status, immunity or privilege of the same. 685 It is the general objective
and duty of the MMO to ensure that MMO functions are so exercised, that the carrying
on of activities by persons in the MMO‘s area is managed, controlled or regulated with
the objective of making a contribution to the achievement of sustainable development,
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taking into account all relevant facts, and in a manner which is consistent and
coordinated.686
The Act prohibits any individual from carrying on a licensable marine activity, or
causing or permitting any other person to carry on such activity except in accordance
with a marine licence granted by the MMO. 687 It necessarily follows that it is an offence
for any person to engage in a licensable activity without the requisite licence. 688 The
licensable marine activities captured by the Act are listed in Section 66 and are those that
were previously under the purview of Part II of the Food and Environment Protection Act
and Section 34 of the Coast Protection Act. Essentially, what Section 66 does is to
modernize, streamline and simplify the consents process by consolidating into a single
licensing decision consideration of environmental, human health and navigational safety
factors.689 Additionally, Chapter 2 of Part 1 of the Act transfers functions relating to sea
fisheries, nature conservation, and the power to grant consents under section 36 of the
Electricity Act, as well as functions relating to renewable energy installations, directly to
the MMO. The transfer of these functions draws together into a single licensing decision
consideration of the interests of other users of the sea. For present purposes, the transfer
vests power in the MMO to grant consent for offshore renewable energy installations in
the UK marine area that have a capacity less than 100 megawatts.690 Furthermore, the
MMO will assume responsibilities for assessing environmental impacts under the
Conservation (Natural Habitats, & c) Regulations 1994 and under the Electricity Works
686
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(Environmental Impact Assessment) (England and Wales) Regulations 2000.691 In sum,
by reducing the number of applications and permits that were once required for offshore
wind projects under the Round 1 and 2 regimes, and shifting the decision-making power
from a variety of local authorities to a central national authority, the Act has created a
new system of development consent which is consistent, simple, streamlined and
integrated.
Part 3 of the Act introduces a new marine planning system, which establishes a
proactive marine management system. Similar to the Planning Act, Chapter 1 of Part 3 of
the MCAA establishes the first stage in the marine planning process. The section makes
provision for the preparation of a Marine Policy Statement (MPS) which articulates
Government goals, objectives, policies and priorities for the sustainable development of
the UK marine area. The MPS may also consolidate all UK policies that impact the
marine environment and its resources.692 Unlike the Planning Act, the preparation of an
MPS is not discretionary. It therefore forces the Government of the day to proactively
plan its national priorities for contributing to the achievement of sustainable development
of the seas. The MCCA outlines specific requirements that must be met before an MPS
may be laid before parliament for passing. Generally, a Statement of Public Participation
must accompany the MPS; a sustainability appraisal must be effected; and a consultation
691
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draft of the MPS must also be prepared and publicized. 693 The preparation of MPSs in
England is the responsibility of the Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural
Affairs.694 In sum, MPSs will ―…create the framework for consistent and evidence based
decision making offering certainty about government policy intentions.‖ 695
The second stage of the marine planning process is the preparation of a series of
Marine Plans by the MMO. 696 The marine plan is created to document all the uses of
ocean space and the resources of the area to which it applies. Further, marine plans seek
to outline how the policies and objectives contained in the MPS should be applied to the
marine plan area. The preparation of the marine plan is subject to similar requirements as
the MPS.697 Once both documents are completed, the MMO and other relevant licensing
authorities become duty-bound to further authorization or enforcement decisions in
accordance with the relevant marine plans and policy statements, unless relevant
considerations indicate otherwise.698 The duty to pursue the objectives of the MPS and
marine plans also apply to any decisions which relate to the exercise of any function that
could affect the whole or any part of the UK marine area but which is not an
authorization or enforcement decision.699 Similar to the Planning Act regime, sections 62
and 63 of the MCAA establish means by which a person aggrieved by an MPS or marine
plan may challenge its validity.
693
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Lastly, in determining an application for a marine licence for offshore wind farms,
the MMO must have regard to the need to protect the environment, human health, and the
need to prevent interference with legitimate uses of the sea. 700 This is a clear duty to
consider all the factors relevant to projects simultaneously, enabling a decision to be
made about the project as a whole, but more specifically, about a project‘s contribution to
progress towards sustainability.

5.5.3 Marine Planning
In very basic terms, marine planning is planning for the different uses of spaces in
the ocean. The practice of planning how ocean spaces are used has been slowly emerging
in ocean governance regimes around the world and is often referred to as marine spatial
planning (MSP). Chapter 2 outlined how growing pressures on the marine environment
have created increased potential for user conflict, and how these pressures and conflicts,
along with climate change, are negatively impacting the long-term viability of the oceans.
It was also noted that these concerns highlight the need to revise and improve the current
uncoordinated practices respecting management, control and regulation of the uses of
ocean spaces.701 Against this backdrop, marine spatial planning has emerged as an
important means for securing coordinated approach to the allocation of marine spaces. 702
More definitively, marine spatial planning refers to
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…a public process of analyzing and allocating the spatial and temporal
distribution of human activities in marine areas to achieve, economic,
ecological and social objectives that are usually specified through a
political process. 703
The objective of marine spatial planning is to create an integrated place-based or
area-based plan in the marine environment to inform how ocean zoning maps 704 are to be
constructed and implemented.705 In turn, the zoning maps and marine spatial plans lend
guidance to individual permit decisions made within individual sectors.706 Implicitly,
therefore, MSP does not replace current practices of single sector management; there is
still single sector management, authorities, plans and policies for fisheries, energy,
tourism, transportation, etc. In relation to the MCCA, the regime integrates sectoral
consenting processes by transferring a number of marine management functions to the
MMO.707 Instead, MSP identifies key challenges within a marine planning area and
determines priorities within that area by reducing conflicts through the redistribution of
uses, or reducing conflicts through the amalgamation of compatibilities. 708 Simply,
‗priorities‘ refer to the development objectives (sustainable development, precaution,
integration, polluter-pays, etc.,) set for the marine planning area. Therefore, through the
process of identifying key challenges and setting priorities in a marine planning area,
MSP is able to ―…provide guidance for a range of decision-makers responsible for
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particular sectors, activities or concerns, so that they will have the means to make
decisions confidently in a more comprehensive, integrated and complementary way.‖ 709
In other words, the benefit of MSP to sectoral consenting processes is that when an
application is made for a particular activity or conservation initiative, agreed marine
spatial plans have already allocated spaces for them wherein their impacts on other
human uses and nature have already been identified and assessed. This makes it possible
for the permitting process to be accelerated while still producing comprehensive
outcomes that address all user interests.710 Rounds 1 and 2 have shown that without an
integrated framework, there are problems with identifying existing the conflicts and the
equitable management and resolution of those conflicts. As well, because MSP focuses
on human uses of the marine spaces, the process of planning and redistribution of uses in
marine planning areas pays explicit attention to trade-off/cost and benefit issues before
the decision-making stage is reached. This underscores a key feature of MSP: it facilitates
proactive management over reactive management. Together, attention to trade-offs and
forward-looking planning are aspects of democratic governance consistent with Gibson et
al.‘s criteria of sustainability. Also, the process of redistributing uses ensures that
decisions taken to allow developments seek to permit those decisions in a manner that
incorporates all eight of Gibson et al.‘s core principles for progress towards
sustainability. Further, by creating marine spatial plans with the aim to identify areas of
ecological importance as a basis of planning, decision-makers will consider those areas as
709
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high priority for conservation during the decision making process and, will produce
decisions that seek to maintain the natural capital at or near current levels in those
areas.711 Therefore, in this way biodiversity objectives are incorporated into planned
decision-making. 712 For Gibson et al.‘s criteria, this is desirable.
In addition, consistent with Gibson‘s criteria, MSP helps decision-makers to avoid
rendering decisions that convert ocean space uses from less intensive to more intensive
varieties. While MSP as a sea use management tool does not restrict increase in ocean
uses per se, the creation of plans in particular areas guide what level of development may
be permissible, i.e., what intensities a particular marine planning area can sustain.
The consensus in the literature is that the area-based, integrated, strategic,
anticipatory, participatory and adaptive characteristics of MSP enable governments to
convert their commitments to sustainable development and other policy goals and
objectives into action. To secure movement towards achieving stated goals and
objectives, MSP was not designed to create a one-time plan for the management of a
marine planning area. Instead, MSP‘s adaptive feature requires that it be updated
periodically to reflect developments in science and technology. In this regard, the MCAA
makes provision for marine policy statements713 and marine plans714 to be kept under
review.
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5.6

The New Regime at a Glance
The emerging characteristics of the marine planning and consents regime

established under the Planning Act 2008, and the MCCA, represent a more strategic and
streamlined approach to marine management. One of the key characteristics is the
adoption of a more structured approach to consultations wherein better engagement of
non-State actors can be achieved. Together, these characteristics denote a clear departure
from Round 1 and Round 2 consenting processes, which lacked much needed gains on
the principle of democratic governance. A brief assessment according to new governance
thinking confirms the same. First, both Acts have effectively displaced the location of
power under the political dimension of Howlett‘s framework. Both Acts have removed
from the State the legal power to make binding decisions on consent applications, and
have vested it in central body corporates that were created to be independent of the
Government. In relation to the Planning Act, legal power was transferred to the
Infrastructure Planning Commission, while the MCAA transferred legal power to the
MMO. The purposeful vesting of power in independent establishments serves to insulate
the new decision-makers from the pressures of industry, thereby weakening industry‘s
influence over the process. There is now one identifiable actor under both Acts. It is
important to note however, that a proper consideration of the realities of the regime in
practice may blur the conclusion that the newly established body corporates are actually
independent. So by way of example, the cozy relations between the MMO and the
Secretary of State do not make the MMO as independent as the analysis concludes. By
sections 14 and 15 of the MCAA, the Chief Executive of the MMO is appointed by the
Secretary of State, as ell as the Scientific Adviser. Additionally, the membership of the
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MMO are to be not fewer than 5, nor more than 8 other persons who are to be appointed
by the Secretary of State715 and serve a term not more than 5 years 716. Though the MMO
is to be funded by the Government, it is authorized by section 33 to borrow money from
the Secretary of State or from private sources as it may require for meeting its obligations
and carrying out its functions. However, the MMO may only borrow from private sources
if the Secretary of State consents. In practice, these realities have the potential to reflect
government commitment to promote wind energy development in the consents process.
Interpretatively, this means that there is also a great possibility of strong industry
influence in the consents process. In other words, the process of assessment of eligibility
of projects may likely continue to experience a balance of influence that may still favour
those with the stronger leverage. Again, it is to be recalled at this time, that each
government, through the Marine Policy Statements, prioritizes its goals for sustainable
development; a concept that is economic-development oriented as it is environmental and
resources protection and conservation-minded. On the other hand, it is submitted here
that the structure of the Act which centralizes, essentially, the overall use of the marine
area under the MMO gives the organization tremendous power. Ironically, the MMO is
also authorized to enter into agreement with other agencies, including private agencies, to
have them carry out its mandates as set out in the Marine Policy Statements and Marine
Plan. A conclusion inclusive of practical realities would state that the MMO‘s power is
very huge but also potentially unwieldy.
Meanwhile, the institutional and regulatory dimensions have experienced little
change. Institutionally, the IPC and MMO are established by Acts of Parliament. Thus,
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the institutional structures are still enmeshed with the formal establishment. However, the
onerous and structured duties under the Planning Act seek to diversify the institutions
that have the capacity to influence outcomes, by empowering a range of non-state actors
to have some leverage under the exercise of its institutional jurisdiction. Even so, the
regulatory dimension is still characterized by top-down hierarchical control through laws
and regulations, except that the diversity in the regime comes via are the duties to consult
at many points of the consents process.
The question whether these new arrangements have produced outcomes sufficient
to satisfy Gibson et al.‘s criteria cannot be dealt with at present. This is because the
regimes are fairly new and have not yet subjected offshore wind applications to their
processes. However, given the clear mandate to achieve sustainable development
articulated under both legislations and so long as the implementation of the regime
operates as it should, it is doubtful that future licensing decisions will fail Gibson et al.‘s
criteria. This conclusion is informed as it is speculative. Indeed, more so given that the
implementation of these two Acts must necessarily pitch two central authority-wielding
body corporates against each other in some way, a specter which is also duplicative of
their functions in this issue area.
The following table summarizes the evolution of the consents regime over the
three Rounds of offshore wind deployments and their contributions towards
sustainability.
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5.7

Conclusion
Freedom-Kai Phillips has noted in reference to European Union countries that the

United Kingdom ―…is clearly ahead of most in terms of legislation pertaining to
renewable energy broadly and ocean-based renewables particularly.‖ 717 In relation to the
advancements in the consents process, this chapter has reflected the truth of this assertion.
The chapter began with an assessment of the first consents regime used to deploy
offshore wind farms in the UK. It was found that the regime failed to produce sustainable
outcomes. The assessment of the Round 2 regime came to a similar conclusion. The
chapter ended with a review of the new consenting regimes under the Planning Act 2008
and the Marine and Coastal Act 2009. The assessment demonstrated that the new regimes
remedied the weaknesses of the Round 1 and Round 2 regimes. Therefore, the Round 3
model of governance is best placed to produce sustainable decision outcomes for oceanbased energy developments.
Overall, what this Chapter demonstrates, is that there is something to be had,
something very core, in plurilateral governance arrangements for regulating marine
renewables. Rounds 1 and 2 failed Gibson et al.‘s criteria for progress towards
sustainability largely because the regimes conformed to the tradition of hierarchical
governance. The Round 3 model of governance, by design and effect, shifts away from
governance arrangements that conform to the tradition of hierarchical control. Among
other things, it incorporates participatory decision-making. This plurilateral arrangement,
finds favour with New Governance scholars who argue that the social trait of non-state
actors would influence more effective rules and solutions to social problems
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CHAPTER 6
Adopting Lessons from the United Kingdom’s Approach to
Offshore Wind to the Development of an Effective
Governance Arrangement for Renewable Ocean Resources
in the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States

6.1

Chapter Overview
This Chapter seeks to apply the governance lessons learnt from the UK‘s many

attempts to regulate offshore wind to the development of an effective governance
arrangement or offshore renewables in the OECS. The Chapter begins by outlining the
energy supply and consumption context in the OECS region. Thereafter, the Chapter
describes the energy strategy and legal requirements of the region. The remaining
sections are dedicated to justifying the transposition of lessons from the UK case study
through a new governance assessment of marine development practices in the region. The
findings of the assessment are then discussed in relation to their similarities and
differences to the UK experience. The chapter ends with a discussion of lessons policymakers in the OECS could adopt in attempting to formulate a governance framework for
the regulation of marine renewables in the OECS.

6.2

The Energy Supply and Consumption Context in the Organisation of
Eastern Caribbean States
Like the case of many other Small Island Developing States (SIDS) around the

world, the Caribbean energy story, particularly that of the OECS region, is one that must
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begin with a description that is testament to its high-dependence on imported fossil
fuels. 718 This dependence is directly linked to the lack of oil, natural gas and coal
resources in the region. 719 Statistically, the ‗high-dependence‘ situation means that more
than 90% of power supply in the region is dependent on imported fossil fuels. 720
Unsurprisingly, the region remains the most import dependant globally where petroleum
is concerned.721 The grim consequences of chronic dependence on imported energy in the
OECS countries, is reflected in the fact that some governments have had to spend as
much as half of their export revenues on imported fossil fuels. 722 For the most part, such
expenditure is necessary to supply energy for efficient business operations, particularly,
in the tourism industry which has become the economic mainstay for many Caribbean
countries. 723 On the other hand, meeting modern energy standards through oil import has
diverted much financial resources away from progress on health, education and other
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developmental agendas.724 An added burden of import dependence is the risk of supply
disruptions and the inability to escape volatile fossil fuel prices725. In 2008 Caribbean
economies suffered several burdensome oil shocks as a direct consequence of their high
dependence on oil imports. Economists in the region now argue that these economies
―…will not be able to survive many more oil shocks similar to that experienced in
2008.‖726 Additionally, for quite some time governments in the region have been raising
concern over the negative environmental impact of current power generation practices. 727
Whether taken individually or collectively, these concerns have led to an increasing
recognition that what the countries in the OECS need desperately is a lowered reliance on
imported fossil fuels through the development of indigenous sources of energy. 728 As
noted in Chapter 3, this need to develop indigenous sources of energy accords with
current government policy around the world. 729 As such, countries around the world are
in the ongoing process of developing their renewable and non-renewable sources of
energy. However, for many Caribbean countries, particularly those in the OECS,
724
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renewable energy is the only indigenous supply option. Potentially, the region can make
use of wind power, solar energy, hydropower, biomass, and geothermal renewable energy
technologies.730 These supply options have been identified as realistic economic
alternatives to fossil fuels in the region. 731 At present, the region has utilized wind power,
hydropower, geothermal and solar energy technologies. 732 To date, of the nine Member
States of the OECS only two Member States, Dominica and Saint Vincent and the
Grenadines, have fed renewable energy into their electricity grid supply. 733 A 1999 study,
Renewable Energy in the Caribbean; Where we are; Where we should be, found that the
current amounts of electricity generated from these renewable sources are nowhere near
the region‘s potential. 734 The fact that only two Member States have been able to feed
renewable energy into their grid system supports the proposition that the 1999 finding is
still a defining characteristic of the region‘s energy profile today.
Recently, governments, policy-makers, utilities, renewable energy developers and
other stakeholders in the region have directed much of their attention towards the
possibility of tapping into the Caribbean‘s ocean energy (wave, tidal, ocean thermal)
potential. 735 Discussions have also raised the possibility of harnessing the renewable
energy potential of the offshore trade winds in the region. 736 Where onshore wind is
concerned, the Caribbean energy sector has long recognized the potential of their trade
winds to offer competitive and reliable electricity in amounts signiﬁcant enough to supply
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the needs of electrical utilities.737 Like many other countries around the world, onshore
wind development in the region faces significant challenges: accessibility, connectivity,
land availability, environmental effects, etc.738 It is no surprise therefore, that offshore
wind has made its way on energy agendas in the region as it has in other jurisdictions.
Other drivers for the integration of offshore energy into the Caribbean/OECS energy mix
include: energy security, greenhouse gas emission reductions, job creation opportunities,
and opportunities for saving foreign exchange. 739 Apart from the potential benefits to be
derived from the utilization of wave, tidal, ocean thermal energy conversion and offshore
wind energy, the use of these technologies have great potential to impact current ocean
use and management practices.740 Currently, the focus on renewable energy sources in the
region has been on overcoming financing and other capacity challenges. However, if the
objective of ―…moving the ocean energy industry forward in the Caribbean‖ 741 is to be
met, then in addition to recognizing ocean energy as a viable renewable energy resource
and targeting funding support, industry developers and policy-makers argue that there
needs to be a ―review of pertinent policy and regulatory framework from an ocean energy
perspective.‖742 The remainder of Chapter 6 is dedicated to the latter cause.

6.3

Energy Strategy in the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States
Chapter 2 of any Caribbean energy story must outline the pertinent policies and

strategies for energy management and development in the region. At present, most
737

See, Ponsot, ―Cheaper and Safer Energy in the Caribbean‖¸ supra note 72. See also, Henk Hutting, ―The
Challenge of Converting the Caribbean‘s Significant Wind potential into a Cost-effective and Reliable
Energy Source‖, (slide show presented to the Caribbean Renewable Energy Forum, 15 October 2009)
online: CREF <http://www.caribbeanenergyforum.com> [Hutting ―The Challenge‖].
738
Hutting, ―The Challenge‖, supra note 739.
739
Murphy, ―Caribbean‘s Ocean Energy Potential‖, supra note 28.
740
In relation to offshore wind see Chapter 4 above.
741
Murphy, ―Caribbean‘s Ocean Energy Potential‖, supra note 28.
742
Ibid.

182

Caribbean countries do not have an established national energy policy, long-term energy
strategy or energy action plan.743 Many authors relate the occurrence of this trend to the
practice of privatizing State-owned electrical utilities prevalent in most Caribbean
countries. 744 Typically, privatization practices were ―…motivated by budgetary pressures,
the desire to attract private capital for expansion, and the need to improve operational
efficiency.‖745 Privatization meant that the responsibility for energy forecasting and
policy shifted from the authority of the State to privately-owned utilities.746 Beyond any
doubt, policy-makers have noted that energy strategies, policies, legislation and
regulation are critical tools through which governments are able to deliver alternative
energy resources.747 Without these, the accepted need to diversify energy sources will
continue to assume the status of a gentleman‘s agreement.748
Noteworthy, the absence of energy strategies and policies on the national and
regional levels has spawned identifiable characteristics, which further define the energy
context in the OECS. So for instance, the lack of energy policies and strategies directly
hampers private sector participation, which is a heralded and necessary framework
condition for renewable energy investment and development. 749 This dynamic has created
energy governance arrangements in the OECS with ill-defined rules on Independent
Power Producers and ill-defined rules on support measures of government.750
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Consequently, therefore, with the exception of one OECS Member State, Dominica, there
is a universal monopoly for electrical utilities in OECS countries. 751 Furthermore, the
lack of regional energy policies and strategies prevents the development of arrangements
that seek to export surplus renewable energy within and outside the OECS region. 752 The
ramifications are significant. The absence of interconnections among islands and thus
regional power markets, fail to improve the economics for renewable energy
development and investment in an already small market.753 In sum, these instruments,
especially policies, must be implemented at the national and regional levels as they
―…set the framework and establish realistic targets for increased exploitation and
utilization of alternative energy sources.‖754 The foregoing has given rise to the following
recommendations:755
Governments need to:
Formulate and Implement sustainable energy policies and action
plans
Regain control over the energy sector
Reform and liberalize the energy sector
The dynamics outlined above are generally true for OECS countries. To remedy
the policy deficit, World Bank specialists have urged OECS countries to pursue the
establishment of a regional energy institution, the Eastern Caribbean Energy Planning
and Regulation Authority.756 In the interim, however, some OECS Member States have
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begun to formulate national energy policies. Presently, these policies are at various stages
of drafting and completion. 757
In sum, the growing consensus in the region has long been that ―…significant
policy and institutional changes are necessary if we are to derive the benefits of clean
energy. Radical if not revolutionary changes must take place if we are to protect both our
society and nature.‖758

6.4

Legal Requirements in the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States
Chapter 3 of this study outlined some of the concerns that encourage shifts

towards renewable energy generation practices. Chief among those concerns was the
issue of climate change. It was also noted that the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change and its Kyoto Protocol were formulated to promote and effect urgent
and massive reductions in carbon dioxide emissions to achieve climate stability. In this
regard, specified parties (Annex I) to these treaties were legally bound to mitigate climate
change by limiting anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases. Unlike the United
Kingdom and other Annex I Parties, Member States of the OECS are not bound to effect
emission reductions under the international climate change regime.

It is therefore

unsurprising that a perusal of the law books of Member States of the OECS would show
that there is no legislation in force, or in draft, akin to the United Kingdom‘s Climate
Change Act 2008.759 That Act sets long-term, legally binding targets for the reduction of
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greenhouse gas emissions and by so doing, provides incentive through sanctions for
utilities to explore and exploit renewable energy.
Unlike Annex I State Parties of the climate change regime, the members of the
OECS produce extremely low levels of greenhouse gas emissions. 760 In context, this
means that these states will suffer disproportionately from the damaging impacts of
climate change.761 As noted above, their geophysical sensitivities also make them most
susceptible to climate change. It is against this backdrop that some writers have suggested
that Caribbean States establish a regional emission reduction target.762 To date, however,
there are no established targets or attempts to establish the same.

6.5

Adopting Lessons from the United Kingdom’s Approach to
Regulating Offshore Wind to the Development an Effective
Governance Arrangement for Renewable Ocean Resources in the
Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States
Taken by itself, there can be no question that the concept of marine renewables is

a sustainable initiative. 763 However, the question whether it is able to maintain this cloak
of sustainability in practice arises for consideration. The answer to the question depends
on the manner in which it is allowed to enter the marine environment. Chapter 5 reviewed
the UK governance arrangements that have been employed to regulate offshore wind
development. Through the application of the three-dimensional Howlett et al. analytical
framework, and the application of Gibson et al.‘s criteria for measuring sustainability,
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conclusions were made as to the effectiveness of each governance arrangement
employed. Specifically, the exercise identified what modes of governance were ill suited
for the purposes of regulating offshore wind and what combinations of governance
arrangements proved effective, i.e., what combinations of governance arrangements made
positive contributions towards sustainable development. Ultimately, Chapter 5 concluded
that in light of the Gibson et al. criteria, the current regime under the UK Planning Act
2008 and the MCCA holds the greatest potential for making positive contributions
towards the sustainable development of the offshore wind industry. In other words,
Chapter 5 concluded that the Round 3 model of governance arrangement was effective
because it held the greatest potential for ranking high on the Gibson et al. criteria for
sustainability.
In seeking to propose an effective governance arrangement for the regulation of
renewable ocean resources in the OECS, the new governance framework is a good device
for challenging policy-makers to think about what governance arrangement might
possibly work in the OECS and what governance arrangements might not work. By
challenging policy-makers to think about the local circumstances, it provides a rational
basis for transposing lessons learnt in other regimes. This is important, as one of the most
common pitfalls of comparative research is the fruitless exercise of comparing legal
solutions in one jurisdiction to legal problems of another jurisdiction where the sociocultural, political and economic contexts of those jurisdictions differ dramatically. In
other words, are the political, institutional and regulatory contexts in the OECS
sufficiently similar to justify transposing lessons from the UK offshore wind governance
arrangements?
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One way to begin answering this question is to look at the current governance
arrangement for regulating renewable ocean resources in the OECS region and make a
determination as to whether it bears similarities with the UK case study. However, as
noted at the outset of this study, there is no governance arrangement in place for the
regulation of these resources in the OECS. Additionally, there are no draft proposals, bills
or policies that seek to regulate the same. This is unsurprising because thus far, there have
been no projects in any of the OECS territories that seek to harness the power of
renewable ocean resources. As noted earlier, harnessing the power of renewable ocean
resources is a recent policy objective for the region. 764 Alternatively, however, policymakers can justify transposition in the absence of issue-specific governance
arrangements, from practices in related areas. Prima facie, it would appear from an
examination of other governance practices that the political, institutional and regulatory
contexts in the region are akin to the Round 1 and 2 experiences in the United Kingdom.
Prima facie, therefore, this makes a strong case for justifying the transposition of
governance lessons from the UK to the OECS region. Additionally, the similarity in
governance arrangements is unsurprising as many of the OECS member states were once
colonized by Britain, and have therefore, adopted many of their governance practices. 765
By way of example, Chapter 5 demonstrated that during the Round 1 and Round 2
consents processes, the Government held the legal power to make decisions on consent
applications. The decisions made favoured the development of the offshore wind industry
over the maintenance of other natural capital for instance, because of the perceived
benefit of offshore wind power and strong industry pressure for development. In the
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OECS region the likelihood of such a situation recurring is great. The manner in which
other projects in the region are being approved evidences the truth of this assertion. The
following sections seek to highlight, by way of example, some existing marine projects in
the region. Specifically, the section will make a detailed reference to the governance
arrangements used to regulate the development of a dolphinarium industry in the Island
of Anguilla, an Associate Member State of the OECS.

6.5.1 Case Study: The Governance Arrangements used to Regulate the
Development of a Dolphinarium Industry in Anguilla
In 2001, the Government of Anguilla (GOA) gave developers permission to
construct a dolphinarium at Meads Bay located in the west of the island. Primarily, the
developers and the GOA intended that the facility ―…provide high quality, educational,
entertaining interactive experiences to its guests.‖766 Moreover, the dolphinarium was
also meant to serve as a ―…substantial contributor to the tourist-based Anguilla
economy.‖767 In 2002, the Government of Anguilla published the Anguilla Visitor
Expenditure Survey768 which covered the period 24th February to 9th March. The survey
sought to profile visitors to the country by referencing the purposes of their visit. The
survey found that 6.3% of day visitors answering the survey indicated that Dolphin
Fantaseas was the main purpose of their visit. 769 The survey also profiled visitors based
on the activities they engaged in while on the island. The results were that 12% of stay766
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over visitors engaged in activities offered by Dolphin Fantaseas. 770 The property on
which the facility was built was later sold to a hotelier. As the maintenance of the facility
depreciated, the water in the dolphinarium became polluted causing concern to spread
throughout the island and internationally about the unhealthy conditions that the dolphins
were now being subjected to. Initially, the decision was made to relocate the dolphins to
Road Bay, Sandy Ground, an area which houses the main industrial port on the island.
However, after much protest from the residents of the community, construction at Road
Bay halted. The residents were mainly concerned about the environmental impact of the
development on the Road Bay beach, which is a popular tourist attraction. The residents
were also concerned about the impact of the heavy-duty marine traffic from the nearby
shipping port on the health of the dolphins. In fact, after demanding to see the
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) for the project, the residents discovered that the
Government neglected to carry out one. This caused further alarm that eventually forced
the Government to cease work. There is some speculation as to the chain of events that
‗forced‘ the government to allow construction in the ocean without having first carried
out an EIA. Catherine Orchard, a resident of the Sandy Ground Community wrote a letter
to the editor of The Anguillian771 in which she detailed the strong opposition to the
project in her community. She also stated that the Government failed to consult any of the
residents of Sandy Ground or the Department of Fisheries or the Anguilla National Trust,
even though the Government maintains that it had consulted with the latter
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organizations. 772 However, as to why construction proceeded without an EIA, Catherine
Orchard wrote:773
Furthermore, Mr. Proctor [the Director of Physical Planning] said that an
environmental study would have taken time and that his department had to
consider the Dolphin‘s timetable, they were under pressure to move from
the present location. There is only one interpretation possible here: the
needs and timetables of a foreign owned corporation are more important
than the Anguillian.
The facts as presented by Catherine Orchard after doing her own investigations
into the matter are nothing short of deplorable. In addition to failing to comply with EIA
regulations, the letter also references the fact that the Government of Anguilla gave the
developers permission to construct on the seabed without the requisite licences and
permits. Given the foregoing and the pending calamity, the Government decided to
relocate the dolphins to Sandy Point, Blowing Point where a new dolphinarium would be
constructed, but this time in the open sea. 774 It meant that Dolphin Discovery, the new
developers, had to seek permission to carry out works on the seabed at Blowing Point for
the new dolphinarium.
As is the case with Round 1 and Round 2 offshore wind developments, the
developers had to obtain a range of consents and licences from different governmental
departments to carry out works on the seabed and related onshore works. The specifics of
the development and its location brought it within the ambit of the Beach Control Act,775
the Beach Protection Act,776 the Ports, Harbours and Piers Act,777 the Building Act778 and
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the Land Development Control Act779. Again, this is representative of the fragmented
approach to the regulation of the marine environment common to the Round 1 and Round
2 offshore wind regimes in the UK. On 12 June 2007, the developers applied for
permission to construct a dolphin pier in the water at Sandy Point, Blowing Point, in
respect of a parcel of land forming part of the property of the Crown. Pursuant to the
Land Development (Control) Act, the Land Development Control Committee gave
planning approval on 12 December 2007. The Anguilla Building Board also gave
approval for the construction of a building to be located in the area pursuant to the
Building Act. In addition to these approvals, the developers also needed a licence to
permit any use of the foreshore and the floor of the sea under section 3 of the Beach
Control Act. As well, developers needed to obtain written permission from the relevant
Minister for the construction of any pier on any part of the foreshore pursuant to section
36 of the Ports, Habours and Piers Act. However, construction of a pier and
dolphinarium was commissioned within the waters without the necessary licences and
permits under the Beach Control Act and the Ports, Habours and Piers Act. Additionally,
while the project received planning approval, it commenced work without the requisite
tenancy rights in violation of the Registered Lands Act.780 The events caused nine
applicants to make a claim for judicial review of the various decisions of the
governmental bodies or persons giving rise to the construction of the pier and/or
dolphinarium. Even in the face of clear uncontroverted evidence that construction was
underway at the site location without the required licences and permits, Counsel for the
Government of Anguilla argued that there was no basis for the applicants to make a claim
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for judicial review. 781 The High Court disregarded Counsel‘s argument and ordered
interim relief as follows: 782
(1) That all construction of all piers or structures or any encroachment on
the foreshore or floor of the sea in whatever manner at the Sandy Point
Beach or in the waters forming the Port at Blowing Point by any persons
whether by themselves, their servants or agents, in violation of the
requisite licensing provisions of the Beach Control Act and the Ports,
Harbours and Piers Act cease forthwith until further order.
(2) The Respondent shall perform all acts and do all things as may be
necessary to ensure compliance with the terms of this order.
(3) It is further ordered and directed that this order be served upon Dolphin
Fantaseas Anguilla, being a person appearing to the Court to be directly
affected by the making of this order.
Noteworthy, the work continued for three days after the grant of the Order. Work
eventually ceased when a Senior Crown Counsel of the Attorney General‘s Chambers
visited the site and verbally ordered that the works come to a complete stop. 783 This act
alone gave an inescapable opportunity for political comment and criticism in respect of
‗the power of the Attorney-General‘s Chambers‘: 784
The way I heard it said, the A-G's Chambers have power. When the Queen
says, "Stop", you can ignore her. When the Governor says it, you can
pretend you did not hear. When the Court says it, you can keep right on
going. But, when the A-G's Chambers say it, you better comply. Or else!
Further, it is noteworthy that during the judicial review proceedings, the Attorney
General referred the Court to the affidavit of Vincent Proctor, the Director of Physical
Planning wherein ―…Mr. Proctor allude[d] to information passed on to him by the
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Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Lands to the effect that "the Ministry of Lands gave the
Developer permission to commence building the pier" and that "the licence to use the
beach is a new concept, the details of which is still being developed." 785 This is
significant because it demonstrates the manner in which the Government of Anguilla
approached the regulation of a new marine industry. Arguably, it is worse than the UK
experience. Instead of adapting existing legislation to suit the development, the
Government decided not to follow its own procedures and laws for permitting activity on
the foreshore and the floor of the seabed. In making the Order, Justice Janice GeorgeCreque noted that despite the breaches of the laws of the land, ―…no steps [were] taken
to bring such activities which are being carried out in plain sight to halt.‖ 786 She then
noted that ―…such a derelection or abdication of responsibility [cannot] be permitted to
the detriment of public interests.‖787 Furthermore, in making the Order Justice GeorgeCreque posed a very interesting question that is particularly relevant for the present
purpose of ascertaining the character of marine governance arrangements in the OECS:
How could such activities which attract criminal sanctions, in the absence
of the requisite licences and permissions, simply be allowed to occur and
proceed unabated without the necessary intervention by the relevant
servants or agents of the Crown?
The simple answer is that the Government of Anguilla treated the construction of
the dolphinarium differently because of the perceived benefit to be had. As noted in
Chapter 5, this was one of the reasons the UK Government made poor decisions
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respecting Round 1 and Round 2 deployments.788 To add insult to injury, in proceedings
to discharge the Order, the Government argued that…789
…maintaining the Order causes prejudice and that the balance of
convenience lies with the Attorney General representing the Government
of Anguilla and Dolphin Discovery in the non-continuation of the Order
and says that the Dolphinarium project is substantially completed and thus
would cause no additional hardship to the Property Owners.
In addition:
Reliance [was] further placed on the losses which Dolphin Discovery may
suffer from the loss of visits of cruise ship guests to the Dolphinarium as
well as loss of income and employment opportunities to other ancillary
service providers who are Anguillians, of the Dolphin Discovery business
which it is said results in a loss of revenue to the Government of Anguilla.
Counsel also urges that I take judicial notice of the general slow down in
the world economy and that of Anguilla. On this basis, counsel argues
that the Order is currently having an oppressive effect on the people and
government of Anguilla and should be discharged on this basis.
Unsurprisingly, nowhere in the proceedings did the Government attempt to advance
an argument to the effect that there had been no negative environmental impact.
Nonetheless, Justice George-Creque concluded that the line of argument advanced by the
Government did not ―…afford a proper basis for the discharge of the Order granted.‖790
The example of the dolphinarium and the line of argument advanced by the Government,
demonstrate how governments sometimes favour business efficacy and the interests of
industry developers over the protection of public interest and the letter of the law.
It is necessary to single out for mention the Government‘s argument ―…that the
Order is currently having an oppressive effect on the people and [G]overnment of
Anguilla and should be discharged on this basis.‖ It is interesting that the Government
could confidently advance and seek to rely on this argument when the general population
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blatantly opposed the relocation and in some instances, the dolphinarium itself.
According to Anguillian blogger, Don Mitchell CBE QC, ―[t]he Anguilla Hotel and
Tourism Association is in the process of conducting a poll among its members.
Preliminary results indicate that upwards of 90% are opposed to it, on the ground that
none of Anguilla‘s tourists and few Anguillian residents visit it.‖ 791 What is more, since
the Anguilla Revolution in 1967, three dolphins became the National Emblem on the
revolutionary flag, representing the tenets of Friendship, Wisdom and Strength. As
Anguilla is now a British Overseas Territory, the dolphins form the crest on its British
Flag. Therefore, there is a general feeling among Anguillians that to degrade a symbol of
national pride by proceeding with the construction of the dolphinarium is a mistake that
should not be repeated. In the letter to the editor of The Anguillian, Cathrine Orchard
began by asking one fundamental question that embodies the heartfelt sentiments of the
Anguillian people. She asks; ―When did the Dollar Sign replace the Dolphin as our
National Emblem?‖792
In the end, the Government argued that since the making of the Order, the issued
the requisite licences and permissions to the developers and as such, there had been a
material change in factual circumstances that warranted a discharge of the Order. 793
However, the licences as issued in August 2008 were made to commence retroactively in
an effort to legalize the previous construction built in violation of the Laws of Anguilla.
Given the foregoing, it is interesting to note that the later issuance of the licences were so
effected for the sole purpose of ‗correcting the illegality‘ and not for the purpose of
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permitting the development under the terms, conditions and processes of the Beach
Control Act and the Ports, Habours and Piers Act. It is to be remembered that the
legislation intended to protect the foreshore and the floor of the seabed by regulating the
activities that may be carried out there. This observation aside, the Court relied on the
well-settled principle of law established in the case of Sovfracht v. Van Udens
Scheepvaart794 to hold that the developers had not actually obtained the requisite licences,
as licences could not operate retrospectively. 795 In closing, Justice George-Creque noted:
―[t]his is a sad state of affairs and highlights the pitfalls when activities are undertaken
without due regard for the regime of laws governing such activity. 796
While there is no marine renewable governance arrangement regarding renewable
marine resources in the OECS, the above case study of the dolphinarium in Anguilla
demonstrates that the political, institutional and regulatory governance arrangements for
new marine developments are akin to the Round 1 and Round 2 governance arrangements
in the UK.

6.5.2 New Governance Assessment of the Dolphinarium Governance
Arrangement
The dolphinarium case study in the previous section outlined the range of possible
consents and licences required for development in the marine environment. The
following sub-sections apply the three-dimensional analytical framework of Michael
Howlett et al. to the OECS decision-making process for marine works in the context of
the dolphinarium. To recap, the first dimension created by the Howlett et al. is the
political dimension. In this mode of governance, the authors were mainly concerned with
794
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one question: ―whether political power – that is, the ability to make legitimate,
authoritative decisions allocating societal resources – favours state or non-state actors.‖797
It can be argued on end about what it means for political power to be vested in the state
and what it means for that power to be vested in society-driven actors.798 For instance,
earlier, in Chapter 2, it was noted that ―many people have been disappointed with the
ability of government to tackle social problems.‖ 799 Because of this, New Governance
scholars argue that the social trait of non-state actors would influence more effective rules
and solutions to social problems.800 These are issues that the framework forces one to
consider after having identified whether the political power in the regime favours state or
non-state actors.
The other two dimensions recognize that there is more to a governance
arrangement than political power. The second dimension for instance, is symbolic of the
fact that ―[i]nstitutions set the framework for the exercise of power.‖ 801 In this dimension,
Howlett et al. were concerned with the constitution and composition of institutional
structures, i.e., are the institutions formally or informally constituted? Are the institutions
composed of state or non-state actors? Essentially, in their view, these characteristics
determine ―…the abilities of various state and non-state actors to prevail in policy
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disputes and decisions, as well as the possibilities for the choice of the policy instruments
used to implement the mode of governance.‖ 802
The third dimension focuses attention on the nature of the legal instruments used
in the governance arrangement under study. The authors were concerned about whether
the legal regime is characterized by traditional top-down hierarchical government control
through laws and regulations or market-oriented regulation which are generally flexible
and voluntary.
Overall, in each of the dimensions, the focus is on locating the governance
arrangement, (is it State (hierarchical)? or Non-State (plurilateral)?), of each mode of
governance (political, institutional, regulatory). Howlett et al. describe the key to using
the framework in the following terms: ―…movement along the horizontal ‗hierarchical‘
to ‗plurilateral‘ axis is seen as being associated with changes along three distinct but
overlapping vertical dimensions: namely institutional structures, political practices and
regulatory techniques… .”803 In other words, in moving across the horizontal axis, the
fundamental question is whether there is one actor or many actors in each mode of
governance, and who those actors are.

6.5.2.1 The Political Dimension
The range of consents and licences required for the dolphinarium demonstrate the
involvement of several actors in the decision-making process for development on the
foreshore and the floor of the sea. These actors play various roles and perform various
responsibilities and, thus, can be grouped by their affiliate state or non-state orientations.
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On the state side, the central bodies involved in the development and regulation of
the marine territory are: the relevant ministers under the Beach Control Act, the Beach
Protection Act and the Ports, Harbours and Piers Act; the Building Board (Building Act);
the Land Development Control Committee (Land Development Control Act); and the
Department of Lands and Surveys (Crown Lands Act).
Although it may not be expressly reflected by the consents process, many nonstate actors also hold an interest in the development and regulation of marine
environment. The main non-state actors include the public, industry developers,
environmental pressure groups, and fishers. The consensus is that many state and nonstate actors hold an interest in marine development and regulation. The question remains,
which among these State and Non-State actors is actually charged with power to
determine whether a particular marine project will be given approval for development.
A quick review of the dolphinarium case study would confirm that power to
produce legally binding outcomes on consents applications is concentrated in the hands
of State actors. However, while power to make decisions is legally vested in the State,
legitimate questions can be raised as to whether non-state actors influence the exercise of
state power over consents applications. This question turns on two variables. The first
variable concerns the identity of the non-state actor in question. This is of particular
importance because it characterizes the interest of the Non-State actor in the regime, and
hints to its preference of outcome on consents applications. The second variable speaks to
whether the non-state actor has the capacity to influence state power in the direction of
their preferred outcome.
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As noted above, there is no doubt that the public has had an indisputably
dominant and influential role in the decision-making process for marine work. The active
involvement/protest of the residents of Sandy Ground prevented the initial relocation of
the dolphinarium in their community. The residents were concerned about the
environmental impact of the development and about the impact of the heavy-duty marine
traffic from the nearby shipping port on the health of the dolphins. After demanding to
see the EIA for the project, the residents discovered that the Government neglected to
carry out one. This caused further alarm that spread throughout the island. Eventually, the
alarm forced the Government to cease works. Like the case of many other OECS
territories, Anguilla is a tourism-based economy. This dependence has birthed a people
very protective of their tourism product: sun, sand and sea. Their large numbers and
interests in the marine environment gave them sufficient capacity to influence State
action in the development of the dolphinarium. Therefore, although there were no
formally instituted NIMBY organizations, the public outcry became a significant barrier
to the marine development of the dolphinarium in Road Bay, Sandy Ground.
However, the second relocation to Sandy Point, Blowing Point seemed to have
been immune to public opposition. In contrast to the Road Bay, Sandy Ground area, the
Sandy Point, Blowing Point area is a much smaller with fewer residents. This perhaps,
explains why public opposition was not on the same scale as it had been on in the Road
Bay, Sandy Ground community. Nonetheless, the unscrupulous manner in which the
Government of Anguilla consented to the construction of the pier and/or dolphinarium in
Sandy Point, Blowing Point, caused nine residents in the area to apply for judicial review.
Note that at the time when proceedings for judicial review began, construction had
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already commenced on the foreshore and the floor of the sea at the Sandy Point location
without all the necessary permits. Though, the applicants were successful at obtaining an
injunction, they were only able to affect the decision-making process after construction
had begun. To date, there has been no attempt to assess the environmental impact of the
works carried out up until the grant of the injunction. All the same, the point remains that
the public has some capacity to affect the decision-making process.
It seems however, that though public opposition is strong, its capacity to influence
the decision-making process is weakened by the interests of the state and industry in the
development of the marine industry. Evidence of this strong influence over the decisionmaking process was hinted to earlier in the preceding section. The preceding section
noted that in proceedings to discharge the Order, the Government of Anguilla argued
that…804
…maintaining the Order causes prejudice and that the balance of
convenience lies with the Attorney General representing the Government
of Anguilla and Dolphin Discovery in the non-continuation of the Order
[my emphasis] and says that the Dolphinarium project is substantially
completed and thus would cause no additional hardship to the Property
Owners.
In addition:
Reliance [was] further placed on the losses which Dolphin Discovery may
suffer from the loss of visits of cruise ship guests to the Dolphinarium [my
emphasis] as well as loss of income and employment opportunities to
other ancillary service providers who are Anguillians, of the Dolphin
Discovery business which it is said results in a loss of revenue to the
Government of Anguilla. Counsel also urges that I take judicial notice of
the general slow down in the world economy and that of Anguilla. On this
basis, counsel argues that the Order is currently having an oppressive
effect on the people and [G]overnment of Anguilla and should be
discharged on this basis.
As noted earlier, nowhere in the proceedings did the Government attempt to
advance an argument to the effect that there has been no negative environmental
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impact.805 Nonetheless, Justice George-Creque concluded that the line of argument
advanced by the Government did not ―…afford a proper basis for the discharge of the
Order granted.‖806 The example of the dolphinarium and the line of argument advanced
by the Government of Anguilla, demonstrate how governments favour business efficacy
and the interests of industry developers over the protection of public interest, the
environment and the clear letter of the law. This clear abdication of public responsibility
caused much unrest amongst Anguillians. In relation to these events, an anonymous
blogger posed the following questions: 807
Why is it that the Gov't appears to place more interest in the ambitions and
aspirations of these foreign businesses or businessmen [than] concern for the
welfare of its own people? Money is not an end unto itself and should be
treated as a means to facilitate continued economic growth. In this respect, we
need to carefully consider the various programs and projects that are sent our
way. […] Who is profiting from these unilateral decisions? Is this another
corruption scheme where the GOA is again being used as pawns in a crooked
business venture to the detriment of Anguilla and its people?
In essence, the blogger has answered the very questions he/she posed. Therefore,
there is no need to satisfy the same. Noteworthy, several bloggers have also voiced
similar concerns under the same blog. 808 Clearly then, there is at least some portion of the
population who hold the belief that political power to allocate resources has continuously
been exercised inappropriately by the Government.
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The Ashton Marina Project in Saint Vincent and the Grenadines is another
example that gives some context to the picture of the OECS political governance
arrangement painted by the dolphinarium case study. The Ashton Lagoon is located on
the south coast of Union Island, a small island in the Grenadines. It supports a range of
important habitat types, which include mangroves, coral reefs, mudflats, seagrass beds
and salt ponds.809 These habitats supported several commercially important fish and
vertebrae and a variety of important flora and fauna including several rare or endangered
species. 810 Together, the lagoon and the nearby Frigate Island provided habitat for
wintering and migrating populations of seabirds, waterbirds, shorebirds and landbirds. 811
On 5 January 1987, the Ashton Lagoon was designated a Conservation Area under
schedule 11, regulation 20 of the Fisheries Act812 in recognition of its rich biodiversity
and ecological importance. Despite the protected status of the area, the government of
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines permitted the construction of a massive marina, hotel
and golf course project. Specifically, the project proposed to build a 300-boat marina in
the midst of the lagoon, a large condominium to be built on top of the outer reefs, and a
50 acre golf course to be laid over the mangrove. 813 As well, to complete this new
tourism development, a causeway was to be constructed connecting Union Island to
Frigate Island. As one might image the specifics of the project proposal required
extensive land reclamation.
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Prior to construction, it was recommended that an EIA of the area be carried
out.814 Although the Government‘s EIA gave extensive detail of the permanent and
irreversible damage to the Ashton Lagoon Conservation Area, the Government of Saint
Vincent and the Grenadines nevertheless gave consent for works to commence. 815 In fact,
the decision to permit development was made even though ―…the developers presented
no environmental impact assessment in support of [the] project… .‖ 816 In the context of
this subsection, political power to permit development of the Ashton Lagoon area is
legally vested in the State. Like the dolphinarium case study in Anguilla, the Ashton
Marina Project was also permitted in the face of strong local opposition, especially from
fishers, who felt that the project ―...would cause irreparable environmental and social
harm to their community. 817 The inescapable description of the political reality of the
Ashton Marina Project is that the consents process was dominated by the interests of the
developers and the potential economic benefit to the Government. Specifically, the
Government gave the developers permission to begin construction in an area of
ecological importance, against the will of the people, and regrettably, against the better
advice of their own EIA. In actuality, soon after construction began, the developer
declared bankruptcy and disappeared thereafter leaving behind a severely damaged
lagoon. And possibly, as a lesson to the Government of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines
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the developers also disappeared leaving the Government to service a massive loan which
the developers tricked the Government into guaranteeing financially. In relation to the
dolphinarium and noted above, an anonymous blogger asked: ―…is this another
corruption scheme where the GOA is again being used as pawns in a crooked business
venture to the detriment of its people?‖ Perhaps therefore, the Ashton Marina fiasco was
an illustration of governments ‗being used as pawns in a crooked business venture to the
detriment of the people.‘818 All that aside, today the Ashton Lagoon Conservation Area is
the subject of many restoration efforts.
It is clear from the above assessment that many stakeholders hold an interest in
the development of marine areas in the OECS region. It is also clear, that amongst those
stakeholders power to produce legally binding outcomes on consent applications is
concentrated in the hands of the State. Therefore, in the context of the Howlett
framework, it would appear that the political dimension in OECS countries is
characterized by traditional hierarchical governance. However, in practice, this Statedirected governance arrangement is vulnerable to pressures exerted by formally instituted
Non-State actors (industry developers). Therefore, in the context of the Howlett
framework, this dynamic has created movement along the horizontal axis of the political
dimension, ultimately creating a de facto plurilateral governance arrangement. This
governance arrangement is consistent with that of the UK Round 1 and 2 offshore wind
experience.
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6.5.2.2 The Institutional Dimension
The founding concept under this dimension is that ―[i]nstitutions set the framework
for the exercise of power.‖819 Here, Howlett et al. were concerned with the constitution
and composition of institutional structures used to exercise power. Institutions may be
formally or informally constituted and composed of state actors, non-state actors or both.
Essentially, in their view, these characteristics determine ―…the abilities of various state
and non-state actors to prevail in policy disputes and decisions, as well as the possibilities
for the choice of the policy instruments used to implement the mode of governance.‖ 820
Based on the assessment of the political dimension in the previous subsection, the prima
facie assumption can be made that the institutional arrangements that had the capacity to
make legally binding decisions and influence the outcome of applications for marine
development are typically characterized by formal establishment.
As it relates to State actors, their power to produce binding decisions on consents
applications was exercised through several governmental bodies or persons. In relation to
the dolphinarium, the governmental bodies and persons included: the relevant ministers
under the Beach Control Act, the Beach Protection Act and the Ports, Harbours and
Piers Act; the Building Board (Building Act); the Land Development Control Committee
(Land Development Control Act); and the Department of Lands and Surveys (Crown
Lands Act). These governmental bodies and persons determine whether a particular
dolphinarium project will be given consent for development. By extension, these
governmental bodies and persons would also preside on consent applications for other
marine works. Another characteristic of these governmental departments is that they were
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all established by acts of parliament. Therefore, the common trait among state actors is
that their power is exercised through governmental departments that are formally
established by acts of parliament, and are therefore empowered to produce legally
binding outcomes on consents applications.
As noted in the assessment of the political dimension above, there is a wide range
of stakeholders that hold an interest in the development of the marine area other than the
state. In fact, diversity in institutional arrangements is borne out in how these non-state
actors are organized.
Most obvious industry developers, like Dolphin Fantaseas, are typically formally
established institutions (corporate bodies). The company is a subsidiary of a larger
company which operates dolphinariums in other countries in the Caribbean and the rest of
the world. This formal establishment backed by financial capital and industry experience
has given Dolphin Fantaseas significant capacity as an institution to influence the
decision-making process.
By definition, the public is not, per se, formally instituted. Unlike the case in the
UK, there are no NIMBY organizations in the OECS region. However, as noted in the
political assessment above, the public has the potential to play an influential role in the
decision-making process for marine development through public protest and judicial
review. All the same, as was demonstrated by the Ashton Marina Project, the potential of
public protest is sometimes unable to match the strong influence of industry developers
and political priority. This becomes even more apparent on a simple review of the
influence of the public as statutory consultee during the EIA process for the marina. As
noted, there was strong public opposition to the Ashton Marina Project that was reflected
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in the government‘s EIA of the proposal. Nevertheless, the perceived benefit to be had
and the strong industry influence, trumped those concerns. In Anguilla, the initial
relocation of the dolphinarium to Road Bay, Sandy Ground was ‗approved‘ and was
allowed to begin construction without the commissioning of an EIA, which by law would
have required public consultation. Therefore, had it not been for the environmental
consciousness of the people of Sandy Ground, the public as a ‗statutory consultee‘ would
have never had an impact on that project. Even worse, as noted above, many criticized
the EIA process for the second dolphinarium relocation on the ground that it failed to
adequately involve the public. In sum, even if the public is given some semblance of
formal establishment as ‗statutory consultees,‘ it seems as though the EIA practice has
been to turn blind eyes to public concerns in furtherance of the benefit to be had from the
industry. Related to this point, in the Notice of Application821 for judicial review, the
applicants noted what they believed a flagrant irregularity in the EIA process. They note
that the EIA ―… was not compiled by a disinterested source. The EIA was compiled by
Applied Technology & Management, Inc. They are, it would seem, a reputable company,
but they build dolphinaria for commercial gain and cannot, therefore, be considered
independent.‖822
This section reviewed and characterized governmental institutional structures,
non-governmental environmental agencies, the public and industry institutional structures
in the context of the dolphinarium and Ashton Lagoon case studies. The conclusion that
can be drawn from this assessment is that formal establishment characterized the
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institutional arrangements that had the capacity to influence the outcome of consent
applications for development in the marine area. The governmental bodies and the
industry developers were all formally established, and therefore, best placed to influence
consents decisions. Most notably however, on the institutional dimension, the
government retained an important structural advantage in the consents process largely
due to its ownership of the sea bed and formal legislative control over activities in the
marine area. In practice, this structural advantage and legislative control tends to
overpower much of the capacity the general public and fishermen have as ‗statutory
consultees‘. Taken by themselves, fishers in the region are much like those in the UK:
some belong to a national fisheries organization, but the majority of them are simply lone
fishers. In this regard, the institutional arrangements retain some plurilateral features.
However, the Government was able to dominate the consents process by moving upwards
along the vertical axis of the Howlett et al. institutional dimension away from informality
towards more formal structures. Additionally, there has been very little movement along
the horizontal axis of the institutional dimension. In sum, the institutional dimension is
mainly representative of hierarchical governance. This governance arrangement is
consistent with that of the UK round 1 and 2 offshore wind experience.

6.5.2.3 The Regulatory Dimension
Power to make decisions on consents applications is legally concentrated in the
hands of the state and exercised through formally established institutions. This dynamic
has influenced the creation of a marine development consents regime that respects
traditional top-down hierarchical government control through laws and regulations. First,
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as is most obvious, the regulation of the dolphinarium was effected through existing
regimes that respected top-down hierarchical control through laws and regulations. This
fact remains despite the decision taken by the Government of Anguilla not to follow its
own procedures and laws for permitting activity on the foreshore and the floor of the
seabed. As noted by the Minister of Lands, ―…the licence to use the beach [for the
construction of a dolphinarium] is a new concept, the details of which is still being
developed."823 In relation to the Ashton Marina Project, the Government of Saint Vincent
and the Grenadines also used existing laws and regulations to permit the development.
Moreover, for quite some time, Dominica has been using existing laws and regulations to
permit hydropower development. Even today, hydropower is still comes under the
purview of the Electricity Supply Act.824 There has been no attempt to pass specific
legislation for the regulation of hydropower renewables. Essentially, therefore, the nature
of the regulatory regime is consistent with the notion of hard law – the upper end of the
vertical axis on the regulatory dimension. To recap, Howlett et al. describe the notion of
hard law as ―… synonymous with a state-centric, command and control mode of
regulation that imposes generally applicable obligations, articulated with a relatively high
degree of precision, that are directly enforceable through the courts.‖825 Noteworthy, the
respective EIAs by design and purpose were intended to incorporate some measure of
non-state actor participation in the consent process for offshore works. However, as has
been seen in the case of the dolphinarium, the Government neglected to carry out an EIA
for the Sandy Ground relocation. Further, in the preparation of the EIA for the second
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relocation at Blowing Point, many allege that the EIA failed to consult with stakeholders.
Nonetheless, the GOA accepted the EIA. In essence, governments do not always follow
its own procedure and rules pertaining to development in the marine area. Further, the
Ashton Lagoon illustrated that governments may at whim decide to ignore the EIAs
altogether even when completed for the specific purpose of aiding the decision-making
process. In sum, the hard law governance arrangement constrained the ability of non-state
actors to alter the policy-making process and the eventual binding outcome. As a result,
the regime is representative of hierarchical governance on the horizontal axis of Howlette
et al.‘s regulatory dimension.

6.5.3 Discussion of Findings and Adoption of Governance Lessons from the UK
In seeking to propose an effective governance arrangement for the regulation of
renewable ocean resources in the OECS, the new governance framework is a good device
for challenging policy-makers to think about what governance arrangement might
possibly work in the OECS and what governance arrangements might not work. By
challenging policy-makers to think about the local circumstances, it provides a rational
basis for transposing lessons learnt in other regimes. This is important, as one of the most
common pitfalls of comparative research is the fruitless exercise of comparing legal
solutions in one jurisdiction to legal problems of another jurisdiction where the sociocultural, political and economic contexts of those jurisdictions differ dramatically. In
other words, are the political, institutional and regulatory contexts in the OECS
sufficiently similar to justify transposing lessons from the UK offshore wind governance
arrangements?
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As noted at the outset of section 6.5 above, one way to begin answering this
question is to look at the current governance arrangement for regulating renewable ocean
resources in the OECS region and make a determination as to whether it bears similarities
with the UK case study. However, it has already been noted that there is no governance
arrangement in place for the regulation of these resources in the OECS. This is
unsurprising because thus far, there have been no projects in any of the OECS territories
that seek to harness the power of renewable ocean resources. As noted earlier, harnessing
the power of renewable ocean resources is a recent policy objective for the region. 826
Alternatively, however, policy-makers can justify transposition in the absence of issuespecific governance arrangements, from practices in related areas. The previous
subsections primarily outlined the governance arrangement used to develop the
dolphinarium industry in Anguilla. The new governance assessment also drew principles
from the political context of the Ashton Marina Project in Saint Vincent and the
Grenadines. In addition, the assessment also referenced the regulation of hydropower in
Dominica in support of a description of the OECS regulatory dimension. In essence, the
findings of the new governance assessment demonstrate that the political, institutional
and regulatory contexts in the OECS are akin to the Round 1 and 2 experiences in the
UK.
Firstly, it was found that the political dimension in OECS countries is
characterized by traditional hierarchical governance. Further, it was also found that, in
practice, this State-directed governance arrangement is vulnerable to pressures exerted by
formally instituted non-state actors (industry developers). Therefore, in the context of the
Howlett framework, this dynamic has created movement along the horizontal axis of the
826
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political dimension, ultimately creating a de facto plurilateral governance arrangement. 827
A review of Chapter 5 would confirm that the OECS political arrangement is consistent
with the Round 1 and 2 political arrangements. Secondly, as with Round 1 and 2 of the
British consents process, the institutions that have the capacity to exert influence over the
consent process in the OECS are formally established. Finally, consistent with Round 1
and 2 of the UK consents process, the nature of the regulatory dimension is also
representative of hard law approaches to governance. In other words, the OECS
regulatory regime is also representative of hierarchical governance on the horizontal axis
of Howlett et al.‘s regulatory dimension. Taken together, the similarities in each mode of
governance provide a rational basis for transposing legal approaches and solutions in the
UK to the development of a governance regime for regulating renewable ocean resources
in the OECS.
As noted earlier in this Chapter, in 2009 OECS countries directed energy
discussions towards the possibility of tapping into their ocean energy potential. Added to
this focus, the region has had the principle of sustainable development as their defining
developmental objective for quite some time. Clearly then, if sustainable development is
the defining objective for all OECS Member States, the political, institutional and
regulatory efforts to tap into the offshore energy potential cannot begin as it has in the
UK. As Chapter 5 demonstrates, the British experience is that the Round 1 and 2
political, institutional and regulatory efforts to regulate offshore wind produced
unsustainable outcomes. It follows then, that because the governance arrangements in the
OECS and the UK are similar, if the same arrangement is used for regulating renewable
ocean resources in the OECS, there is a high probability that the regime would not make
827
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positive contributions towards sustainability. In other words, the OECS Member States
would need to adopt a different governance approach to Round 1 and 2, if the intention is
to develop renewable ocean resources in furtherance of the principle of sustainable
development. The issue that must now be dealt with is whether the British Round 3
regime as is, is wholly appropriate for the OECS or whether the Round 3 regime would
require some modification, if it is to fare well as an effective governance arrangement in
the OECS.
It would be helpful to recount the transitions in the governance arrangements from
Round 1 to Round 3 as they properly explain why the Round 3 regime would be most
appropriate for contributing towards sustainable development. Among other things, the
transitions from Round 1 to Round 3 demonstrate one fundamental point, i.e.,
hierarchical governance of offshore renewable resources does not seem to work. The
dolphinarium case study demonstrates the unsatisfactory effects of hierarchical
arrangements. As with Round 1 and 2, where political power is concentrated in the hands
of the state, the reality has been that industry developers are easily positioned to influence
the exercise of that power to the detriment of the environment and the people who rely
upon it. Chapter 2 made mention of the argument by New Governance scholars that the
social trait of non-state actors would influence more effective rules, approaches and
solutions to the allocation of societal resources. One inescapable interpretation is that
hierarchical control means that those normally affected by government decisions seldom
have the capacity or opportunity to exert some influence over the decision-making
process. In other words, in the context of Gibson et al.‘s core requirements for
sustainability, hierarchical arrangements tend to restrict progress on the principle of
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socio-ecological civility and democratic governance. Taking all of the foregoing into
consideration, hierarchical control represented development for the people and not
development by the people - a restriction that New Governance scholars would also
frown upon. Herein lies the main problem with the Round 1 and 2 governance
arrangements and by extension the current framework in the OECS.
However, the transition between the Round 2 and 3 regimes demonstrates a
conceptual shift away from governance arrangements that conform to the tradition of
hierarchical control. This concept is a favourable approach that policy-makers should
adopt in the development of a governance regime for regulating offshore renewable
resources in the OECS region. In considering whether the Round 3 regime would require
some modification for use in the OECS, it is helpful to set out a brief description of the
changes in the modes of governance that forced a shift away from the tradition of
hierarchical governance. However, firstly it is to be recalled that unlike the Round 2
transition, the Round 3 model of governance was established through the creation of
specific legislation. At present, the Planning Act 2008 and the Marine and Coastal
Access Act 2009 represent the new legal frameworks within which decisions will be
made. Therefore, as it pertains to the regulatory dimension, the tradition of top-down
hierarchical control through laws and regulations continued. What was changed however,
was the fragmented approach to marine management. For instance, the MCAA sought to
modernize, integrate and simplify the consent process by consolidating into a single
licensing decision consideration of environmental, human health and navigational factors.
This licence is to be granted by an independent organization, the Marine Management
Organization (MMO), created for this purpose. The Act also transfers several functions
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relating to marine management (sea fisheries, nature conservation, renewable energy,
etc.) to the MMO. At this point, it is necessary to emphasize the fact that the Round 3
model of governance under the MCCA regulates all renewable energy activity in the
marine environment and not just offshore wind. Therefore, there is a wider governance
lessons that policy-makers in the OECS may adopt given that the regime transcends all
forms of offshore renewables. In essence, the transfer of these functions (sea fisheries,
nature conservation, renewable energy, etc.) drew together into a single licensing
decision consideration of the interests of other users of the sea. The governance lesson
learnt is that traditional top-down hierarchical control through laws and regulations is not
a faulting initiative in and of itself so long as such control through laws and regulations
adopts an integrated approach to marine management. This governance lesson draws
inspiration from the fact that conceptually, sustainability is a challenge to business as
usual practices and therefore, the use of existing regimes would be ill suited for making
positive contributions towards sustainable development in the OECS.
In relation to the political dimension, the problem in the Round 1 and Round 2
UK regime is that power was concentrated in the hands of the State, which was under
industry influence. To alleviate this problem, the British government through the
Planning Act and the MCAA, removed from the State the legal power to make decisions
on consents applications, and vested it in central corporate bodies that were created to be
independent of the government. Conceptually, the purposeful vesting of power in
independent establishments serves to insulate the new decision-makers from the pressures
of industry, thereby, weakening industry‘s influence over the process. Given the results,
for an effective governance arrangement in the OECS, it would be prudent to mimic the
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Round 3 arrangement by placing power to make legally binding decisions in a body
corporate independent of the Government.
It is true and undisputed that the newly created corporate bodies are, by the clear
provisions of the Acts, independent of the Crown. 828 It is important to note however, that
a proper consideration of the realities of the Round 3 regime in practice may blur the
strict conclusion that the newly established corporate bodies are actually independent of
the government of the day. By way of example, Chapter 5 noted that the cozy relations
between the MMO and the Secretary of State do not make the MMO as independent as
the analysis concludes. By sections 14 and 15 of schedule 1 of the MCAA, the Chief
Executive of the MMO is appointed by the Secretary of State, so too is the Scientific
Adviser. Additionally, the membership of the MMO are to be not fewer than 5, nor more
than 8 other persons who are to be appointed by the Secretary of State829 and serve a term
not more than 5 years830. Though the MMO is to be funded by the Government, it is
authorized by section 33 to borrow money from the Secretary of State or from private
sources as it may require for meeting its obligations and carrying out its functions. While
the MMO has the option of borrowing from private sources it may only do so if the
Secretary of State consents. In practice, these realities have the potential to reflect
government commitment to promote wind energy development in the consents process.
Obviously, therefore, where the political dimension is concerned the Round 3 model is
not foolproof. Given the control of the government over the MMO, there is built into the
Round 3 model some room to continue business as usual political practices. In other
words, the process of assessment of eligibility of projects may likely continue to
828
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experience a balance of influence that may still favour those with the stronger leverage.
Again, it is to be recalled at this time, that each government, through the Marine Policy
Statements under the MCAA, prioritizes its goals for sustainable development; a concept
that is economic-development oriented as it is environmental and resources protection
and conservation-minded. Possibly then, the OECS would need a different approach
which through learning from the British must avoid the potential pitfall to better ensure
that some semblance of sustainability would be accomplished in the development of
offshore renewable resources. On the other hand, it is submitted here that the structure of
the MCAA, which centralizes, essentially, the overall use of the marine area under the
MMO gives the organization tremendous power. Ironically, the MMO is also authorized
to enter into agreement with other agencies, including private agencies, to have them
carry out its mandates as set out in the Marine Policy Statements and Marine Plan. For
the OECS region, this power carries both a financial and technical benefit. For instance,
the MMO may conclude agreements with relevant bodies that have been exercising
existing power concerning the various sectors brought under the Act, to authorize them to
do so under its delegation. Delegation therefore has the benefit of drawing on the
knowledge capital of these departments that have a long history in relation to the
management of their respective sectors. A conclusion inclusive of practical realities
would state that though the political arrangement under the MCAA is not foolproof, as a
compromise the MMO‘s power is very huge but also potentially unwieldy.
Apart from shifting the governance arrangement from development for the people
to development by the people, what makes the Round 3 model effective, and thus more
attractive for the OECS region, is the introduction of duties to consult under the
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legislations.831 As with the dolphinarium case study, under the Round 1 and 2 British
regimes, the institutions that had the capacity to influence the consent process were
formally established. Those formally established institutions were mostly industry
professionals. The creation of onerous and structured consultation duties under the
legislations seek to diversify the institutions that have the capacity to influence outcomes,
by empowering a range of non-state actors to have some leverage under the exercise of its
institutional jurisdiction. Further, in relation to the fact that there is still some room in the
UK model to continue business as usual political practices, the onerous and structured
consultation duties empower non-state actors to act as a potential check and balance on
the exercise of power by the MMO. In sum, the adoption of lessons from the Round 3
governance arrangement in the OECS would ensure that marine renewables in the region
are regulated in a manner that makes positive contributions towards sustainability. In
sum, the major recommended changes would be the vesting of political power in an
independent body corporate and the adoption of integrated regulatory instruments backed
by structured consultation duties.
Lastly, the Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) experience in Round 2
was a lesson in everything not to do when carrying out SEAs and by extension EIAs.
Generally, the SEA was considered to be a rushed and cosmetic exercise. The British
Government completed the entire SEA process in the space of five short months. Having
rushed the SEA process in the interests of industry developers and business efficacy, the
British government alienated many stakeholders and the public by failing to give an early
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streaming of the decision process carries the risk of alienating stakeholders and the public – a risk which
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and effective opportunity within appropriate time frames for stakeholders and the public
to express their opinion. This is an unwelcome state of affairs as one of the fundamental
purposes of the SEA was to empower actors other than the State. By their very nature,
many non-state actors have limited capacity to understand and respond to issues raised
during consultation on matters of this nature requiring some functional understanding of
what is at stake. As such, the allotted minimum of four weeks for consultation did little to
empower them. Instead, it further weakened their influence over the consents process.
Moreover, the rush to complete the SEA also had the undesirable result of producing an
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) that failed to consider a number of core issues
including the cumulative impacts. The SEA experience also demonstrates the danger in
concentrating power to make legally binding decisions on consent applications in the
hands of the State. Under the Round 2 regime, the SEA process was rushed to advance
State goals and targets, but more so, to provide an environment of business efficacy for
developers. Therefore, the exercise of power by the State in relation to the manner in
which the SEA was conducted came under the influence of industry developers. The EIA
experience regarding the dolphinarium in Anguilla deserves brief mention. In the first
relocation process, the EIA process was circumvented to meet the developer‘s deadlines
to evacuate the facility at Barnes Bay. Simply put, the lesson from the UK SEA
experience is that environmental impact studies should be commissioned on terms,
conditions and processes that conform to some international standard rather than the
demands of the relevant and interested industry.
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6.6

Conclusion
This Chapter briefly outlined the energy context in the OECS region by touching

upon the regions‘ supply and consumption context, strategy and legal requirements. The
defining characteristic of the energy supply and consumption context in the OECS is that
the region has a high-dependence on imported fossil fuels. This dependence is directly
linked to the lack of oil, natural gas, and coal resources in the region. The grim
consequences of this chronic dependence on imported energy in the OECS countries, is
reflected in the fact that some countries have had to spend as much as half of their export
revenues on imported fuels. Further, the added burden of import dependence in the region
is the risk to energy security. Compounding the energy supply and demand context in the
region is the threat of climate change aided to some extent by the combustion of these
imported fossil fuels. These energy challenges have led to an increasing recognition that
what the countries in the OECS need desperately is a lowered reliance on imported fossil
fuels through the development of clean and renewable sources of indigenous energy. In
furtherance of this mandate, attention has been directed to the possibility of tapping into
the energy potential of offshore renewable resources in the region. However, standing in
the way of the development of renewables is the absence of national and regional energy
policies as well as the absence of firm regulatory regimes.
The body of the Chapter sought to develop a rational basis for appling lessons
learnt in Chapter 5 towards the creation of an effective governance arrangement in the
OECS for marine renewables. To do this, a new governance assessment was carried out
for the OECS region drawing mainly on a dolphinarium case study from Anguilla. In
describing the governance arrangement in the OECS, the new governance assessment
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also drew principles from the political context of the Ashton Marina Project in Saint
Vincent and the Grenadines. In addition, the assessment also referenced the regulation of
hydropower in Dominica in support of a description of the OECS regulatory dimension.
In essence, the findings of the new governance assessment demonstrated that the
political, institutional and regulatory contexts in the OECS are akin to the Round 1 and 2
experiences in the United Kingdom. Thereafter, the lessons learnt from the British
offshore wind experiences in Chapter 5 were used to guide recommendations for the
creation of an effective governance arrangement for offshore renewable resources in the
OECS. Specifically, the Chapter grappled with the issue of whether the British Round 3
regime as is, is wholly appropriate for the OECS or whether the Round 3 regime would
require some modification, if it is to fare well as an effective governance arrangement in
the OECS. The conclusion was that the Round 3 regime is an effective governance
arrangement for making positive contributions towards sustainable development and
should serve as a model for the OECS region. Firstly, the Round 3 arrangement sought to
cure the main problem with the Round 1 and 2 regimes, that is, it reversed the trend of
hierarchical control by shifting political power to independent corporate bodies (MMO
and IPC). As with the Round 1 and 2 regimes, the OECS governance assessment
demonstrated how governments favour business efficacy and the interests of industry
developers over the protection of public interests, the environment and the clear letter of
the law. However, the entire tradition of hierarchical control was not displaced. In fact,
under the Round 3 model, the regulatory and institutional dimensions retained their
hierarchical control. On the regulatory dimension, the major governance lesson for the
OECS region is that traditional top-down hierarchical control through laws and
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regulations is not a faulting initiative so long as such control through laws and regulations
adopts an integrated approach to marine management. In other words, the passing of
integrated legislation for the marine environment under the Round 3 model, avoided the
peril of unsustainable development associated with piecemeal approaches to regulating
the marine environment. Further, on the institutional dimension, the governance lesson
for the OECS region is that although desirable, the character of the institutions do not
necessarily need changing, so long as the regime introduces structured duties to consult.
In the main, these duties to consult are necessary to balance the influence of formally
established non-state actors (industry) in the regime against informally established nonstate actors.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
CONCLUSION

7.1 Thesis Overview, Conclusions and Recommendations
Our oceans cover over 70% of the Earth‘s surface. From the beginning of time,
the utilization of this huge body of water and the diverse marine resources that it supports
has made life on earth possible for mankind. Early uses of the ocean were generally
confined to subsistence fishing and trade and navigation. Today, the oceans are pressured
to provide a variety of services for the advancement of individual livelihoods and world
economies. These services include food and recreational opportunities; the development
of coastal and marine tourism economies; the facilitation of navigation, shipping and
commerce activities; access to immense sources of usable energy (such as oil and gas)
and other non-living resources (minerals). The sea also serves as a depository for the
waste products generated through our contemporary global socio-economic activities.
Above all, the oceans provide the invaluable service of regulating our climate and
weather. The variety of services offered underscores the importance of the seas to
mankind. If the expectation is that present and future generations will continue to benefit
from our dynamic oceans and seas, then the maintenance of safe, healthy and productive
seas and the attainment of principled ocean governance are of even greater importance.
The seemingly endless uses and services of the oceans have spawned a modern
culture of exploration and exploitation. This pervasive culture is aided and abetted by
advances in technology, excessive consumption patterns, and the increasing demands of
growing coastal populations and economies. Coastal overdevelopment and excessive
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marine exploitation pressures have empowered anthropogenic influences that
fundamentally change the natural order of coastal and marine ecosystems. The
cumulative

pressures

of

over-fishing,

pollution,

climate

change

and

other

environmentally harmful activities are bearing down on the marine environment. Simply
put, the health of our seas is at risk. So too is its capacity to provide the services that
contribute to human well-being, economic security and sustainable development for
present and future generations. If left unchecked, the severity of these risks will be
amplified as our technologies advance and as human needs, values and expectations of
the oceans continue to change and increase.
Over the past few years, there has been significant progress to develop
commercial scale operations of ocean energy. Today, the ocean is on the threshold of
providing a reliable base-load source of renewable energy on a commercial scale. 832 It is
safe to say that renewable energy is now part of that long list of services we expect from
the oceans and seas. Typically, when new values, expectations and services, such as the
generation of renewable energy, are demanded from the oceans and seas, there is a clear
mandate to guide their deployment, and in particular, to develop new regulatory regimes
where they do not exist, and revise existing arrangements where they exist.833 The key
however, is to pursue these mandates in a manner that ―…suitably deal[s] with the
environmental impacts of ocean energy projects.‖834
The recent discussions at the 2009 Caribbean Renewable Energy Forum indicate
that in the very near future, the possibility of tapping into the energy potential of
renewable marine resources will be pushed to primacy on the energy agenda‘s of OECS
832
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Member States. The region lacks laws and policies for regulating the development and
use of these resources. Therefore, it has been the purpose of this thesis to propose a
governance arrangement that meets the priority of sustainable development for the
regulation of offshore renewable resources in the OECS region. To do this, the study has
sought to draw lessons from the United Kingdom, the jurisdiction Freedom-Kai Phillips
describes as ―…clearly ahead of most in terms of legislation pertaining to renewable
energy broadly and ocean-based renewables particularly.‖835
In seeking to extrapolate governance lessons from the UK‘s offshore wind
governance regimes, Chapter 2 developed a two-tiered analytical framework to assist in a
review and assessment of the effectiveness of the UK case study. The first tier of the
analytical framework is the New Governance Approach as articulated by Michael
Howlett, Jeremy Rayner & Chris Tollefson. The concept of this approach is particularly
useful for policy makers and regulators. For one, the approach is not about adopting or
advocating a certain course of action, procedure or method to solving public problems.
Rather, it is a way of taking stock of political practices, institutional structures and
regulatory instruments and deciding where amongst these dimensions the power to make
decisions respecting societal resources is concentrated. In other words, the first tier of the
analytical framework is that it provides a means by which regulators may understand,
analyze, and thereafter, critique a particular governance arrangement. This is a useful first
step when trying to create new governance regimes or revise those already in existence,
as it opens the door to understanding the political, institutional and regulatory nature of
the governance arrangement under study. The only probable drawback to Michael
Howlett et al.‘s framework is that it stops at an evaluation of the decision-making process
835
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that leads to decisions and substantive outcomes. The framework fails to indicate what a
substantively good outcome would be. For any policy-maker or regulator, this would
necessarily be their focus.
The second tier of the analytical framework was, therefore, created to pick up the
slack of the first tier. In essence, the second tier is a substantive standard against which
the effectiveness of offshore renewable energy regimes can be measured. As Chapter 2
notes, many standards are available to measure the effectiveness of offshore renewable
energy regimes. Because these regimes impact ocean use and management, suitable
criteria for effectiveness can be located in principles that advocate certain standards for
stewardship of the oceans and seas. Chapter 2 noted that statements of principles for
ocean governance can be found in a variety of sources: directives and protocols on good
governance, international agreements, declarations and codes of conduct. Some of these
principles include sustainable development, integration, precaution, the ecosystem
approach and community-based management. Any of these principles may serve as
legitimate criteria for measuring the effectiveness of substantive outcomes of offshore
renewable energy regulation. Ultimately, the core requirements for progress towards
sustainable development developed by Gibson et al., was chosen as the second tier of the
analytical framework.
Chapter 5 presented the case study of the development of the offshore wind
regulatory regime in the United Kingdom. To date, there have been three identifiable
regulatory attempts to establish the manner in which offshore wind technologies would
be allowed to enter the UK marine environment. Each regulatory approach coincided
with the UK government‘s decision to deploy a new round of wind projects, that is, a
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different consents process was used to approve Round 1, Round 2, and Round 3 projects
respectively. In chronological order, Chapter 5 outlines the consents approaches used to
approve project applications under each round of development. Each consent process was
then considered in light of Howlett et al.‘s three-dimensional new governance framework.
Thereafter, Gibson et al.‘s core requirements for progress towards sustainability were
used to measure the effectiveness of the substantive outcomes of each consent process.
Finally, on an evaluation of all three regulatory regimes, Chapter 5 concluded that in light
of the Gibson et al. criteria, the current regime under the Planning Act 2008 and the
Marine and Coastal Access Act 2009 holds the greatest potential to make positive
contributions to the sustainable development of the offshore wind industry. In other
words, Chapter 5 concluded that the Round 3 model of governance arrangement was the
most effective regime because it holds the greatest potential to rank high on the Gibson et
al.‘s criteria for sustainability.
Chapter 6 sought to apply the governance lessons from the study of all three
offshore regulatory regimes in the UK to the development of an effective governance
arrangement for renewable marine resources in the OECS. One of the most common
pitfalls of comparative research is the fruitless exercise of comparing legal solutions in
one jurisdiction to legal problems of another jurisdiction where the socio-cultural,
political and economic contexts of those jurisdictions differ dramatically. Therefore,
much of Chapter 6 was dedicated to demonstrating that the political, institutional and
regulatory contexts in the OECS are sufficiently similar to justify transposing lessons
from the UK. As there is no marine renewable energy governance arrangement regarding
renewable marine energy resources in the OECS, a new governance assessment of the
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dolphinarium industry in Anguilla was used to demonstrate that the political, institutional
and regulatory governance arrangements for new marine developments are akin to the
Round 1 and Round 2 governance arrangements in the UK.
Briefly, the results of the new governance assessment of the dolphinarium
industry are as follows. First, the political dimension in OECS countries is characterized
by traditional hierarchical governance. However, in practice, this state-directed
governance arrangement is vulnerable to pressures exerted by formally instituted nonstate actors (industry developers). Therefore, in the context of the Howlett framework,
this dynamic has created movement along the horizontal axis of the political dimension,
ultimately creating a de facto plurilateral governance arrangement. A review of Chapter 5
would confirm that the OECS political arrangement is consistent with the Round 1 and 2
political arrangements. Second, as with Round 1 and 2 of the British consents processes,
the institutions that could exert influence over the consent process in the OECS, are
formally established. Finally, consistent with Round 1 and 2 of the British consents
process, the nature of the regulatory dimension is also representative of hard law
approaches to governance. In other words, the OECS regulatory regime is also
representative of hierarchical governance on the horizontal axis of Howlett et al.‘s
regulatory dimension. Taken together, the similarities in each mode of governance
provide a rational basis for transposing legal approaches and solutions in the UK to the
development of a governance regime for regulating renewable ocean resources in the
OECS.
The OECS region has had the principle of sustainable development as its defining
developmental objective for quite some time. Chapter 6 reasoned, that if sustainable

230

development is the defining objective for all OECS Member States, the political,
institutional and regulatory efforts to tap into the offshore energy potential cannot begin
as it did in the UK. Chapter 5 demonstrates the British experience, to the effect that the
Round 1 and 2 political, institutional and regulatory efforts to regulate offshore wind
produced unsustainable outcomes. It follows then, that because the governance
arrangements in the OECS and the UK are similar, if the same arrangement is used for
regulating renewable ocean resources in the OECS, there is a high probability that the
regime would not make positive contributions towards sustainability. In other words, the
OECS Member States must adopt a different governance approach to Round 1 and 2, if
the intention is to develop renewable ocean resources in a manner that furthers
sustainable development. In this regard, the major recommendation was that policy
makers and regulators in the OECS must adopt lessons from the British Round 3 regime
and process.
To recap, among other things, the transitions from Round 1 to Round 3
demonstrate the fundamental point that hierarchical governance of offshore renewable
resources does not seem to work. Similarly, the dolphinarium case study demonstrated
the unsatisfactory effects of hierarchical arrangements in the OECS region. As with
Round 1 and 2, where political power is concentrated in the hands of the state, the reality
has been that industry developers are easily positioned to influence the exercise of that
power to the detriment of the environment and the people who rely upon it. Chapter 2
mentioned the argument by New Governance scholars that the social trait of non-state
actors would influence more effective rules, approaches and solutions to the allocation of
societal resources. One inescapable interpretation is that hierarchical control means that
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those normally affected by government decisions seldom have the capacity or opportunity
to exert the requisite influence over the decision-making process. Therefore, in line with
Gibson et al.‘s core requirements for sustainability, hierarchical arrangements tend to
restrict progress on the principle of socio-ecological civility and democratic governance.
Taking all of the foregoing into consideration, hierarchical control represented
development for the people and not development by the people - a restriction that New
Governance scholars would also frown upon. Herein lies the main problem with the
Round 1 and 2 governance arrangements and by extension the current framework in the
OECS. Therefore, the first governance lesson suggested for regulators and policy makers
in the OECS is that hierarchical governance of offshore renewable resources must be
eschewed.
However, the transition between the Round 2 and 3 regimes demonstrates a
conceptual shift away from governance arrangements that conform to the tradition of
hierarchical control. This concept is a favourable approach that policy-makers should
adopt in the development of a governance regime for regulating offshore renewable
resources in the OECS region. First, unlike the Round 2 transition, the Round 3 model of
governance was established through the creation of specific legislation. At present, the
Planning Act 2008 and MCAA represent the new legal frameworks within which
decisions will be made. Therefore, as it pertains to the regulatory dimension, the tradition
of top-down hierarchical control through laws and regulations continued. What changed
however, was the fragmented approach to marine management. For instance, the MCAA
sought to modernize, integrate and simplify the consent process by consolidating into a
single licensing decision consideration of environmental, human health and navigational
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factors. This licence is to be granted by an independent organization, the MMO, created
for this purpose. The Act also transfers several functions relating to marine management
(sea fisheries, nature conservation, renewable energy, etc.) to the MMO. It should,
however, be emphasized that the Round 3 model of governance under the MCCA
regulates all renewable energy activity in the marine environment and not just offshore
wind. Therefore, there are wider governance lessons that policy-makers in the OECS may
adopt given that the regime transcends all forms of offshore renewable resources. In
essence, the transfer of these functions (sea fisheries, nature conservation, renewable
energy, etc.) drew together into a single licensing decision consideration of the interests
of other users of the sea. The second governance lesson recommended for the OECS
region is that traditional top-down hierarchical control through laws and regulations is not
a faulting initiative in and of itself so long as it adopts an integrated approach to marine
management. This governance lesson draws from the fact that conceptually, sustainability
is a challenge to ‗business as usual‘ practices and therefore, the use of existing regimes
would be ill suited for making positive contributions towards sustainable development in
the OECS.
In relation to the political dimension, the problem in the Round 1 and Round 2
British regime is that power was concentrated in the hands of the State, which was under
industry influence. To alleviate this problem, the British government through the
Planning Act and the MCAA, removed from the State the legal power to make decisions
on consents applications, and vested it in central corporate bodies that were created to be
independent of the government. Conceptually, the purposeful vesting of power in
independent establishments serves to insulate the new decision-makers from the pressures
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of industry. This weakens industry‘s influence over the process. Thus, for an effective
governance arrangement in the OECS, the third governance lesson is that it would be
prudent to mimic the Round 3 arrangement by placing power to make legally binding
decisions in a body corporate independent of the Government. Note however, that a
proper consideration of the realities of this arrangement may indicate that the corporate
bodies are not as independent as the analysis concludes, and so, there is still some room
to continue business as usual practices. On the other hand, it is submitted here that the
structure of the MCAA, which centralizes, essentially, the overall use of the marine area
under the MMO gives the organization tremendous power. The MMO may enter into
agreement with other agencies, including private agencies, to have them carry out its
mandates as set out in the Marine Policy Statements and Marine Plan. For the OECS
region, this power carries both a financial and technical benefit. For instance, the MMO
may to conclude agreements with relevant bodies that have been exercising existing
power concerning the various sectors brought under the Act, to authorize them to do so
under its delegation. Delegation therefore has the benefit of drawing on the knowledge
capital of these departments that have a long history in relation to the management of
their respective sectors. A conclusion that accounts for the practical realities in issue
would state that though the political arrangement under the MCAA is not foolproof, as a
compromise, the MMO‘s power is very huge but also potentially unwieldy.
Apart from shifting the governance arrangement from development for the people
to development by the people, what makes the Round 3 model effective, and thus more
attractive for the OECS region, is the introduction of duties to consult under the
legislations. As with the dolphinarium case study, under the Round 1 and 2 British
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regimes, the institutions that had the capacity to influence the consent process were
formally established and, mostly, they are industry professional institutions. The intent
behind creating onerous and structured consultation duties under the legislations is to
diversify the institutions that have the capacity to influence outcomes by empowering a
range of non-state actors to have some leverage under the exercise of institutional
jurisdiction. Further, in relation to the fact that there is still some room in the UK model
to continue ‗business as usual‘ political practices, the consultation duties empower nonstate actors to act as a potential check and balance on the exercise of power by the MMO.
The adoption of lessons from the Round 3 governance arrangement in the OECS would
ensure that marine renewable resources in the region are regulated in a manner that
makes positive contributions towards sustainability. In sum, for an effective governance
arrangement in this sector in the OECS, regulators should vest political power in an
independent body corporate and adopt integrated regulatory instruments that prescribe
structured consultation duties.
Additionally, the Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) experience in
Round 2 was a lesson in everything not to do when carrying out SEAs and, by extension,
Environmental Impact Assessments (EIA). Generally, the SEA conducted was considered
to be a rushed and cosmetic exercise. The British Government completed the entire
process in a space of five short months, and this, in the interests of industry developers
and business efficacy. This alienated many stakeholders and the public who were denied
an early and effective opportunity within appropriate time frames to express their
opinions. The process thus failed to fulfill one of its fundamental purposes, which was to
empower actors other than the State. By their very nature, many non-state actors have
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limited capacity to understand and respond to issues on matters of this nature raised
during consultation, that require some functional understanding of what is at stake. The
allotted minimum of four weeks for consultation did little to empower them. Instead, it
further weakened their influence over the consents process. The rushed SEA process also
had the undesirable result of producing an incomprehensive Environmental Impact
Statement (EIS) that failed to consider a number of core issues including cumulative
impacts. The SEA experience also demonstrates the danger in concentrating power to
make legally binding decisions on consent applications in the hands of the State. Under
the Round 2 regime, the process advanced State goals and targets, and provided an
environment of business efficacy for the industry developers that strongly influenced its
course. By way of a brief cross-reference to the EIA experience regarding the
dolphinarium in Anguilla, it must be noted that in the first relocation process, that process
was also circumvented to meet the developer‘s deadlines to evacuate the facility at
Barnes Bay. So, the lesson from the UK SEA experience is that environmental impact
studies should be commissioned on terms, conditions and processes that conform to some
international standard rather than the demands of the relevant and interested industry.

7.2 General Conclusions on Conditions for Effective Ocean Governance
The main purpose of this study is to propose a governance framework for the
regulation of renewable marine resources in the OECS. Beyond this, it has a wider
purpose to look at general conditions or effective ocean governance via the context of
renewable energy development. In this regard, what this thesis demonstrates is that strict
hierarchical governance of the marine environment is not a desirable condition for
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effective ocean governance. This point accords with the modern concept of ‗ocean
governance‘ outlined in Chapter 2 of the study. Chapter 2 noted that academics proffer
the view that ‗ocean governance‘ goes beyond traditional command and control
approaches to regulating and influencing human behaviour in relation to the ocean. The
other dimension or characteristic of the concept advanced by Rothwell & VanderZwaag
embrace a more interactive decision making process which not only incorporates
―…government agencies and departments but a broader range of participants including
the private sector, scientists, community groups, non-governmental organizations,
academics, First Nations and others.‖836
It is well accepted that ‗ocean governance‘ is primarily concerned with the
management of stakeholder activities in coastal and marine areas. 837 However, the
concept of ‗ocean governance‘ necessarily goes beyond the ambit of simply mitigating
conflict of use inevitabilities in the marine environment. In fact, the justification for the
management of stakeholder activities in ocean spaces is mainly two-fold: to maximize the
benefits that may be derived from the resource and non-resource use of the ocean, while
ensuring the ocean‘s long-term viability by conserving and protecting ocean habitat and
marine life. To balance these objectives, the evolving trend in ocean governance favours
interactive decision making over traditional regulation. A core condition of effective
ocean governance therefore, is a strong presence of human perceptions on the value of
ocean uses. In sum, through the study of marine renewable resources development, this
thesis generally demonstrates that strict hierarchical governance of the marine
environment is not a desirable condition for effective ocean governance.

836
837

VanderZwaag, ―Towards Principled Ocean Governance‖, supra note 72.
Sutherland, ―Issues in Governance of Marine Spaces,‖ supra note 67 at 7.
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This thesis has proposed that the OECS region adopt governance lessons from the
UK Round 3 Model of governance. In this regard, it is necessary to note that this model
of governance might need modification or improvement as experience grows and as
familiarity is gained with other regulatory regimes elsewhere in the world as they emerge.
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